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ABSTRACT
In the world today, software is everywhere. Thus, maintaining the assurance that the soft-
ware a person is using is safe and of high quality is imperative. Software for controlling a
plant or production facility is often placed in a programmable logic controller (PLC), a ro-
bust and reliable embedded controller. Currently, manual testing, which often turns out to
be sensitive to errors, is generally used to ensure the quality and safety of PLC programs.
Use of model checking for PLC programs could alleviate this problem of error sensitivity by
exploring all possible states of the software. An often-discussed challenge is that of the state
space explosion when model checking PLC programs, for example. This research focuses
on the idea that the hierarchical structure of Siemens PLC programs can be leveraged to
apply compositional model checking. Current studies demonstrate the model checking of
small lab test scale case studies, and only a handful of studies reveal the model checking of
an industrial-sized PLC program in case studies. None of the studies apply compositional
model checking to PLC programs. This research presents a novel approach to model check-
ing PLC programs through the addition of compositional reasoning to the model checking
of industrial-sized Siemens PLC programs. The presented approach demonstrates success-
ful compositional verification of an industrial-sized PLC program.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Currently, people’s lives are frequently influenced by software in a large diversity of context.
Software is used in smartwatches, cars, houses and many more items that individuals inter-
act with daily. Industries also use software (e.g., to produce food, cars and other consumer
items as well as for the supply of fresh drinking water and electricity). For a large part,
these industries rely on programmable logic controllers (PLCs)1 and their corresponding
software programs to control the diverse equipment in the field or on production lines [3].
The assurance of quality and safety of industrial software is of utmost importance, and
model checking software can contribute to this. Correct implementation of software func-
tionality while ensuring the absence of bugs is important to maintain high quality and guar-
antee the safety of people and the environment. Model checking methods for computer
applications are more common than the formal verification of PLC programs. Currently,
no commercial tools are available for model checking of PLC programs. However, many
studies have been conducted concerning model checking of PLC programs [18].
1.1. MOTIVATION
Currently, assurance for quality and safety of PLC programs is generally achieved by manual
testing, where unlike model checking, certain fault states can remain undiscovered. The
manual testing of PLC programs requires ample time and effort to eventually obtain only a
partial assurance of quality and safety. Such PLC systems may have hundreds of inputs and
outputs. A great advantage to model checking is the formal basis with which all states of
the model can be explored. Thus, model checking can provide a complete view regarding
the quality and safety of PLC programs.
A frequently recurring challenge with model checking is the state space explosion; this
also applies to the model checking of PLC programs. A rapidly expanding state space be-
cause of the addition of a small number of extra inputs or outputs is a clear example of
the state space explosion. This is also reflected in related work, where case studies are of-
ten small lab tests [16, 17, 25, 34] conducted only once with a large industrial real-life PLC
program [7, 8].
1.2. CONTRIBUTION
Clear and structured PLC programs often utilize hierarchical and modular programming
methods. An example of a hierarchical method is presented in the ISA88 standard, which is
also commonly used in Siemens PLC programs. The use of these hierarchical programming
methods can accomplish modularity of PLC programs. A hierarchical structure helps in
dividing the PLC program into smaller pieces, each with its own responsibility. This in turn
enables a PLC program with low coupling and thus high modularity.
This research focuses on the idea that this hierarchical and modular structure of Siemens
PLC programs can be leveraged to apply compositional reasoning when model checking
PLC programs. By using compositional model checking, one large model is divided into
multiple sub-models for verification. This divide-and-conquer principle is used for coun-
1According to a Siemens salesman, their PLCs are used in at least the following markets (although this is not
an exhaustive list): mechanical engineering industry, chemistry, petro-chemistry, offshore markets, food
and beverage, automotive, textile processing, plastic processing industry, logistics centers, agriculture, water
and wastewater treatment facilities, feed, photo-voltaic manufacturing, pulp and paper industry, concrete
industry and mining.
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tering the state space explosion. Together with a hierarchical and highly modular PLC pro-
gram with low coupling, this was demonstrated to be an effective approach.
For this approach to be precise and valid according to the semantics of a PLC, further
research into the formal definition of the semantics of Siemens PLCs and their program-
ming languages is required. This research therefore also attempts to formally define the
semantics of the Siemens PLC program due to a lack of concise definitions from the man-
ufacturer.
This research proposes a novel approach to compositional model checking of a hier-
archical PLC program. The discussed case study further reveals the effectiveness of this
approach. All the code, models and materials necessary for the reproduction of the results
discussed in this thesis (e.g., the PLC code and export, generation of the logic model and
the nuXmv models and properties) are located online at the following GitHub repository:
https://github.com/roelerps/TIA-XML-modcheck.
1.3. STATE OF THE ART
Current related work typically presents small-scale lab tests for the model checking of PLC
programs [16, 17, 25, 34]. Soliman et al. present rules for the translation of PLC programs
to UPPAAL timed automata models [25]. In their paper, Soliman et al. describe a case study
of a laboratory system that consists of 12 inputs and 3 outputs. This can be qualified as a
small PLC program. A comparable approach has been presented by Li et al [16]. In their pa-
per, they present an automatic translation of PLC programs in the function block diagram
(FBD) programming language to NuSMV models. As NuSMV is a symbolic model checker,
some performance gain is to be expected using binary decision diagrams. A case study is
described, which consists of 20 inputs and 10 outputs. Although the PLC program here is
larger than that from the case study in the paper by Soliman et al., it is still considered a
small PLC program.
In contrast to the above, research at the European Council for Neclear Research (CERN)
demonstrates that model checking PLC programs can also be done at an industrial-sized
scale [1, 7, 8]. The most recent paper by Darvas et al. presents a case study that consists
of 120 inputs and 80 outputs [8]. In multiple papers by Darvas et al., abstractions, reduc-
tions and symbolic model checking have been described to enable model checking of large
industrial-sized PLC programs [7, 8]. Additionally, other approaches for the translation of
PLC programs into formal models exist. The tools Arcade.PLC [4] and PLC-NuSMV [22],
for example, create the opportunity to automatically translate PLC programs into formal
models.
Although compositional model checking is not a new technique [6] and has been stud-
ied for many years, it has not yet been applied to PLC programs. The compositional model
checking approach has already been applied to, for example, the verification of protocols
running on on-chip networks [28] and the verification of train control systems [32]. In both
approaches, the compositional approach enabled verification of these systems. No studies
currently illustrate the compositional approach being applied to PLC programs.
1.4. OUTLINE
The remainder of this document is structured as follows. In Chapter 2, related work con-
cerning the model checking of PLC programs is discussed. In Chapter 3, the running ex-
ample of this research is introduced and discussed. This running example is also used as
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the case study in this research. Chapter 4 discusses the approach of information extraction
and the compositional model checking of PLC programs. In Chapter 5, the case study is dis-
cussed in further detail together with the discussed approach from Chapter 4. In Chapter 6,
the characteristics of this tool and method are discussed. Chapter 7 ends this paper with
a conclusion on the discussed case study and the proposed approach for compositional
model checking of hierarchical PLC programs.
3
2. RELATED WORK
Model checking in industrial automation or industrial control systems is not a new research
area; a significant amount of research has already been conducted in this area. Neverthe-
less, there are still many open challenges for verification of PLC programs, which is why this
research area remains active and important. A number of these challenges are indicated by
Darvas and Blanco in their study [9] and in the survey by Ovatman et al. [18]. These papers
are discussed more extensively in the next sections of this chapter.
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows: first, three surveys are discussed
that observed and summarized many studies in the research area of model checking PLC
programs. Subsequently, various model checkers are discussed in separate paragraphs
with their associated studies. The discussed model checkers and approaches are UPPAAL,
NuSMV, nuXmv, Cadence SMV, counterexample-guided abstraction refinement (CEGAR),
PLCverif and some others that are, to a lesser degree, related to model checking PLC pro-
grams.
Most of the discussed studies are processed and listed in Tables 1 and 2 for comparison
in the second to last paragraph of this chapter:
• Table 1 presents an overview of the discussed model checking tools or methods and
their global characteristics.
• Table 2 presents an overview of the same model checking tools or methods and their
detailed properties. It reveals the possibilities and impossibilities together with other
details for each tool or method.
The last paragraph of this chapter describes the contribution and relevance of this study
for the related research area.
2.1. SURVEYS
Many studies have already been conducted regarding model checking PLC programs. First,
three surveys are discussed in the next three paragraphs to gain an adequate overview of
the research field.
One of the early surveys conducted in this research area is done by Lampérière [15].
Here, the focus is on the verification methods for the sequential function chart (SFC) and
ladder (LAD) IEC 61131-3 programming languages. Lampérière et al. note studies that
present verification of SFC and LAD as being possible by transforming LAD to SFC or Petri
nets. Another possibility is the formal expression of the PLC program and its requirements
followed by use of a symbolic model verifier (SMV). Verification methods for Grafcet are
noted as potentially easily adapted for verification of SFC. The Grafcet specification lan-
guage (IEC 60848) is very similar to SFC, as Grafcet was the starting point for the develop-
ment of SFC. Lampérière et al. conclude that at the time of their survey, no method was
proposed that could handle more than one PLC programming language. There are, how-
ever, methods proposed for the verification of one specific programming language or for a
specific purpose, like liveness or safety.
The survey by Ovatman et al. provides an extensive overview of the research field [18].
Besides providing ample background information about PLC’s and PLC programming, Ovat-
man et al. compare and discuss the studies based on the programming language used in
each study. Section 5 of the survey discusses the model checking of textual PLC programs.
The PLC programming languages that are discussed here are instruction list (IL) and struc-
tured text (ST). Ovatman et al. note that the study by Willems is one of the few that uses
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timed models and can only handle a few complex programs [31]. The study by Pavlovic et
al. demonstrates that their approach can handle more complex programs with a greater
state space [21]. Section 6 discusses model checking graphical PLC programs, including
the FBD and LAD languages. With FBD, PLC programs are automatically translated in most
studies. Ovatman et al. analyze and conclude that model checking of LAD programs is con-
ducted on systems with a maximum of around 100 variables. Another interesting note by
Ovatman et al. is the fact that only half of the studies perform automatic transformation of
LAD code into formal models. The most used specification language is computation tree
logic (CTL), and only a few studies use timed CTL. For the studies based on the SFC pro-
gramming language, most are semi-automatic at minimum. Abstractions are completed
manually after automatic translation. None of the studies concerning SFC have used real-
time properties. Together with SFC, studies that are Petri net based also lack explicit use of
real-time properties. The study by Ovatman et al. discusses that Petri net studies also lack
evaluation of the performance of the model checking based on Petri nets. Furthermore,
Ovatman et al. discuss multiple open problems and research challenges. The common
challenges are summarized in the list below:
• State space explosion: Because PLC programming languages can be quite detailed
and granular, the translation of a PLC program into models for model checking can
cause the state space to grow exponentially. Different solutions, include applying
abstractions to the generated model, compacting recurring places in a Petri net or
using an intermediate model generated from the source code.
• Consistency of the model: An often-occurring problem is whether the built model
is consistent with the system it represents. For the real-time characteristics of PLC
programs, it is challenging to ensure consistency. One solution can be the reuse of
manually translated and extensively tested templates for timed aspects of the PLC
program.
• Properties to be checked: Another difficult but important step in model checking
is the specification of the properties that are to be checked by the model checker.
Model checkers often expect linear-time temporal logic (LTL) or CTL specifications,
which is not common practice for people working with PLCs. Automatic translation
from natural language or tabular format information to LTL or CTL specifications can
become a solution for this challenge.
• PLC-cycle execution: The several components of a PLC cycle also create a challenge
for model checking. In addition to the PLC program itself, the execution characteris-
tics of a PLC also need to be modeled. To access a consistent model, the timed aspects
of the PLC cycle must be modeled as well.
• Modeling timers: A commonly used element in PLC programming is the timer. Be-
cause of the timed behavior of timers, they are often modeled as a timed automata
and used with the real-time model checker UPPAAL.
A list of open research challenges that Ovatman et al. found unresolved at the time of their
study is provided below:
• Conformance generated model with original program: When generating a model
from PLC source code, it is important that the model is still in conformance with
the actual system. Often conformance testing is used, but another possible solution
could be the generation of PLC source code and a model, which are both generated
from a parent model.
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• Performance of the presented solutions: In the discussed studies, performance has
often been measured in errors found by the proposed solution, but information about
the size of the program is missing or vague. More detailed information about the
study is necessary to compare the performance of the proposed solutions.
• Networked or multitasking PLCs: Research into networked or multitasking PLCs still
has challenges, mainly the state space explosion that occurs when model checking
these types of PLC programs.
Although the survey by Rösch et al. has a slightly different scope, namely, a review of
model-based testing approaches [23], it also notes an interesting subject that can be bene-
ficial for model checking. Failures and faults caused by the hardware can have devastating
consequences. Rösch et al. determined that for model-based testing, the system’s reaction
to faults requires more research. Failures and faults in the PLC system itself trigger an orga-
nization block (OB) associated with that type of failure or fault. These fault OBs interrupt
the normal PLC cycle. Because of the importance and impact of these interrupts, Table 2
has a column that indicates whether interrupts have been considered in each study.
2.2. UPPAAL
One of the two most used model checkers is UPPAAL, which is also reflected in Tables 1
and 2 through the number of studies discussing UPPAAL. One of the early studies was com-
pleted by Willems [31]. Willems presents a set of tools that makes it possible to convert a
PLC program in the IL programming language to timed automata for verification. A pecu-
liarity to his research is the method to split the PLC program in a timed and untimed part.
By splitting the PLC program, most of the program is located in the untimed part. In this
part, time does not influence the execution of the program. Through considering time, the
state space grows quickly. Thus, by splitting the PLC program in the manner as proposed
by Willems, the state space explosion can be countered.
In their study, Zoubek et al. introduce a framework for automatic verification of LAD
PLC programs [34]. They present a case study in which an Allen-Bradley PLC is used. Ac-
cording to Zoubek et al., an automatically converted PLC program into a timed automata
cannot be verifiable without automatic or manual abstraction(s). Wardana et al. also present
an automatic verification approach but for continuous function chart (CFC) programs [30].
In their research, Wardana et al. propose a method for the transformation of CFC programs
to timed automata for verification.
Soliman and Frey propose an approach for the verification of safety applications that
are built from PLCopen safety function blocks (SFBs) [24]. These SFBs are safety blocks
in the FBD programming language. Soliman et al. continue their previous research [24]
by transforming the extensible markup language (XML) exported SFBs to timed automata
automatically [25]. Further details of this study and its comparison with other studies are
located in Tables 1 and 2. In their paper, Soliman and Frey also describe the formal defini-
tion and transformation rules they used for their proposed approach.
In their paper, Enoiu et al. present a method of transforming FBD into timed automata
and test generation [11]. Former related work has focused on transforming PLC programs
into formal models and/or timed automata [24, 25, 30, 31, 34]. However, for verification,
test properties are also needed, which differentiates this research from the former. In con-
trast to the other UPPAAL papers mentioned here, Enoiu et al. indicate future work in the
direction of finding more data about usage in realistic industrial-sized PLC systems.
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2.3. NUSMV AND NUXMV
The other often-used model checker is NuSMV and (to a lesser degree) its successor nuXmv.
Pavlovic and Ehrich present a method for model checking PLC programs written in FBD
with NuSMV [20]. The method described in their paper demonstrates a translation via a
text-based FBD version (textFBD) to a proposed tFBD language. The paper indicates that
textFBD is the IL representation of the PLC program. The translation to tFBD is mainly
achieved to reduce the state space of the model.
Pakonen et al. use a different approach in FBD PLC program verification. Pakonen et
al. propose a toolset for model checking FBD PLC programs [19]. In their paper, they de-
scribe a manual translation of elementary PLC functions to NuSMV models. Subsequently,
they use the open-source modelling tool Simantics for building models of the FBD PLC
program. Additionally, this tool allows for visualization of counter examples when proper-
ties fail in a test. Possibilities and impossibilities of this approach are compared with other
studies and presented in Table 2.
An example of an automated tool for the translation of FBD PLC programs to NuSMV
models is presented in a study by Li et al. [16]. Here, the authors present their tool called
PLC-NuSMV compiler, which accomplishes exactly that. A PLCopen XML export from the
engineering software together with a truth table in .CSV format can be transformed into
a NuSMV model for verification of the PLC program. The used case study, the Falcon
Controller, consists of a safety program, and it includes 18 inputs and outputs. In Ta-
ble 1, this case study is compared with others. In his master thesis, Qeriqi, a co-author
with Li et al. [16], further describes the details of the PLC-NuSMV tool [22]. Here, Qeriqi
offers more information about the PLC-NuSMV compiler, for example, the structure of the
compiler. Qeriqi also notes the modular architecture of the PLC-NuSMV compiler, which
enables easy extension for the support of more PLC languages. Qeriqi uses the same case
study in his master thesis as is used by the Li et al. [16] study.
Another paper using the NuSMV model checker for the verification of PLC programs is
by Kottler et al. [14]. Kottler et al. propose a method to show that PLC programs in LAD
can be modeled and verified in NuSMV with use of CTL specifications. No automation is
proposed in the paper, but with a small case study and manual fault injection, Kottler et al.
indicate the possible positive effect of the verification of LAD PLC programs with NuSMV.
2.4. CADENCE SMV
Although Cadence SMV seems to have ceased, there are still some informative studies using
Cadence SMV. In their paper, De Smet and Rossi present a case study of some laboratory
tests with an Allen-Bradley SLC-500 PLC [10]. They use the LAD programming language,
and the PLC consists of 15 inputs and 15 outputs, which is a small case study compared
to some of the other studies listed in Table 1. De Smet and Rossi conclude their paper
through noting that even symbolic model checking is not capable of verifying very large or
unbounded state space.
Another study using Cadence SMV is by Jee et al. They propose a tool called the
FBDVerifier [12]. This tool verifies FBD PLC programs using Verilog models. Then, LDA
file exports are generated from the FBD code using the engineering environment. These
LDA files are then converted into Verilog models automatically. The user adds properties
to be verified, and Cadence SMV verifies these properties on the Verilog models. In case a
property fails, the tool visualizes the counter-example with a large matrix filled with values
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of variables at a specific time. Jee et al. also describe a large case study of 20,000 function
blocks and 9,000 variables, which can be compared with other studies in Table 1.
2.5. COUNTEREXAMPLE-GUIDED ABSTRACTION REFINEMENT (CEGAR)
Counterexample-guided abstraction refinement [5] is a method that is frequently used with
model checking. The CEGAR method creates an abstract model that most likely contains
counterexamples that are not actual counterexamples of the model. These are called er-
roneous or spurious counterexamples by Clark et al. [5]. An erroneous counterexample is
then used to guide the abstraction refinement. In general, this means that the abstraction
level will be lowered, and at that point of the model, more detail is introduced. This process
can be iterated to remedy all erroneous counterexamples.
Biallas et al. present the Arcade.PLC tool in their paper [4]. This tool is described as a
verification platform for PLCs. It can handle the following PLC programming languages: IL,
ST and the Siemens dialect of IL, statement list (STL). The exports need to be in EXP, POU,
ST or AWL file formats, as presented in Table 2. The tool is built in Java and is also one of
few publicly available tools. Biallas et al. describe three case studies, all of which are being
lab tests. The case studies consist of the PLCopen safety FBDs, a conveyor system and a
robot control system.
The second CEGAR-based study is by Nellen et al. [17]. Nellen et al. present two differ-
ent approaches for verification of safety features of PLC-controlled plants concerning PLC
programs developed in the SFC programming language. The first approach consists of the,
broadly seen reach-ability analysis. The second approach uses a combination of bounded
model checking for the PLC behavior and reach-ability analysis on the environment model.
Nellen et al. implemented the methods and approaches in SpaceEx with CEGAR, which is
publicly available.
2.6. PLCVERIF
Over the past years, extensive research for the verification of PLC programs has been con-
ducted at CERN. Their studies mainly contain work towards their PLC verification tool
called PLCverif. A small number of studies concerning PLCverif are used in the papers
written by Darvas et al. and Adiego et al. [1, 7, 8], which are presented in Tables 1 and 2.
Adiego et al. propose a methodology for the translation of a PLC program into an inter-
mediate model for verification purposes [1]. By using an intermediate model, they apply
the separation of concerns, make it easy to add new/other model checkers and allow for
abstraction techniques on the intermediate model for more advantageous performance of
the verification. In their study Adiego et al. describe and use only the translation from the
ST programming language. Adiego et al. also demonstrate the applicability of the transfor-
mation methodology by describing a CERN lab test. The OnOff object from CERN’s UNI-
COS library is used for the case study. It is one of the simpler objects in the UNICOS library
and can represent different types of Boolean process equipment.
Darvas et al. go into greater detail regarding the intermediate model and specifically the
language used. They investigate the possibility of using the Siemens ST language, that is
the structured control language (SCL), modified by emulating the option of register access
(STr) [7]. They presented the possibility to transform LAD, FBD, IL and ST into STr, which is
used for creation of the intermediate model. Their case study of a cryogenic safety-critical
machine consists of 9,500 lines of IL code and can be seen as a large case study when com-
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pared with all case studies in Table 1.
More recently, Darvas et al. released a paper about PLCverif, which states that PLCverif
will soon be publicly available [8]. This would make PLCverif one of a sparse number of
publicly available tools for PLC verification. PLCverif can be provided with IL or ST PLC
code (AWL and SCL files) for verification of that PLC code. Additionally, two case studies
are described by Darvas et al. [8], both situated at CERN. The first is a magnet test bench
and the second is a so-called Super Proton Synchrotron accelerator. The size of the
programs, which is presented in Table 1, is around 10,000 lines of LAD PLC code and around
200 IO points.
A significant comparative study is conducted by Helder [27], where Helder compares
several model checkers’ performance with performance of PLCverif. The model checkers
for models used are as follows: Spin, NuSMV and nuXmv. The model checkers for the code
used are as follows: CBMC, Kinductor, CBMC Incremental, 2LS, CPA-checker and SATABS.
The case study used is the CPC program, which is comparable to the OnOff object from
Adiego et al. [1]. Although most of tests reveal that PLCverif is slightly faster, there are a few
tests that demonstrate a significant improvement in performance by using a model checker
on code instead of models. As Helder indicates in the thesis, the tests were performed on
different machines.
Another interesting study is conducted by Darvas et al [9], who indicate some of the ad-
vantages, difficulties and challenges of model checking PLC programs. The most relevant
points are listed below:
• PLC programming languages: The variety in PLC programming languages them-
selves and in the implementation of the same language by different vendors create
complication. Furthermore, proprietary languages by vendors often have partial or
unprecise syntax definitions, which further complicate the formalization of the PLC
program.
• Semantics PLC languages: Behavior of PLC languages is not regularly obvious or pre-
cisely described. Additionally, the real-time behavior of a PLC creates another chal-
lenge in how precise this real-time behavior needs to be. By increasing the precision
of the real-time behavior, the needed resources for verification also increase. Seman-
tics also seem to depend on the programming environment and PLC hardware that
is used.
• Environment and faults: The environment (process) is controlled by the PLC, and
the environment’s behavior, context and dependencies can also be modeled. This
generates a more precise model and thus the possibility of less false negative results
of the verification. The same applies for assumptions made about faults that can
occur. Some faults can physically never occur, but others will most certainly happen
in a possible chain of events. Proper assumptions are therefore important in model
checking PLC programs.
2.7. OTHER TOOLS
Besides the above-mentioned model checkers, more model checkers exist; a small number
of them are also mentioned in research targeting PLC programs. Because most studies
seem to focus on UPPAAL and SMVs (e.g., NuSMV, nuXmv and Cadence SMV) and for the
sake of readability of Tables 1 and 2, the model checkers mentioned in this section are not
appended to these tables.
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The first example is the study by Zheng et al., where an efficient method for modeling
and the verification of PLC systems is proposed [33]. This study uses the model checker
Spin for the formal verification of PLC programs by the proposed PLC Checker tool. Al-
though the exact supported PLC programming languages are not specified in the study, the
noted PLC programming languages are LAD, IL and ST.
In the study by Voros et al., Petri nets are elaborately described together with the tool
PetriDotNet [29]. This tool can be used for modeling and analysis of industrial applications
as noted by the case studies in Section 4 of their paper. Voros et al. conclude with the
statement that with the described analysis algorithms, they were able to analyze systems
that could not previously be analyzed. Further case studies and papers are located in the
survey of Ovatman et al. [18] in Table 1 of that survey.
Another example is the study by Song et al., where the Yices SMT Solver is used [26].
Song et al. used the Yices SMT Solver to extend existing research from Jee et al. [13]. The
tool FBDTester 2.0 automates test generation for FBD programs and considers the internal
memory states of the block. Although FBDTest 2.0 utilizes Yices SMT Solver, the study by
Song et al. focuses on the generation of tests for verification.
2.8. OVERVIEW OF STATE OF THE ART
All discussed related work and a selection of additional studies are summarized in Tables 1
and 2 to provide a clear overview and comparison of the related studies.
Table 1 lists a great part of the relevant research in this area. The discussed or sup-
ported model checkers are listed for each study, together with the discussed and supported
PLC progamming languages. The Automated column presents which part of the process
of model checking is automated. Most studies automate the PLC code to formal model
translation together with possible abstractions or simplifications of the formal model. In
most of the studies, one or more case studies are mentioned. The context of this case study
and the size of the case study are also presented in Table 1. Unfortunately, most of the
studies discuss or propose a tool that is not publicly available, which is listed in the last
column of Table 1. The studies are presented in two separate tables, Tables 1 and 2, to fit
the information on the pages. Table 1 presents a rough overview of the studies, and Table 2
presents all specific details mentioned in each study or case study. The Model Checker
and Lang. columns are used in both tables for potential to compare study details based
on model checker or PLC programming languages. The program size of the possible case
studies is often mentioned in a unique unit. For example, one research study measures
the program size by counting the lines of IL, another by counting the FBD networks and
another through describing the environment that is controlled and monitored by the PLC
program. This makes it harder to compare the actual program size of the case studies.
Table 2 presents a more detailed comparison between the proposed solutions in the
discussed related studies. The discussed or supported model checkers are listed for each
study, together with the discussed and supported PLC progamming languages. Most of
the studies present or propose a tool or method for translating the PLC code into formal
models. The supported file formats are listed in the Export format column. In the four
columns on the right more information is listed about the presented or proposed tool or
method:
• IO-scan cycle: This column indicates whether the study considers the IO-scan cycle.
This is the cycle of a PLC in which the operating system sequentially, reads the inputs,
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[31] UPPAAL IL PLC code
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Unknown N/a No 3
[34] UPPAAL LAD PLC code
to model
Pumping line 10 IO No
[14] NuSMV LAD No automation
described
None N/a No





[19] NuSMV FBD No automation
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[20] NuSMV FBD No automation
but a method
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Rail automation 165 lines IL,
100 vars
No
[10] Cadence SMV LAD PLC code
to model
Lab-tests Unknown No





















































1) To be released in the upcoming months
2) Partly available through Simantics
3) Provided URL is not reachable (anymore)
Table 1: Comparison related studies
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executes the PLC program and writes the outputs.
• Interrupts: In addition to the IO-scan cycle, the normal cycle can be interrupted.
This column indicates whether the study also considers such possible interrupts.
• Block-based model checking: The PLC programs in and of themselves are structured
by program blocks in a hierarchy. This hierarchy and call structure can be used for
block-based model checking. This can be done, for example, by applying compo-
sitional reasoning and thus reducing state space by dividing the big program into
smaller blocks for model checking.
• Timers: Timers are frequently-used timed components in a PLC program. Depend-
ing on how these timers are modeled, a real-time model checker is necessary. This
column presents whether the study mentions a method about how timers are han-
dled.
• Variables: In PLC programs, global variables can be used. These variables can be
used more than once for reading and writing. This column reveals whether the study
considers variables.









[11] UPPAAL FBD N/a Yes No No Yes Unknown
[25] UPPAAL FBD .XML
(PLCopen
format)
Unknown No No Yes Yes
[24] UPPAAL FBD N/a No No No No No
[30] UPPAAL CFC N/a Yes No No Yes Unknown
[31] UPPAAL IL IL text-
based
Yes No No Yes Unknown
[34] UPPAAL LAD N/a Yes No No Yes Unknown
[14] NuSMV LAD N/a Unknown No No Yes Unknown
[16] NuSMV FBD .XML
(PLCopen
format)
Yes No No No Unknown
[19] NuSMV FBD N/a No No No No Unknown
[20] NuSMV FBD IL text-
based
Yes No No No Yes
[10] Cadence SMV LAD LAD text-
based
Yes No No Unknown Yes
[12] Cadence SMV FBD LDA format
to Verilog
model







Yes No No Unknown Unknown
[17] CEGAR SFC N/a Yes No No No No












.SCL, .AWL Yes in [7] No No No Unknown
Table 2: Details related studies
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2.9. COMPOSITIONAL MODEL CHECKING
Compositional model checking and compositional reasoning are not a new subject. In
1989, Clarke et al. proposed compositional reasoning for model checking [6]. They describe
it as a method to reduce complexity of systems with many parallel processes. However, they
also note that a similar method can be used when the program contains a modular or hi-
erarchical structure. This is accomplished by hiding details of lower-level components that
are not relevant for the higher-level components. Different states can be merged into one
which can subsequently reduce the state space.
Verbeek et al. present a compositional approach for model checking protocols running
on-chip networks [28]. In this research, discussed results are positive regarding the com-
positional approach of model checking, whereas the monolithic approach is considered
infeasible.
Xie uses a compositional approach for the formal verification of train control systems.
In his research [32], Xie converts train control systems into Petri net models. These models
are then verified using a compositional approach.
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3. RUNNING EXAMPLE
In this chapter, a running example is discussed, which is used throughout the research as
an example for explanation and as the case study for this research. This chapter provides
a brief overview of the specifics of this running example in terms of the process as well as
more details about the PLC and the PLC program of this running example. The discussed
running example also poses as a motive for the proposed research.
3.1. PROCESS
Before presenting more details about the running example, the actual process used for the
running example is briefly introduced.
For a large high-tech manufacturer, a chemical cleaning installation is supplied. Stain-
less steel tools that are used in production are cleaned in this machine. For this, two chem-
ical fluids are used. The tool is first placed in a small container, after which it is soaked with
the first fluid. After draining this fluid, the tool is flushed with demineralised water be-
fore being soaked in the second fluid. This is done separately because the two fluids react
uncontrollably with each other, which can result in an explosion.
The actuators and sensors of the machine are as follows (simplified). See Figure 1 for a
schematic overview of the machine. (The two black triangles represent a valve.)
• Supply valve liquid (x2): These two valves fill the container with the specified liquid
when opened.
• Drain valve: This valve drains the container when it needs to be emptied.
• Container full sensor: This sensor indicates that the container is entirely filled with
a liquid.
• Container emtpy sensor: This sensor indicates that the container is completely empty
and that no liquid resides in the container.
Figure 1: Process (simplified) of the running example
The risk for machine and humans is that the two fluids react dangerously with each
other. Thus, it must not be possible to have the two fluids together in the container in any
possible event. The goal is to verify this safety property by means of model checking the
PLC program.
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3.2. PROGRAMMABLE LOGIC CONTROLLER (PLC)
The process as described in the previous section is controlled by a Siemens S7-1500 PLC.
This PLC is programmed with the Siemens TIA-Portal V16 engineering environment. The
PLC blocks are programmed using the following IEC 61131 standard programming lan-
guages: FBD, LAD and SCL. For the execution of the PLC blocks, OB1 is used; other OBs
are not used in the example.
The PLC program for this case study largely revolves around four blocks. This is dis-
played in Figure 2. Three of the four blocks, called control modules, are instances of a
block to control a solenoid valve (FB110). An instance of a block means that the block is
provided with its own data block for the storage of instance-specific variables. This way, a
function block can be reused and used multiple times simultaneously. The fourth block is
the program logic (FB5), which controls the valves in a sequential way depending on the
sensors and push buttons on the control cabinet. This block is called a sequencer.
In short, the hierarchy of the PLC program is as follows: The sequencer controls the
valves. This is done by global variables that are written by the sequencer and read by the
control modules of the valves. This logical relation between the blocks is illustrated in
Figure 2. This reveals the division of responsibilities in the PLC program. The sequencer
defines when something needs to happen, and the control modules define how this will
be achieved. For example, the sequencer defines when the valves need to open and close,
and the control module defines how the valve is controlled and monitored. The high level
of modularity and re-use of blocks causes this PLC program to have a notably hierarchical
structure. This, in turn, is leveraged for compositional model checking as is further dis-
cussed in Section 4.2.
Figure 2: Logic relations PLC program
Even though it is a simple example, the PLC program contains a significant amount
of code. This is mainly due to the standardized way of programming, where control
modules are used to control the valves. These control modules consist of broadly appli-
cable functions. An example instance of the control module valve solenoid is presented
in Figure 3a, representing the instance of the drain valve. In the header of the grey block, it
is displayed that this is block FB110 called fbValve_Solenoid. Above the grey block, its in-
stance and thus its data block are displayed. The revealed instance is VlvDrn, which is short
for valve drain. On the left-hand side of the block, the inputs of the block are presented, and
on the right-hand side, the outputs of the block. This demonstrates that to safely control
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a valve, many signals are used. Besides controlling the valve, this block also monitors and
alarms when the valve does not respond as expected.
The program logic block (FB5) is a sequencer that can move from step to step, depend-
ing on various variables. This sequencer in the end controls the valves depending on the
step the sequencer is in. A code snippet of the program logic block is presented in Fig-
ure 3b. The sequencer consists of numbered steps, which are traversed depending on the
conditions of transitions. Two other blocks are used in the program logic block. They act as
helpers for the execution of the sequence. These two blocks are now discussed. The upper
block, FC185, which is called fcStepChooser, assigns the value of the next step depending
on the connected condition and the current step number. This block can be seen as a small
helper used to simplify the step choice. Below FC185, the block FB185, which is called fb-
StepSequencer, is revealed. This can also be seen as a helper. It orchestrates the function
that when a transition is made, the current step number is updated with the next step num-
ber. On the right-hand side, the generation of three command signals are displayed. These
are the signals that are connected to the control modules of the three valves. These sig-
nals are the commands for the valve to open. These commands are generated depending
on the active step number of the sequence. The valve automatically closes when the open
command is not active.
(a) Valve solenoid instance (drain-valve) (b) Program logic block
Figure 3: PLC code snippets
Blocks of the PLC program are called as functions for other blocks in a hierarchical man-
ner. The execution order of the PLC program is as follows. The PLC’s OS calls OB1. OB1
then calls FB2, FB3, FB4 and FB5. The blocks FB2, FB3 and FB4 then each call their own
instance of FB110. Block FB5 calls FC185 multiple times and FB185 once. This is illustrated
in Figure 4 in the call structure figure. A clear list of these blocks and their defined names
are in Appendix C. The complete call structure is generated by the developed TIA-XML-
modcheck tool and is in Appendix D.
3.3. COMPARISON
In this section, a comparison of characteristics and features is provided between this run-
ning example project and some related studies from Chapter 2 as displayed in Tables 1
and 2. This running example consists of 17 PLC blocks in the programming languages LAD,
FBD and SCL. This PLC program uses 17 inputs and outputs to control the equipment of
the machine. The machine as subject of this running example serves to chemically clean
tools used in the production of high-tech chips.
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Figure 4: PLC call structure
Observing the details of this running example, more characteristics and features can be
found. It can be stated that interrupts are not used, only OB1 —the main cycle— is used.
Timers and global variables are also used in this running example. The export format is XML
but not the PLCopen format. Siemens TIA Portal uses a proprietary format for their XML
export.
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4. OVERVIEW OF APPROACH
This chapter consists of two sections. The first section describes the process of informa-
tion extraction. Information from the PLC program is exported and processed in several
steps into a nuXmv model. This nuXmv model is then used for formal verification. The sec-
ond section describes the verification process. Compositional reasoning is used for model
checking of the nuXmv models. Together with CEGAR, this enables compositional model
checking of PLC programs.
4.1. INFORMATION EXTRACTION
This section describes the method of information extraction of the PLC program. The first
step of information extraction is the export of the PLC program compile units, which is fol-
lowed by the graph extraction and then conversion into a logic model of the PLC program.
This logic model is then converted into a nuXmv model to enable model checking. These










Figure 5: Overview information extraction section
4.1.1 PLC PROGRAM EXPORT
Siemens offers a TIA Portal Openness tool that can export the PLC program independently
from which programming language is used. The export functionality uses the XML file
format. For each PLC block, an XML file, containing all relevant information about that PLC
block and the PLC code of that block, is created. The PLC code is defined for each compile
unit. All instructions, variables and wires are provided a unique identifier for each compile
unit. The definitions of compile units, instructions, variables and wires are discussed in the
next section.
4.1.2 COMPILE UNITS
The program of a PLC is built with PLC blocks. These PLC blocks divide the PLC program
into logic parts and provide the possibility to reuse functionality. A PLC block consists of
one or more compile units. Compile units provide a greater overview of the code in a PLC
block because the functionality of a PLC block is divided into smaller pieces of PLC code.
Each compile unit can consist of instructions, variables and wires.
Example 4.1. Figure 6a presents a small example of PLC code. It reveals three variables,
#HMI_ValveControl.bHomeOn and #HMI_ValveControl.bSignalHome at the input of
the AND instruction and #bOutActiveHome at the coil assignment. In the same figure, two
instructions are found: the AND instruction and the coil assignment. The AND instruction ex-
ecutes a logical and-function on the connected inputs on the left side of the instruction. The
right side outputs the result. The coil assignment assigns the input value on the left side of
the instruction to the connected variable. The wires are the lines that connect variables with
instructions and instructions with instructions. This is also called the Boolean data flow.
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(b) Graph representation of example network
Figure 6: Small example PLC code information extraction
Definition 4.1. Let I be a sorted list of instructions, V be a set of variables and W be a set of
wires. A PLC compile unit is a directed acyclic graph G = 〈I ×V ,W 〉 where the set of vertices
consists of variables and instructions, and vertices are connected by wires as the edges. It
is not possible for a wire to connect two variables. Instructions are sorted because of the
sequential execution of instructions as further discussed in Section 4.1.2 in the Execution
order paragraph.
Example 4.2. Through Definition 4.1, the example from Figure 6 can be defined as fol-
lows: I = { &, = }, V = { #HMI_ValveControl.bHomeOn, #HMI_ValveControl.bSignalHome,
#bOutActiveHome } and W = { <#HMI_ValveControl.bHomeOn, &>,
<#HMI_ValveControl.bSignalHome, &>, <&, =>, <=, #bOutActiveHome> }. The following ex-
ecution order of instructions holds here: & v = .
Semantics of compile units: To explain the semantics of compile units, Example 4.1 and
Figure 6a are used. For each compile unit, unique Ids are assigned to all instructions, vari-
ables and wires. Together with Definition 4.1, the graph in Figure 6b is created. The seman-
tics are as follows:
Variables #HMI_ValveControl.bHomeOn with Id=21 and
#HMI_ValveControl.bSignalHome with Id=22 are connected with wires to an AND instruc-
tion with Id=24. The result of the AND instruction is connected with a wire to the input of
the coil assignment instruction with Id=25. Variable #bOutActiveHome with Id=23 is con-
nected with a wire to the coil assignment instruction with Id=25. The wires in this example
are not explicitly numbered but can be found in Figure 6b as the edges between the vertices.
The result is that when the variables with Id=21 and Id=22 are true, the variable with
Id=23 is also true. In all other cases, the variable with Id=23 is false.
In general, instructions can be simple Boolean instructions (e.g., an AND instruction),
a complex mathematical calculation or even a call to another PLC block. The common
aspect is that an instruction executes a function and uses optional inputs and outputs for its
execution. Instructions used in Figure 6b are the AND instruction and the coil assignment.
Variables can consist of local or global variables and are used for storing and reading
values. Global variables used in Figure 6b are #HMI_ValveControl.bHomeOn and
#HMI_ValveControl.bSignalHome. An example of a local variable is #bOutActiveHome.
The definition of local or global depends on the place of the declaration of the variable.
Wires connect the two types of building blocks of a compile unit: the instructions and
variables. Wires let Boolean data flow between the instructions and variables. To assign
variables to the input of an AND instruction, wires are used between the variables and the
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instruction. To pass the value of the AND instruction to the next instruction, the coil assign-
ment, a wire is used. To assign the value to a variable, a coil assignment is used. A wire
between the variable and the coil assignment assures the value is written to the variable.
Wires can connect two instructions but not two variables.
Execution order: A very important part of Definition 4.1 is the partial order of the in-
structions. Instructions of compile units are not all evaluated at the same clock-tick but
sequentially so the partial ordering is of importance here. This partial ordering generates
an execution order, and this defines the order in which the instructions are executed in the
PLC.
In an industry effort to standardize the programming languages used in PLCs the IEC-
1131 was created and later renamed the IEC-61131. Unfortunately, there is still room for
interpretation for the automation system manufacturers. This means that the Siemens
programming language does not fully comply with the IEC-61131; Siemens released sev-
eral documents over the years stating which parts of the IEC-61131 they do comply with.
To analyze the execution order of Siemens PLC programs, the following example is used:
Example 4.3. Figure 7a presents a small example of PLC code of a compile unit. The wire
between the instructions add and & visualizes the data flow and order. As revealed on the
instruction itself, the EN input is the trigger to start the instruction, which is always true if it
is not connected like in this example. The ENO of instructions is a signal to indicate that the
instruction has been successfully completed. This way, instructions for integers and floating
points can be placed in a Boolean data flow.
Figure 7b illustrates three directed graphs created from the compile unit presented in
Figure 7a. The numbers in the vertices are again the Ids used in the export files. An im-
portant detail of these graphs is not only the execution order of the graphs but also the in-
structions inside the graph. Due to the lack of definition in the IEC-61131, the automation
system manufacturer is partly free to determine the execution order. Because Siemens docu-
mentation about execution ordering was not located, the execution order is defined here in
Definition 4.2.
Definition 4.2. A block is an ordered list of compile units together with a defined interface
of inputs, outputs and local variables.
The execution order of a block is provided by executing its compile units in the given
order. The execution order of a compile units is as follows: If a compile unit consists of
more than one graph, the graphs are executed from top to bottom. The execution order of
each graph of compile unit C must conform with the following definitions: Let I be a sorted
list of the instructions used in Cn . Let ii be all inputs and io all outputs of an instruction
In in I . Before executing instruction In all ii need to be evaluated first. The execution of
instruction In is only finished when all io are evaluated. The execution of a graph is only
completed when all io are evaluated of all In in the graph.
Example 4.4. Through Definition 4.1, the example from Figure 7 can be defined for Cn as
follows: I = { move, <>, . . . }, V = { 10, X, . . . } and W = { <10, move>, <move, X>, . . . }. The
following order holds here: move v <> v S v add v . . . .
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(b) Graph representation of example
Figure 7: Small example PLC code execution order
Semantics of execution order: The main semantics of Figure 7b and Example 4.3 are as
follows: The first instruction revealed is the move block. This writes the value of 10 to vari-
able X. Next, variable X is checked if it indeed has a value of 10. If this is not the case, variable
Xnot10 is set to true. The following instruction, add, adds the value of 2 to the variable X
and writes the result to variable X. This means that variable X has the value of 12 at this
point. Lastly, whether variable X indeed has a value of 12 is verified. If not, the variable
Xnot12 is set to true.
To further explain the execution order of a compile unit, the example from Figure 7b
and Example 4.3 is used. The graph of Example 4.3 consists of three smaller graphs.
The first graph to be executed is the graph with vertices < 24,49,25 >. This graph con-
sists of one instruction: move. First, all its inputs are evaluated, and constant value 10 is
read. Then, the outputs are evaluated, and constant value 10 is written to variable X.
The second graph to be executed is the graph with vertices < 26,27,50,51,28 >. This
graph consists of two instructions: <> with id 50 and S with id 51. The instruction with
which the process is started does not affect the result because all inputs are always first
evaluated. Effectively, this means that instruction <> and its inputs are always evaluated
first. This means that variable X is checked for a value other than the constant value 10. If
the value of variable X is not 10, then the variable Xnot10 is set. An evaluation from top to
bottom and left to right can be observed here.
The third graph to be executed is the graph with vertices < 29,30,51,31,32,33,53,54,55,
34 >. This graph consists of four instructions: add with id 52, <> with id 53, & with id 54 and
S with id 55. To determine the execution order of this graph, it can be started at instruc-
tion S. Then, by evaluating its inputs, instruction & is encountered. This, in turn, leads to
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instruction add and <>. Conforming with the top-to-bottom approach, add is the first in-
struction executed. This execution is only finished if the output of add is evaluated and thus
a value of 12 is written to variable X. Then instruction <> is evaluated, and together with the
completed instruction add, the variable Xnot12 is set to true if the output of instruction &
is also true.
Generally and informally, the order from top to bottom and left to right provides a solid
idea of the execution order. The compile units are executed instruction by instruction,
where the next instruction only starts when the previous instruction is finished completely
and all outputs of that instruction have been evaluated.
Algorithm graph extraction: This paragraph describes the algorithm that is responsible
for the extraction of the graph. The algorithm returns a reversed graph as the result.
Algorithm 1 Graph extraction algorithm per code unit
1: procedure CREATEGRAPH(plcCode)
2: v ←variables extracted from plcCode
3: i ←instructions extracted from plcCode
4: w ← wires extracted from plcCode
5:
6: g ← create new Graph
7: for all v ∪ i do
8: x ← create new vertex
9: add x to g
10: end for
11: for all w do
12: if wn has branches then . Some wires connect one output to multiple inputs
13: separate wn into multiple w2’s
14: replace wn with set of w2’s
15: end if
16: end for
17: for all w do
18: e ← create new edge
19: add e to g
20: end for
21:
22: g 2 ← create new ReversedGraph of g . All edges of the graph are reversed
23: return g 2
24: end procedure
Definition and semantics algorithm: For each code unit, the algorithm is executed to
extract the graph from the PLC code of that code unit. The pseudo-code algorithm is pre-
sented in Algorithm 1; this represents the functionality of a part of the developed Java tool.
This algorithm consists of five steps. All steps of the algorithm are described below with
the line numbers of the pseudo-code in Algorithm 1:
1. The first step, within lines 2 to 4, extracts the variables, instructions and wires from
the PLC code export.
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2. The second step is the creation of a new graph and addition of vertices representing
the extracted instructions and variables. Lines 6 to 10 represent this step.
3. In the third step, the wires are split when a wire is branched; this is represented in
lines 11 to 16. Branching can be used when an instruction is connected with two
other instructions. When step three is finished, all wires consist of one source and
one destination.
4. The fourth step is adding the wires as edges to the graph; this is represented in lines
17 to 20.
5. The fifth step creates a reversed version of the graph. This means that the direction of
all edges is reversed; this is represented in line 22.
4.1.3 LOGIC MODEL
To universally define and describe the code of a PLC compile unit independently from the
model checker used, a logic model is defined. A logic model is an abstraction of PLC code
and is a text-based model of the graphical FBD programming language. Other PLC pro-
gramming languages can also be translated into a logic model. Figure 7 presents the con-
version from PLC code to a graph. In the next example, the conversion from graph to logic
model is explained, which is based on Example 4.3.
Example 4.5. Listing 1 presents the logic model for the PLC code discussed in Example 4.3.
The graph in Figure 7b is used as input for the creation of the logic model. Line 1 starts with
the assignment of a constant value of 10 to variable X. Line 2 states that variable Xnot10 is set
true when variable X has a value anything but 10. Line 3 reveals the add instruction, which
adds a value of 2 to the variable X and assigns the variable X a value of 12. Line 4 states that
variable Xnot12 is set true when variable X has a value anything but 12.
1 X = 10
2 Xnot10 = ( i f (X <> 10) then TRUE)
3 X = 2 + X
4 Xnot12 = ( i f (X <> 12) then TRUE)
Listing 1: Example logic model
Definition 4.3. A logic model is an ordered list [(v0, f0), (v1, f1), . . .] of tuples of type V ×F ,
where each tuple denotes an assignment of formula fi to variable vi .
Semantics of logic model: As presented in Listing 1, one compile unit can consist of mul-
tiple lines of formulas in the logic model. Furthermore, the logic model must adhere to the
execution order as described in Section 4.1.2.
For example, Listing 1 is executed as follows: First, line 1 is executed. This means that
first the right-hand side of the assignment is evaluated. After this evaluation is complete
for the entire right-hand side, the assignment is executed, and the result is assigned to the
variable on the left-hand side. For line 2, the same procedure occurs. The right-hand side
here is different; ( if (X <> 10) then TRUE ) means that the left-hand side variable is
set to true when X!=10. If, for example, X==10, the variable on the left-hand side is not
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changed. Line 3 is executed by first evaluating the right-hand side 2+X. At this point, before
the execution of this assignment, the value of X is 10. The result of the evaluation after
execution of the right-hand side is 12. This value is than assigned to variable X. Line 4
evaluates analogous to line 2.
A list with PLC instructions and the corresponding defined symbols and syntax in the
logic model is presented in Appendix B.
Example with a block call: Figure 8a presents an example of a function block call, FB330,
in this case. In Figure 8b, the graph of the call in Figure 8a is presented.
















(b) Graph representation of example call
Figure 8: Small example PLC code information extraction
Figure 8b resembles Figure 6b in that the variables are represented as numbers 21, 22,
23, 24, 25, 26 and 27. The call of FB330 is displayed as an instruction with number 28. The
edges here also represent the wires between elements. The difference is that the wires on
the side of the call are identified with the corresponding interface variable (e.g., interface
variable bInError01). This is displayed in Figure 8b with the text near each edge. The
graph from Figure 8b is then converted into the logic model presented in Listing 2.
1 Call : FB330 ( f b E r r o r S c r o l l e r ) , Instance : E r r o r S c r o l l e r ( LocalVariable )
2 Inputs :
3 ERROR_Valve . NoHomeFeedback ==> bInError01
4 ERROR_Valve . NoWorkFeedback ==> bInError02
5 ERROR_Valve . HomeFeedbackStillActive ==> bInError03
6 ERROR_Valve . WorkFeedbackStillActive ==> bInError04
7 bInEstop ==> bInError05
8 Outputs :
9 bOutErrorExists ==> HMI_ValveControl . bError
10 iOutScrollingErrorNumber ==> HMI_ValveControl . iErrorCode
Listing 2: Example logic model call
In general, instructions are represented as conforming to the conversion list in Ap-
pendix B. They connect with variables and other instructions. Variables are represented by
their name and are connected to instructions. Wires are not represented in the logic model,
but they do determine the placement of variables and instructions in the logic model.
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Algorithm logic model: This section describes the algorithm for the creation of the logic
model to understand how the logic model of a PLC program is created. First, the algorithm
is demonstrated with use of the running example as illustrated in Figure 6 and Listing 1.
Example 4.6. Figure 9 presents the reversed graph from Figure 6b. The direction of all edges
is reversed. In Listing 3, the sequence of the results of the logarithm is displayed. Each line
represents the output of a subsequent step of the algorithm. Line 1 reveals the vertex with
zero incoming edges: cu-25. Line 2 reveals the conversion from cu-25 to =, the vertex with
zero outgoing edges cu-23 and the remaining connected vertex cu-24. Line 3 reveals the
conversion from cu-24 to && and the connected vertices of cu-24, cu-21 and cu-22. Line 4







Figure 9: Reversed graph
1 cu−25
2 cu−23 = cu−24
3 cu−23 = cu−21 && cu−22
4 bOutActiveHome = ( HMI_ValveControl .bHomeOn && HMI_ValveControl . bSignalHome )
Listing 3: Algorithm iterations
Definition and semantics algorithm: For each compile unit, the algorithm is executed
to extract the logic model from the reversed graph of that compile unit. The pseudo-code
algorithm is presented in Algorithm 2; this represents the functionality of a part of the de-
veloped Java tool.
The algorithm consists of four steps. All steps of the algorithm are described below with
the line numbers of the pseudo-code in Algorithm 2:
1. The first step prepares the reversed graph for traversing. Some edges are replaced by
new edges to create a continuous Boolean data flow. For example, move instructions
can interrupt the Boolean data flow. This step ensures that the conditions on the
input of the move instruction are also used on the input of the instruction connected
to the output of the move instruction. This step can be found in lines 2 to 7.
2. The second step has two possible options: The first option is when the compile unit
contains a call to another block. Then, the called block is displayed together with its
interface. For both the inputs and outputs, the connected variables and/or instruc-
tions are displayed. The second option is when the compile unit does not contain a
call to another block. Then, this step traverses the reversed graph to construct the
logic model, which can be found in lines 9 to 16. The algorithm starts at the vertex
25
Algorithm 2 Logic model algorithm for each code unit
1: procedure CREATELOGICMODEL(reversedGraph, plcCode)
2: if x ∈ reversedGraph contains < Coil,Move,Add > then
3: xt ← get vertex connected to ENO output of x
4: xs ← get vertex connected to EN or IN input of x
5: wo ← get wire < xt , x >
6: replace wo with wire < xt , xs >
7: end if
8: i ←instructions extracted from plcCode
9: if i contains call then
10: output ← call with connected variables/instructions
11: else
12: li ← get x where incoming e == 0 . Last instruction of the code unit
13: lv ← get x where outgoing e == 0 . Last variable of the code unit
14: output ← lv+ li
15: xn ← connected vertices of li
16: add xn to output . If xn ∈ i display instruction, if xn ∈ v display cu−nn
17: loop . Loop recursively until no more connected vertices
18: xn+1 ← connected vertices of xn




23: for all cu−nn in output do





with zero incoming edges. The connected output variable is the connected vertex
with zero outgoing edges. Instructions are displayed by their logic model represen-
tation (see Appendix B). Variables are represented by cu-nn, where nn represents the
id of the variable.
3. The third step recursively traverses the reversed graph to find connected vertices until
all vertices are traversed and the logic model is completed. This is represented in lines
17 to 20.
4. The fourth step, in lines 23 to 25, replaces the cu-nns in the logic model for the actual
variable names.
4.1.4 NUXMV MODEL
The last step in the information extraction process is the conversion from a logic model
to a model suitable for the model checker nuXmv. This conversion step has been achieved
manually due to time restrictions, but the procedure of the conversion is presented in total
detail in this section.
An example is presented here after a short introduction of the global structure of the
nuXmv model. The example is followed by definitions for the nuXmv model. This section
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ends with semantics of the nuXmv model to generate a more advantageous understanding
of the model.
Introduction: A particular structure for the nuXmv model is used to represent the execu-
tion of PLC code in the PLC. To fully understand the structure of the nuXmv model, this is
first briefly introduced here.
A PLC block has an interface: inputs and outputs that are read and written by the PLC
block. The inputs of the PLC block are modeled as parameters of a module in the nuXmv
model that represents the PLC block. Outputs and local variables are defined as variables
in the nuXmv model.
As explained in Section 4.1.2, a PLC block contains multiple compile units. These com-
pile units are sequentially executed in one PLC cycle from the first to the last compile
unit. This principle is modeled in the nuXmv mode by using an enumeration type named
loc which indicates the location of the execution in the block. Possible values of loc are
<start, nw1, nw2, ... end>. The values start and end indicate the start and end of
the PLC block; in these states, a change of value of the input variables of the PLC block is en-
abled. Due to this construct, the input variables of the PLC block cannot change during the
execution of the block. This also conforms with the PLC’s I/O cycle. The I/O cycle happens
before and after the program execution. This means that physical inputs are read before
the program is executed, and the physical outputs gain the updated values after execution
of the program. The sequence for loc is presented in Listing 4.
In the following example, the conversion of a code unit is illustrated. This example
extends to Example 4.5:
1 next ( loc ) :=
2 case
3 ( loc = s t a r t ) : nw1;
4 ( loc = nw1) : nw2;
5 ( loc = nw2) : nwXX;
6 . . .
7 ( loc = nwXX) : end ;
8 ( loc = end) : s t a r t ;
9 esac ;
Listing 4: Construct for loc
Example 4.7. Listing 5 presents a small part of the nuXmv model converted from the logic
model of Listing 1 and Example 4.5. It displays the code for the determination of the next state
of the variable o_bOutActiveHome (named bOutActiveHome in Listing 1). When loc =
nw29, the AND-evaluation of the two variables io_HMI_ValceControl_bHomeOn and
io_HMI_ValveControl_bSignalHome (named HMI_ValceControl_bHomeOn and
HMI_ValveControl_bSignalHome in Listing 1) occurs. The result of this evaluation be-
comes the next value for o_bOutActiveHome. When loc 6= nw29, the value of
o_bOutActiveHome remains unchanged.
1 next ( o_bOutActiveHome ) :=
2 case
3 ( loc = nw29) : ( io_HMI_ValveControl_bHomeOn & io_HMI_ValveControl_bSignalHome ) ;
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4 TRUE: o_bOutActiveHome ;
5 esac ;
Listing 5: nuXmv model
Definition 4.4. Let B be a module in the nuXmv model representing a function block.
The set of parameters P of B represent the inputs of the function block. The set of vari-
ables V of B represent the outputs and variables of the function block. V also consists
of a variable for the execution position in B and an instance of a module for all used global
variables. Let loc be the execution position in B . Start value of l oc = st ar t and the next
value of l oc is the next compile unit until end is reached. This cycle is then repeated indef-
initely. Let S be the set of next statements of the nuXmv model representing all variables
that are modified by the function block. 2
Definition 4.5. Let M be a module in the nuXmv model representing a main block where
B is called. The set of variables I of M represent the following: the inputs of B and one
instance of module B . For each input in I of B , when B has loc = end , the input is provided
a new non-deterministic value.
1 MODULE blockname ( input1 , input2 )
2 VAR
3 globalvars : globalvar ;
4 loc : { s t a r t , nw1, nw2, end } ;
5 output1 : boolean ;
6 ASSIGN
7 i n i t ( loc ) := s t a r t ;
8 i n i t ( output1 ) := FALSE ;
9
10 next ( loc ) :=
11 case
12 ( loc = s t a r t ) : nw1;
13 ( loc = nw1) : nw2;
14 ( loc = nw2) : end ;
15 ( loc = end) : s t a r t ;
16 esac ;
17
18 next ( output1 ) :=
19 case
20 ( loc = nw1) : ( input1 & input2 ) ;






27 input1 : boolean ;
28 input2 : boolean ;
29 Valve : blockname ( input1 , input2 ) ;
30 ASSIGN
2 Note that in nuXmv, a variable can only be used in one next statement. When a variable is given a new
value more than once in one PLC cycle in the PLC code, these assignments need to be consolidated into one
next statement.
28
31 i n i t ( input1 ) := FALSE ;
32 i n i t ( input2 ) := FALSE ;
33
34 next ( input1 ) :=
35 case
36 ( Valve . loc = end) : {FALSE , TRUE} ;
37 TRUE : input1 ;
38 esac ;
39
40 next ( input2 ) :=
41 case
42 ( Valve . loc = end) : {FALSE , TRUE} ;
43 TRUE : input2 ;
44 esac ;
Listing 6: Template nuXmv model
Semantics of nuXmv model: In Listing 6, an example template of a nuXmv model is dis-
played. It presents the overall structure of the nuXmv model of function block named
blockname with inputs, input1 and input2, and one output, output1. The model of
blockname consists of two compile units: nw1 and nw2.
In the next statement starting on line 18 of Listing 6, the next value of output1 is deter-
mined. If loc = nw1, then the statement input1 & input2 is evaluated, and the result is
assigned to output1. If loc 6= nw1, then the value of output1 remains unchanged.
From line 25 of Listing 6, the main module is presented. The main module instanti-
ates module blockname once and determines a non-deterministic value for the inputs of
module blockname for each PLC cycle.
One important note to consider is the granularity of a single state in the proposed nuXmv
models. In Section 4.1.3, it is explained that each line with a formula of the logic model is
executed sequentially. This means that after every instruction, the state of that logic model
changes. The state of the nuXmv model, however, depends on whole compile units. Infor-
mally, this means that a whole compile unit is executed at once. This abstraction is done
for the sake of state space reduction. If the nuXmv would treat every instruction separately,
this would blow up the state space. In the case study, this abstraction causes no problems
because in the case study, only single assignments for each variable for each compile unit
are made. Informally, no variable is written a (different) value more than once for each
compile unit. A possible solution to this limitation can be the modeling of an extra state for
the extra assignments of the variable. When, for example, a compile unit with loc = nw2
has two assignments of the same variable, the loc = nw2 can be divided into loc = nw2a
and loc = nw2b. This creates an extra state where the second assignment of the variable
can be accomplished.
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4.2. COMPOSITIONAL MODEL CHECKING
This section describes compositional model checking and how it is applied in this study. In
the first part of this section, the applied abstraction of lower-level blocks is discussed. Dur-
ing the verification of the abstracted model a counterexample can be provided by nuXmv.
This is the indication to apply the CEGAR-method on the model. In the second part of this
section, a compositional approach for CEGAR is presented. These steps are visualized in









Figure 10: Overview compositional approach
4.2.1 ABSTRACTION OF LOWER-LEVEL BLOCKS
One of the challenges of model checking real systems is the state space explosion. Indus-
trial PLC applications are no exception. For hierarchical programs, a modular technique,
as proposed by Clarke et al. [6], can be used. This technique is called compositional rea-
soning. Combined with model checking, it becomes compositional model checking.
Compositional model checking can be applied to hierarchical PLC programs by hid-
ing details of the lower-level blocks. Only details that are of interest and applicable to the
higher-level block are considered, thus merging all states of the lower-level blocks that are
not relevant for the model checking of the higher-level block. This reduces the number of
states and thus mitigates the state space explosion to an extent.
There are also disadvantages of compositional model checking. It is challenging to de-
termine if the simplified lower-level blocks are still functionally equal to the original lower
level blocks. This makes it hard to automate the simplification of the lower-level blocks and
still requires human intervention by applying, for example, CEGAR.
Next, an simplified example of compositional model checking is introduced and pre-
sented to clarify its applicability to hierarchical PLC programs.
Example 4.8. For this example two new blocks are introduced and presented. The higher-
level block, FB1, is called fbHigh, and the lower-level block, FB10, is called fbLow. These
blocks are illustrated in Figure 11.
To be able to focus on the used approach, blocks FB1 and FB10 consist of minimal func-
tionality. The Block FB10 is called from the block FB1. Functionality of FB10 is as follows:
FB10 consists of two inputs, input11 and input 12, and one output, output 11. Let the func-
tion of FB10 be an AND-function. Only when both input11 and input12 are true, output11 is
also true. In all other cases output11 is false. Functionality of FB1 is as follows: FB1 consists of
two inputs, input1 and input2, and one output, output 1. Both inputs, input1 and input2,
are connected with input11 and input12, of FB10, respectively. The output of FB10, out-
put11, is inverted before it connects with the output of FB1, output1. This results in an over-
all functionality of FB1 as follows: output1 = !(input1 & input2). This is illustrated in
Figure 12, the blue rectangle illustrates the scope of FB1 and the red rectangle illustrates the
scope of FB10.
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To model check FB1, FB10 must also be considered because output1 is controlled by the
output output11 of FB10. Here, compositional model checking is used as a solution, mod-
eling FB10 as a black box instead of completely modeling FB10 in the model of FB1. See
Definition 4.6 for the definition of modeling a block as a black box. An example of the nuXmv
model containing a black box is in Listing 7.
















Figure 12: Example functionality of the higher-level and lower-level blocks, FB1 and FB10.
1 next ( output11 ) :=
2 case
3 ( loc = nw1) : {FALSE , TRUE} ;
4 TRUE : output11 ;
5 esac ;
Listing 7: Example black box output
Definition 4.6. Let B be the block to be modeled as a black box, and let Bbb be the modeled
black box. All inputs of the interface of B are not relevant for Bbb . Let O be a set of all
outputs of the interface of B ; these are relevant for Bbb and are modeled. All outputs in O
are modeled so that these are given a new non-deterministic determined value in each PLC
cycle.
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Semantics of abstraction of lower-level blocks: In Listing 7, an example of the output of
FB10 in FB1 is revealed in nuXmv code. FB10 is named the lower-level block, and FB1 is
named the higher-level block; this is also illustrated in Figure 11.
The only information needed from the lower-level block is the datatype of the output
of the lower-level block. For Boolean outputs, a non-deterministic generated value is as-
signed to the variable connected to the output of the lower-level block. This value can
change every PLC cycle. This makes the lower-level block a black box. It is not important
what inputs it uses or what the functionality of the block is. Informally stated, it is not nec-
essary to know what the block does, it is only important to assume that the outputs of the
lower-level block can have any possible value.
In cases where the output has the datatype integer, this becomes more complex. To
minimize the state space expansion, it is important to check which values of this variable
are used in the higher-level block. If the higher-level block only uses the values of 1, 2 and 3,
it suffices to give the output of the lower-level block at least these values and, for example, 0
and 4. The values 6 or 99 do not lead to a different state than 4 and, thus only cause the state
space to explode. It is key to observe that values around the overflow value of the datatype
are also worth considering.
4.2.2 COMPOSITIONAL APPROACH USING CEGAR
A methodology used for further abstraction of an abstract model is CEGAR [5]. This is pro-
posed to keep the state space to a minimum.
In this study, we create the initial abstract model with the black box for lower-level
blocks. This model is verified with an initial set of properties. If the model confirms to the
properties, no further refinement is necessary. If the verification presents a counterexam-
ple, an additional manual check is needed. This check is to verify that the counterexample
is not a counterexample in the abstracted model without the black box. This generates
the conclusion that this counterexample is introduced by the black box. The abstractions
enable the model to reach states that are not reachable in the real system.
The refinement step is used to integrate an assumption of the lower-level block in the
model of the higher-level block. This is exemplified in Example 4.9.
Example 4.9. This example presents a counterexample and an application of Definition 4.7.
FB10 from Figure 11 is replaced with a black box. This means that the variables connected to
the outputs of FB10 are provided a random value as revealed in the nuXmv example code in
Listing 7. When model checking this abstracted model, a counterexample is given by nuXmv
for the following property Pb :
AG ( (loc = end & input1 & input2 ) → ! output1 ) (1)
This property checks, for example, whether the output (output1) is false when both in-
put1 and input2 are true.
In Listing 7, the variable output11 is given a random value. The value of this output is
normally determined by FB10 as described in Example 4.8. This output is also used in FB1 to
propagate the value to the output output1 variable of FB1. Thus, output1 is also assigned
a random value.
In the counterexample, a state is revealed where loc = end and input1 and input2 are
both TRUE, but output1 is also TRUE. This is caused by the abstracted model of the output
of FB10. Instead of modeling FB10 as a solution to the counterexample, the model of FB1
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is refined. Here the proposed compositional approach is applied as a solution to the coun-
terexample and to eliminate the need to completely model FB10 for the verification of FB1.
The assumption is that output11 of FB10 is true when both inputs of FB10 are true. This
property, Pl l , reveals this assumption:
AG ( ( loc = end & input11 & input12 ) → output11 ) ) (2)
Specification 2 is used for the verification of FB10 to ensure that FB10 actually satisfies the
property. Specification 2 is also used for the verification of FB1 by applying it as an assump-
tion. The invariant definition of nuXmv is used to apply this assumption to FB1. Defini-
tion 4.7 is used for the compositional approach. This provides the following INVAR specifi-
cation and verification property:
INVAR ( ( loc = end & input11 & input12 ) → output11 ) )
AG ( ( loc = end & input1 & input2 ) → !output1 ) (3)
Specification 3 combines the assumption/property for FB10, which is also verified by the ver-
ification of FB10, with the property for FB1. Informally, The following is checked with this
property: FB1 propagates the signals input1 and input2 to the inputs of the lower-level
block FB10, and FB10 correctly combines the signals of input11 and input12 to its output
output11, FB1, then, inverts the signal of output11 and outputs this signal with output1.
The assumption in Specification 3 is expressed with the INVAR statement. This instructs the
higher-level model to only consider the states where this assumption/invariant holds. Verify-
ing Specification 3 checks the functionality illustrated in Figure 12 by the blue rectangle but
excluding the area of the red rectangle. The functionality in the red rectangle is verified with
the verification of the lower-level block, FB10, by the property in Specification 2.
Definition 4.7. Let B be a block, and let Bl l be the lower-level block that is called in B . When
for a property of B , an output of Bl l is used, the property of that output from Bl l is added
to the model of B in the following way: Let Pb be the property of B and Pl l the property
of the output of Bl l . Let SDl l be the state definition of Pl l . For example, Pl l = AG(Q) then
SDl l = Q. The compositional approach for the nuXmv model of B is then to add SDl l to
the model of B as an invariant state. The model of B therefore contains INVAR (SDl l ) and
Pb .
Semantics of compositional approach using CEGAR: Example 4.9 illustrates the pro-
posed approach of compositional model checking of a hierarchical PLC program. First,
it is important to understand the larger picture of this approach. The approach uses the
modularity of the PLC program by verifying only the block itself and not all lower-level
blocks. Every lower-level block is verified separately. Let the higher-level block consist of
one lower-level block. Then, first the lower-level block is verified. Next, the higher-level
block is verified. In the model of the higher-level block, the lower-level block is modeled
as a black box conforming to Definition 4.6. Because the lower-level block is successfully
verified, this property can be used as an assumption over the lower-level block in the model
of the higher-level block, also see Example 4.9. Lastly the higher-level block is successfully
verified.
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To enable compositional and hierachical model checking it is important that the prop-
erty used for the verification of the block itself is the same as the property that is used for the
assumption in a higher-level block. For example, it is not correct to verify the block with
AF (Q) and use the assumption of AG(Q) in the higher-level block. The block can reach
states during verification that it cannot reach when verifying the higher-level block.
Furthermore, as longs as a compositional property is in the form AG(...), it is possible
to model them in nuXmv. Using the INVAR specification in nuXmv causes the model checker
to apply this invariant to all states of the model. Informally, the assumption is that the
lower-level block always, complies with this specification. That the lower-level block actu-
ally conforms to this assumption is checked during the verification of that property for the
lower-level block itself.
Thus, as long as properties are in the form AG(...) it is possible to use them as an as-
sumption in a higher-level block and the compositional approach is possible. For example,
let AG(Q) be the property of the lower-level block and AG(P ) the property of the higher-
level block.
First, the lower-level block is successfully verified. Thus, Specification 4 holds. Then,
the higher-level block is provided with the assumption of AG(Q) by applying INVAR Q and
the property AG(P ) is successfully verified. This can be combined into one specification,
Specification 5. Thus, after successful verification, also Specification 5 holds.
AG ( Q ) (4)
AG ( Q ) → AG ( P ) (5)
As both Specification 4 and 5 hold, modus ponens can be applied to result into Specifi-
cation 6. This proves that AG(P ) holds for the higher-level block.
AG ( Q )
AG ( Q ) → AG ( P )
AG ( P ) (6)
The proposed compositional approach is sound as demonstrated above, as long as
properties in the form of AG(...) are used. This is because of the use of the INVAR and
that properties of blocks can be used for assumptions in higher-level blocks, thus to en-
able a compositional approach. This approach does not apply if AF, EG and EF properties
are used. For example, replace AG(Q) with AF (Q) in both Specification 4 and 5. Although
modus ponens can still be applied, the assumption AF (Q) can not be modeled in nuXmv in
the higher-level block as an INVAR.
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5. CASE STUDY
In this chapter, the case study of this research is discussed. The machine process and PLC
program used for this case study are discussed in Chapter 3.
This chapter focuses on the leadup to the model checking process for the discussed PLC
program. The following steps have been implemented: First, the PLC program requires
preparation for exporting. Then, information about the PLC program is extracted from the
export by means of the developed TIA-XML-modcheck tool. This extracted information is
then used for the creation of the nuXmv model. After the specification of the properties to
verify, the model checking is executed. Lastly, the results and the validation of the models



















Sections 5.6 and 5.7
Figure 13: Overview case study section
5.1. PREPARATION FOR EXPORT
To successfully extract the information from the export, the PLC program needs some prepa-
ration before exporting. Although the export function of TIA Portal Openness supports all
programming languages, the developed TIA-XML-modcheck tool, for now, only supports
the FBD programming language. The LAD Programming language is also a graphical pro-
gramming language but uses different constructs for compile units. The SCL programming
language is text-based, which leads to a different structure of the export file.
As the focus of this research is the compositional model checking aspect of this case
study, the choice is made to support only FBD and convert the LAD blocks into FBD. This
is an integrated function of the TIA Portal engineering environment. Blocks FB110, FB330,
FC329 and FC333 are written in LAD but converted to FBD. For the sequencer, two small
SCL blocks, FB185 and FC185, are used. These are not exported nor translated into logic
models. Their functions are manually added to the nuXmv model, as the functions are very
trivial, being sequences consisting of mainly steps and transitions.
5.2. INFORMATION EXTRACTION
The process of information extraction consists of the export of the PLC program and con-
version of the PLC program into logic models. This process is illustrated in Figure 5. The
steps of this process are discussed in more detail below.
Exporting the PLC program to XML files is done with the help of the Siemens TIA Por-
tal tool: TIA Portal Openness. A list of the XML files created by TIA Portal Openness is in
Appendix C. This list is generated by the TIA-XML-modcheck tool.
The next step is for the TIA-XML-modcheck tool to import the exported PLC program
and to create the logic model as discussed in Section 4.1.3. The TIA-XML-modcheck tool
generates the logic models of the PLC blocks written in the FBD programming language.




To model check the PLC program, the logic model first needs to be converted into a nuXmv
model. The creation of the nuXmv models is done manually with the help of the logic models
from the previous section. To further simplify the creation of nuXmv models, a template for
the nuXmv models is created. This template is discussed in more detail in Section 4.2.1.
During the manual process of converting the logic models into nuXmv models, three
exceptions came to light. The first exception is that the biggest block, FB110, needed opti-
mizations to access the verification time within a usable time frame. These optimizations
are at the end of this subsection. The second exception is for FB5, the program sequence.
Because the blocks called in FB5 (FB185 and FC185) are written in the SCL programming
language, there is no logic model created for these blocks. The functionality of FB185 and
FC185 is very basic, and thus, these blocks are omitted from FB5 and replaced with man-
ually created nuXmv constructs. The last and third exception is the assignment of multiple
values to a variable. In nuXmv, it is only possible to use one next statement per variable.
If a variable is assigned a value multiple times in a compile unit, then these assignments
need to be divided into multiple states. However, this is not applicable to this case study,
as in this PLC program, variables are only written a value once per compile unit. This is
discussed in more detail together with a proposed solution in Section 4.1.4.
Optimizations: The first manually constructed nuXmv model of FB110 demonstrated that
it would trigger a state space explosion. It was not able to verify the given set of CTL spec-
ifications within a reasonable time frame. The verification was stopped manually after a
duration of 60 minutes.
After manual inspection, the nuXmv model appears to feature parts of dead code and
unbounded integers. The dead code part consists of an integer variable and two Boolean
variables that are assigned values but are never used in the PLC program. After manual
deletion of the dead code parts, the model is verifiable for all named specifications. How-
ever, the verification took a fair amount of time, around 30 minutes.
After further manual inspection, unbounded integer variables were found. These inte-
ger variables are only used for comparing their value to a few other constant integer values
(e.g., the integer values 1, 2 and 10). By manually bounding the integer variable to {0, 1, 2
,10}, all other values are not considered for the states of the model. This last optimization
brings the verification time back to a maximum of 180 seconds for all named specifications.
The nuXmv models with integer constants demonstrated a longer verification time. By
increasingly adding these constants, the verification time again exceeded a reasonable time
frame. Therefore, the nuXmv models of FB110 and FC333 are extended with a module
named global. This module consists of global constants, and the use of these nuXmv con-
stants reduced the verification time again within a reasonable time frame of a maximum of
180 seconds.
The created nuXmv models of the PLC program are in Appendix F.
5.4. PROPERTIES TO VERIFY
For model checking the nuXmv models, properties need to be specified to which the models
should comply to. The properties to verify cover a broad spectrum of properties of the
specified models. The specified properties are discussed in more detail in the following
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paragraphs. A complete list of all checked properties per block is in Appendix G.
The first properties specified for all blocks concern basic reachability properties of the
models. Two example properties are specified in Specifications 7 and 8. Specification 7
specifies that the variable loc will necessarily have the value end. When this property is
successfully verified, this reveals that the model will necessarily reach the location where
loc=end. It also illustrates that the model does not indefinitely loop in a compile unit be-
fore reaching loc=end, which thus prevents it from reaching the location where loc=end.
However, there is an intended loop in the model which enables the cyclic execution of the
block. From the location loc=end, the model circles back to the location loc=start to ex-
ecute the code for another cycle. Specification 8 is more strict and defines that every path
necessarily leads back to the location where loc=end.
In addition to Specification 7, Specification 9 checks if no loops are possible from the
location loc=end to the location loc=start. It defines that the next state from loc=end
will always be loc=start. Together with the check for loops before reaching the location
loc=end from Specification 7, this completes the check for loops.
With a successful verification of these properties, we conclude that the model keeps
cycling through its locations and passes through the location loc=end. During manual
simulation, it was also possible to see the model cycle through all locations as expected.
AF ( loc = end ) (7)
AG AF ( loc = end ) (8)
AG ( loc = end −> AX ( loc = start ) ) (9)
As discussed in Section 4.1.4, the execution of the block is finished when it reaches the
end location. After reaching the end location, the newly computed output values can be
used for further processing. This fact is used to check the model for basic liveness prop-
erties. In the end location of the model, whether the outputs can become true is veri-
fied. An example is presented in Specification 10 and reveals the verification of the output
output_bOutCommandWork of the block FB110, which is used to control a solenoid valve.
Although the functionality is not checked, whether there is a state in the model where this
output can become true is checked. These kind of liveness properties are tested after the
construction of the model.
EF ( loc = end & output_bOutCommandWork ) (10)
Next is the check to verify the functionality of the nuXmv model of the PLC block that
controls the valves (FB110). This is done with several functional properties. An important
property among these functional properties for this case study is to check if there is a pos-
sibility that a solenoid valve is given a command to open and a command to close at the
same time. This can lead to an undefined position of the actual valve. This property is pre-
sented in Specification 11, and it checks that in all states, both commands are never given
to the valve. This is checked when loc = end and conforms with the PLC’s I/O cycle as
discussed in Section 4.1.4.
AG ( loc = end −> ! ( output_bOutCommandHome
& output_bOutCommandWork ) ) (11)
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The following two properties also check the functionality of the nuXmv model of FB110.
Specification 12 checks whether the right command is output in automatic mode. Auto-
matic mode is defined as iInMode = 0sd16_1. Here, it is checked that FB110 does not
output the command to close the valve when it receives the command to open the valve
from the step program (FB5). Specification 13 checks the situation when the emergency
stop is activated. In this case study, the choice was made to give the valve no command at
all. This is checked with Specification 13 below.
AG ( ( loc = end & bInCommandWork & iInMode = 0sd16_1 )
−> ! output_bOutCommandHome ) (12)
AG ( ( loc = end & bInEstop ) −> ( ! output_bOutCommandHome
& ! output_bOutCommandWork ) ) (13)
With the properties described above and some additional properties, whether FB110
properly executes the commands it receives from the step program is verified. The valve
cannot be controlled in an incorrect manner when it complies with the properties above.
The part that remains is the step program FB5. With the following properties, whether FB5
sends the correct commands to FB110 is verified. When FB5 is programmed incorrectly, it
could be possible to send the open command to both valves at the same time.
Specification 14 checks if FB5 only sends the command to open one of the two liquid
supply valves and never both valves at the same time. Specification 15 checks that if one
valve is sent a command to open, the other two valves are not given a command to open.
This property is displayed for the supply valve of liquid 1, but the two other remaining
combinations are also verified. These are in Appendix G. Specification 16 even checks that
when a valve is sent the open command, the other valves are physically in the closed state.
AG ( loc = end −> ! ( bVlvLiq1_Open & bVlvLiq2_Open ) ) (14)
AG ( ( loc = end & bVlvLiq1_Open ) −> ! ( bVlvDrn_Open
| bVlvLiq2_Open ) ) (15)
AG ( ( loc = end & bVlvLiq1_Open ) −> ( Ib_VlvDrnClosed
& Ib_VlvLiq2Closed ) ) (16)
A complete overview of all verified properties is in Appendix G.
5.5. COMPOSITIONAL MODEL CHECKING
In this section, the compositional reasoning and model checking are discussed in more
detail. First, the use of black boxes in the nuXmv models is presented. (This is as introduced
in Section 4.2.1.) Then, it is illustrated that through using CEGAR, it is possible to create
verification properties using compositional reasoning.
In Figure 4 from Section 3 and in Appendix D, it is clear that some blocks execute lower-
level blocks. The blocks executing lower-level blocks are as follows: FB2, FB3, FB4, FB5 and
FB110. In this case study, however, only FB110 is of interest. FB2, FB3 and FB4 only execute
their own instance of FB110; no further logic is added in FB2, FB3 and FB4. The executed
lower-level blocks in FB5 are programmed in the SCL programming language, which can-
not be directly converted into FBD. The FBD programming language is mainly used in this
case study and is the only supported language of the developed TIA-XML-modcheck tool.
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FB110 is of interest because of the logic in this block and the execution of three lower-level
blocks that contain relatively simple logic. The three executed lower-level blocks are FB330,
FC329 and FC333.
The approach of defining the execution of lower-level blocks as black boxes is already
described in Section 4.2.1. The application of black boxes can also be found in the nuXmv
models (see Appendix F). The variables that are connected to outputs of lower-level blocks
are modeled as displayed in Listing 7. When, however, one of these variables has an im-
pact on a specified property, it is possible that the used black box definition is specified too
loosely. This causes the property to fail, although the system under verification does com-
ply with the property. With this counterexample and the CEGAR method, the properties
are redefined using a compositional approach, as explained in Section 4.2.2.
An example of a property that failed verification due to the implementation of a black
box is the property in Specification 17. This is the functionality of FB330, which consoli-
dates all errors generated by FB110 into one error signal that is assigned to an output of
FB110.
AG ( ( loc = end & output_ERROR_Valve_NoHomeFeedback
& output_bOutAuto ) −> output_bOutError ) (17)
The property in Specification 17 fails because of the following reasons. The variable
output_bOutError is assigned the value of variable inout_HMI_ValveControl_bError.
Variable inout_HMI_ValveControl_bError is assigned a non-deterministic value by means
of a black box because normally this variable is assigned to an output of the lower-level
block FB330; this is the output named output_bOutErrorExists. Variable
output_bOutError is thus also assigned a non-deterministic value, and this causes Speci-
fication 17 to fail.
The next step is applying the approach discussed in Section 4.2.2 and adding an as-
sumption about the lower-level block (FB330) in this block (FB110). This is done by adding
the property of the lower-level block to the model as discussed in Section 4.2.2. The prop-
erty has to define output inout_HMI_ValveControl_bError of FB330. This is then added
to the nuXmv model as displayed below in Specification 18.
INVAR ( ( loc = end & output_ERROR_Valve_NoHomeFeedback ) −>
inout_HMI_ValveControl_bError )
AG ( ( loc = end & output_ERROR_Valve_NoHomeFeedback
& output_bOutAuto ) −> output_bOutError ) (18)
Now, the value of variable inout_HMI_ValveControl_bError is not a non-deterministic
value anymore. Informally, if variable output_ERROR_Valve_NoHomeFeedback is true, then
variable inout_HMI_ValveControl_bError must also be true, which is basically part of
the logic of FB330.
All properties for compositional model checking are in Appendix H.
5.6. RESULTS
The results of this case study for the safety of the described process depend on the potential
for contact between the two liquids. To analyze this, the PLC program can be divided into
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two parts. One part is the control of a solenoid valve, which is done by FB110, called a
driver. The other part is the sequence of steps controlling the overall process, called a step
program.
The driver is model checked, and it is never possible to, for example, command the
valve to open and close at the same time. Furthermore, the valve will only send a command
to the valve when the driver receives a command to do so. These situations might sound
trivial but in this case are model checked to be absolutely sure no erroneous controls are
possible. See the properties of FB110 in Appendix G for all checked properties.
The step program sends commands to the drivers of the valves. The step program co-
ordinates when each valve needs to close or open. Here, it is checked whether only one
command to open is sent to one valve and that the other two valves must be closed. See
the properties of FB5 in Appendix G for all checked properties.
Both the driver and the step program pass the model checking properties. Additionally,
the lower-level blocks of the driver pass their model checking properties. This means that
for the situations specified in the properties, this PLC program is safe with regards to the
dosing of the two liquids.
The specified properties cover the automatic mode of the valve driver in conjunction
with the step program. However, if manual operation is enabled, for example an HMI, the
case study is currently not safe. Manual operation is not verified and is therefore considered
unsafe. Furthermore, manual operations are not secured nor interlocked in the current PLC
program.
In reality, there are a multitude of possible unsafe situations caused by, for example,
failing hardware. However, these hardware faults are difficult for the PLC to recognize with
the current layout of inputs and outputs. Nevertheless, this is part of the hardware design
and would be revealed during a proper risk evaluation; it is not within the scope of this
study.
5.7. VALIDATION
Validation of the results of the case study is precisely executed. The validation is divided
into several elements, corresponding to several intermediate results of the information ex-
traction and model checking.
The first check is completed after generation of the logic models. Each logic model is
checked, line for line, against the original PLC program. This ensures that the logic mod-
els match the corresponding PLC code. A PLC program can consist of a great number of
different instructions; validation is completed only for the instructions that are used in the
case study. During this validation step, whether the order of PLC instructions is maintained
correctly in the logic model is also verified.
The next check is done after manual conversion from logic models to nuXmv models. By
means of the specified properties, some sanity checks are executed on the nuXmv models.
This is achieved to ensure the models cycle through the locations and the outputs can take
different values. The properties that check the functionality of the nuXmv models are also
checked in the PLC program. This is done by means of simulation where the PLC program
is loaded into a simulated PLC. The inputs of the block under testing can be manipulated
to simulate the property. After the manual conversion from logic models to nuXmv models,
these properties revealed some typos in the nuXmv models after the initial verification run.
Together with the logic models and the simulated PLC blocks, these typos were rectified.
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6. DISCUSSION
In this chapter, several subjects are discussed. First, the advantages of the formal defini-
tions and the support for the latest TIA Portal engineerin environment are discussed. Then,
the subject of compositional model checking is reviewed. This chapter ends with the char-
acteristics and applicability of the proposed approach.
6.1. FORMAL DEFINITIONS
One of the valuable results of this study is the formal definition of compile units and exe-
cution order as discussed in Section 4.1.2. Standardization efforts in the PLC industry have
had an effect but do not provide a watertight solution and lack formal definitions. An ex-
ample is the IEC-61131 standard. This standard leaves room for interpretation and is too
extensive to implement in an error-free manner. Formal definitions of the IEC-61131 stan-
dard can therefore be valuable. However, formal definitions concerning these topics are
hard to find. Manufacturers even leave ambiguity or incompleteness in their informal def-
initions and explanations or do not describe them at all. Formal definitions on these topics
coupled with Siemens PLCs are also absent from published literature. The importance of
specific literature concerning Siemens PLCs is that every PLC manufacturer can choose
different implementations that can both effect the definitions of compile units and the ex-
ecution order.
6.2. SUPPORT FOR NEW ENGINEERING ENVIRONMENT
Another important result from this study is the conversion from a graphical programming
language (i.e., FBD) to a textual logic model. With the help of XML export files from TIA Por-
tal with TIA Openness and the developed TIA-XML-modcheck tool, it is possible to quickly
convert FBD PLC programs into the discussed logic models. The current version of the TIA-
XML-modcheck tool only supports the FBD programming language; other Siemens pro-
gramming languages are not yet supported. Siemens TIA Portal supports a great number
of instructions, but not all instructions are currently supported by the TIA-XML-modcheck
tool. The most popular instructions are supported, and at least all instructions used in
the PLC program of the case study are supported. The supported instructions are in Ap-
pendix B.
The logic model is used as an intermediate model. This provides greater flexibility to
the used programming languages and model checkers. Other programming languages can
be added and converted to logic models. Other model checkers can be used by converting
the logic models to the defined syntax of the model checker. The idea of an intermediate
model is also discussed in Adiego et al.’s [1] study, although they used SCL as the input
programming language, which is text-based. Darvas et al. [7] discuss the option to convert
LAD and FBD to STL by means of the Siemens engineering environment. However, this
is not true for TIA Portal, the most recent Siemens engineering environment, which was
introduced in 2011. Here FBD and LAD can be converted to each other but not to STL.
However, in this case study, a novel method is presented that takes the TIA Portal Openness
XML export files as an input.
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6.3. COMPOSITIONAL MODEL CHECKING
This case study also delivers valuable and promising results for the compositional approach
of model checking hierarchical PLC programs. Modular PLC programs are becoming more
the standard, and exactly this characteristic is leveraged in this study. This could improve
the scalability of model checking PLC programs to a great extent, through using the pro-
posed compositional approach. The actual improvement in scalability is not yet tested in
this study, but it enables a performance comparison between this compositional approach
and other approaches of model checking for PLC programs found in the literature.
The logic models together with other extracted information using the TIA-XML-mod-
check tool are manually converted into nuXmv models. This could and should be auto-
mated; however, this did not fit the timeframe of this study. A limitation of this proposed
approach occurs when a variable is assigned a value more than once in a compile unit. As
discussed in Section 4.1.4, the proposed nuXmv models consist of a single assignment per
variable per compile unit. In this case study, no situation occurred where a variable was
assigned a value more than once in one compile unit. In Section 4.1.4, a solution to this
limitation is proposed, but it comes at the expense of a larger state space. After the initial
verification run, it was obvious that the state space of the nuXmv models was too large, and
verification could not finish within 60 minutes. Further investigation revealed dead code
and unbounded integer variables, which caused an unnecessarily large state space. After
removing the dead code and bounding the integer variables, the verification could com-
plete in a reasonable time frame of 180 seconds.
The presented CEGAR method for creating the compositional model check properties
is currently accomplished manually. The creation of (compositional) properties still de-
mands significant time and specific knowledge about model checking and CTL. The com-
positional approach uses the inference rule of modus ponens for CTL, which means that
this approach is considered sound. The proposed method involves the use of invariants for
the assumptions of the lower-level blocks. These invariants apply to every possible state
of the model. This provides the limitation that, only AG properties can be correctly trans-
formed into invariants. For the case study this poses no problem as the lower-level prop-
erties are all AG properties. For the use of properties other than AG with this approach,
additional research is needed.
In this case study, the lower-level blocks consist of relatively basic logics, and thus the
compositional properties are not complex to create. When the lower-level blocks become
more complex, the creation of compositional properties becomes more difficult. Generally,
a PLC programmer does not possess the competencies to create these CTL properties. This
could endanger this approach. Other approaches in the literature, however, acknowledge
the same issue.
6.4. CHARACTERISTICS
One characteristic of this proposed approach is the fact that the modularity of modern PLC
programs is leveraged for compositional model checking. Hierarchical approaches (e.g.,
the ISA-88 standard) dictate the breakdown of a machine into smaller modules. The use of
this standard has become more common over the years. This can work in favor of this novel
compositional approach. The possible time savings and increase in scalability can also be
an enabling factor for the model checking of real industrial PLC programs. The complexity
decreases with a compositional approach. Modular sub parts can be verified without losing
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the ability to verify properties of the whole PLC program.
A second characteristic of this study is the use of Siemens TIA Portal and TIA Portal
Openness for export of the PLC program. This enables direct export of PLC program blocks.
Although TIA Portal has existed for 10 years, current literature mainly uses the previous
engineering environment from Siemens. Export options of these two engineering environ-
ments are not comparable nor fully compatible with one another. Thus, the approach of
this study gains an advantage for both now and in the future.
6.5. APPLICABILITY
The degree of applicability depends mainly on two subjects beyond the proposed approach
and tool. First, the PLC program that is used as input influences the applicability and effec-
tiveness of the proposed approach. Second, the competencies and knowledge about model
checking of the engineer who applies this approach greatly influences the applicability of
this approach.
PLC programs that are structured in a hierarchical way gain the full advantage of the
proposed approach. Other more old-fashioned PLC programs generally consist of highly
coupled blocks and are less structured. Applying the proposed approach on these highly
coupled PLC programs would be more difficult. Dividing the PLC program in multiple
smaller parts becomes more complex when the PLC program is highly coupled and not hi-
erarchically structured. The support for the TIA Portal engineering environment together
with the support for the FBD graphical programming language create a starting point for a
novel approach for model checking of modern PLC program, which increases future appli-
cability.
Applicability is also largely impacted by the competencies and knowledge of the desig-
nated engineer. A typical PLC engineer has no knowledge of model checking or CTL. In any
case, it is necessary for the engineer to know the basics used for model checking and more
detailed knowledge about CTL to specify the properties needed for verification.
The use of the proposed compositional approach does not limit the applicability. The
approach is considered sound as demonstrated in Section 4.2.2. The used invariant is ap-
plicable to every state of the model and can therefore only be used when the property in
the lower-level block is of the form AG(...).
To increase applicability of the TIA-XML-modcheck too, the creation of nuXmv models
could be automated; this is currently done manually. By extending the supported program-
ming languages for the TIA-XML-modcheck tool, applicability can be further increased.




In this study, numerous steps for compositional model checking of PLC programs are dis-
cussed. From the PLC export of the PLC program, a graph, which is used for the creation
of logic models, is extracted. These logic models are manually converted into nuXmv mod-
els and are then used for model checking. With the help of CEGAR, compositional model
checking is presented for the verification of PLC programs. To enable these conversions,
several formal definitions are proposed in this research. A case study is used to demon-
strate and present results of the proposed approach. The results reveal the applicability
and several advantages of the proposed approach. In the following paragraphs, the steps
are summarized in greater detail.
The first step is information extraction, where the PLC program is successfully exported,
using a novel approach from the engineering environment TIA Portal with the help of TIA
Openness. Several formal definitions are provided and discussed to develop a tool for the
conversion from export to a logic model. Definitions are provided for compile units, exe-
cution order and the logic model. The algorithm for the conversion from export to logic
model is also offered and discussed in more detail. This approach enables a fast and clear
conversion from the original PLC program to a logic model. The conversion to the nuXmv
model, however, is still manually executed.
The second step consists of the compositional model checking of the nuXmv models. For
this step, the nuXmv model is used, and lower-level blocks are considered as black boxes.
The definition for black boxes is also provided and discussed in this study. Then, using CE-
GAR, the next abstraction refinement steps are determined. These are then added to the
nuXmv model. Using this approach has allowed for the creation of compositional verifica-
tion properties and thus compositional model checking.
This study also discusses the application of the proposed approach to a given case study.
This case study describes how the proposed approach is applied and how all the steps of
the approach are executed. With the case study, a realistic example application for compo-
sitional model checking of a PLC program is provided. Because of the hierarchical structure
of the PLC program, the results consist of two parts: the part of the step program and the
part of the driver. The step program defines when something needs to happen, and the
driver controls the actual equipment and defines how the controls need to occur. It also
monitors the state of the equipment. For the automatic mode of this case study, it has
been revealed that a dangerous situation cannot occur. Thus, the safety of the process is
guaranteed from a software standpoint.
Contributions of this study can be grouped into three categories. The first category
consists of formal definitions stated in this study. Relevant formal definitions about, for ex-
ample, programming languages and manufacturer specific implementations are not pro-
vided by mentioned related studies. Available documentation mainly consists of informal
descriptions, and they tend to be ambiguous. The second category consists of support for
modern PLC programs. Direct exports from TIA Portal with TIA Openness are supported by
the developed tool. In addition, modern hierarchical and modular PLC programs can be
leveraged through use of its structure and modularity for compositional model checking.
The third category consists of the logic model and compositional model checking of PLC
programs. Use of the logic model enables a free choice in model checker. In this research,
nuXmv is used due to similarities between the nuXmv and logic model syntax. Additionally,
CEGAR is used to enable the compositional approach discussed in this study.
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7.1. FUTURE WORK
The proposed approach of this case study has some elements that could benefit from fur-
ther research and work. This further research is mainly needed to enlarge the applicability
of the developed tool and further substantiate the proposed compositional approach and
its scalability. Further research is also needed in the direction of formal definitions of the
PLC and the programming languages to access a solid foundation for formal verification.
The largest gain for applicability would be the possibility of an automated conversion
from the logic model to the nuXmv model, which is currently achieved manually. Another
task that currently demands significant time is the creation of compositional verification
properties for the nuXmv models. It would be a great feature if this could be (at least partly)
automated.
Currently, only the FBD programming language is supported with at least all instruc-
tions occurring in the PLC program of the case study. To increase applicability, future work
could focus on extending the TIA-XML-modcheck tool with support for more or all pro-
gramming languages available in TIA Portal. Parts of a PLC program can be programmed
in multiple programming languages. Therefore, the support for more programming lan-
guages would be a welcome addition. Depending on the PLC program, it is now possible
that the PLC program uses an instruction that is not supported by the TIA-XML-modcheck
tool. It would be another positive addition to further extend the support of instructions
used in PLC programs. Currently, the most common and all basic instructions are sup-
ported (see Appendix B).
An interesting follow-up to this study would be to compare the performance of this
compositional approach to approaches of other state-of-the-art tools. Mainly scalability is
of great interest because this is where the approach of this study should excel.
The lack of formal semantics of PLC standards as mentioned in Section 6.1 instigates a
valuable research direction for future work. The lack of formal definitions found through-
out this research has resulted in the creation of a few formal definitions used here. These
formal definitions, however, are not yet complete, and this surely requires more work. This
direction of future work can form the basis for further research in formal verification of
PLCs in general. This is considered a very important condition for further research in model
checking PLC programs. For formal verification of PLC programs, it is crucial to have solid
formal definitions about PLC programs.
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Name Main Number 1 Type OB
Language FBD Numbering Automatic
Information
Title "Main Program Sweep
(Cycle)"
Author Comment
Family Version 0.1 User-defined
ID
Name Data type Default value Comment
Input
Initial_Call Bool Initial call of this OB










































Name Program Logic Number 5 Type FB
Language FBD Numbering Automatic
Information
Title Author Comment
Family Version 0.1 User-defined
ID

















































































will be the last val‐
ue set for that in‐
put in a different
call. The initialized
value in the decla‐
ration section does
not set it back to
default if unwired.
Allways supply val‐
ues for all inputs.
Modified by Tim
Jager 2005-12-13




sion, no errors, no
timeout; still have










iInStep Int 0 Non-retain False Fals
e
False False Constant: current
step required for
the FB to run
iInNextStep Int 0 Non-retain False Fals
e
False False Next step to go to
if step is done
bInStep‐
Done
Bool false Non-retain False Fals
e
False False if step done logic



































tInStepDelay Time T#0ms Non-retain False Fals
e
False False After the step
done input is true,





Bool false Non-retain False Fals
e





Bool false Non-retain False Fals
e
False False If paused, trigger
next step
bInit Bool false Non-retain False Fals
e
False False











Bool false Non-retain False Fals
e
False False
bOutPaused Bool false Non-retain False Fals
e




Int 0 Non-retain False Fals
e






TON_TIME Non-retain False Fals
e
False False used to delay mov‐
ing to the next
step.
PT Time T#0ms Non-retain False Fals
e
False False
ET Time T#0ms Non-retain False Fals
e
False False
IN Bool false Non-retain False Fals
e
False False
Q Bool false Non-retain False Fals
e
False False
iCurrentStep Int 0 Non-retain False Fals
e




Bool false Non-retain False Fals
e
False False
CurrentStep Int 0 Non-retain True Tru
e
True True
NextStep Int 0 Non-retain True Tru
e
True False






























Network 3: 10 -- Controleer bak op aanwezigheid vloeistof
vloeistof aanwezig 10->11


































































































































































































































































































































































Name Valve Drain Number 4 Type FB
Language FBD Numbering Automatic
Information
Title Author Comment
Family Version 0.1 User-defined
ID







































tInTimeout Time T#0ms Non-retain False Fals
e





iInMode Int 0 Non-retain False Fals
e
False False Mode Selection





Bool false Non-retain False Fals
e




Bool false Non-retain False Fals
e
False False Work position
feedback
bInEnable Bool false Non-retain False Fals
e




Bool false Non-retain False Fals
e





Bool false Non-retain False Fals
e
False False Reset Error
bInSimulate Bool false Non-retain False Fals
e





Bool false Non-retain False Fals
e




Bool false Non-retain False Fals
e



































Bool false Non-retain False Fals
e




Bool false Non-retain False Fals
e
False False Valve is in work
position
bOutAuto Bool false Non-retain False Fals
e
False False Block in auto
mode
bOutError Bool false Non-retain False Fals
e











Bool false Non-retain False Fals
e





Bool false Non-retain False Fals
e







Bool false Non-retain False Fals
e







Bool false Non-retain False Fals
e






















Bool false Set in IDB False Fals
e




Bool false Set in IDB False Fals
e




Bool false Set in IDB False Fals
e




Bool false Set in IDB False Fals
e




Bool false Set in IDB False Fals
e




Bool false Set in IDB False Fals
e




Bool false Set in IDB False Fals
e




Bool false Set in IDB False Fals
e



































Bool false Set in IDB False Fals
e




Bool false Set in IDB False Fals
e




Bool false Set in IDB False Fals
e




Bool false Set in IDB False Fals
e




Bool false Set in IDB False Fals
e




Bool false Set in IDB False Fals
e




Bool false Set in IDB False Fals
e




Bool false Set in IDB False Fals
e




Bool false Set in IDB False Fals
e




Bool false Set in IDB False Fals
e




Bool false Set in IDB False Fals
e




Bool false Set in IDB False Fals
e




Bool false Set in IDB False Fals
e




Bool false Set in IDB False Fals
e




Bool false Set in IDB False Fals
e




Bool false Set in IDB False Fals
e




Bool false Set in IDB False Fals
e




Bool false Set in IDB False Fals
e




Bool false Set in IDB False Fals
e




Bool false Set in IDB False Fals
e




Bool false Set in IDB False Fals
e




Bool false Set in IDB False Fals
e






Bool false Set in IDB False Fals
e
False False An Error Exists
Totally Integrated
Automation Portal



































Int 0 Set in IDB False Fals
e








TON_TIME Non-retain False Fals
e
False False Delay between
each scroll for a
new error
PT Time T#0ms Non-retain False Fals
e
False False
ET Time T#0ms Non-retain False Fals
e
False False
IN Bool false Non-retain False Fals
e
False False





















































































































































































































































































Int 1 Non-retain False Fals
e






Int 1 Non-retain False Fals
e




Bool false Non-retain False Fals
e










TON_TIME Non-retain False Fals
e

































PT Time T#0ms Non-retain False Fals
e
False False
ET Time T#0ms Non-retain False Fals
e
False False
IN Bool false Non-retain False Fals
e
False False
Q Bool false Non-retain False Fals
e
False False
iLastMode Int 0 Non-retain False Fals
e
False False Last mode code
bNewMode Bool false Non-retain False Fals
e




Bool false Non-retain False Fals
e




Bool false Non-retain False Fals
e
False False Work position ena‐
bled
bAutoMode Bool false Non-retain False Fals
e




Bool false Non-retain False Fals
e
False False Manual Mode is
active





Bool false Non-retain False Fals
e
False False
bPB_Home Bool false Non-retain False Fals
e
False False



































































Valve Liquid 1 [FB2]
Valve Liquid 1 Properties
General
Name Valve Liquid 1 Number 2 Type FB
Language FBD Numbering Automatic
Information
Title Author Comment
Family Version 0.1 User-defined
ID







































tInTimeout Time T#0ms Non-retain False Fals
e





iInMode Int 0 Non-retain False Fals
e
False False Mode Selection





Bool false Non-retain False Fals
e




Bool false Non-retain False Fals
e
False False Work position
feedback
bInEnable Bool false Non-retain False Fals
e




Bool false Non-retain False Fals
e





Bool false Non-retain False Fals
e
False False Reset Error
bInSimulate Bool false Non-retain False Fals
e





Bool false Non-retain False Fals
e




Bool false Non-retain False Fals
e



































Bool false Non-retain False Fals
e




Bool false Non-retain False Fals
e
False False Valve is in work
position
bOutAuto Bool false Non-retain False Fals
e
False False Block in auto
mode
bOutError Bool false Non-retain False Fals
e











Bool false Non-retain False Fals
e





Bool false Non-retain False Fals
e







Bool false Non-retain False Fals
e







Bool false Non-retain False Fals
e






















Bool false Set in IDB False Fals
e




Bool false Set in IDB False Fals
e




Bool false Set in IDB False Fals
e




Bool false Set in IDB False Fals
e




Bool false Set in IDB False Fals
e




Bool false Set in IDB False Fals
e




Bool false Set in IDB False Fals
e




Bool false Set in IDB False Fals
e



































Bool false Set in IDB False Fals
e




Bool false Set in IDB False Fals
e




Bool false Set in IDB False Fals
e




Bool false Set in IDB False Fals
e




Bool false Set in IDB False Fals
e




Bool false Set in IDB False Fals
e




Bool false Set in IDB False Fals
e




Bool false Set in IDB False Fals
e




Bool false Set in IDB False Fals
e




Bool false Set in IDB False Fals
e




Bool false Set in IDB False Fals
e




Bool false Set in IDB False Fals
e




Bool false Set in IDB False Fals
e




Bool false Set in IDB False Fals
e




Bool false Set in IDB False Fals
e




Bool false Set in IDB False Fals
e




Bool false Set in IDB False Fals
e




Bool false Set in IDB False Fals
e




Bool false Set in IDB False Fals
e




Bool false Set in IDB False Fals
e




Bool false Set in IDB False Fals
e




Bool false Set in IDB False Fals
e






Bool false Set in IDB False Fals
e
False False An Error Exists
Totally Integrated
Automation Portal



































Int 0 Set in IDB False Fals
e








TON_TIME Non-retain False Fals
e
False False Delay between
each scroll for a
new error
PT Time T#0ms Non-retain False Fals
e
False False
ET Time T#0ms Non-retain False Fals
e
False False
IN Bool false Non-retain False Fals
e
False False





















































































































































































































































































Int 1 Non-retain False Fals
e






Int 1 Non-retain False Fals
e




Bool false Non-retain False Fals
e










TON_TIME Non-retain False Fals
e

































PT Time T#0ms Non-retain False Fals
e
False False
ET Time T#0ms Non-retain False Fals
e
False False
IN Bool false Non-retain False Fals
e
False False
Q Bool false Non-retain False Fals
e
False False
iLastMode Int 0 Non-retain False Fals
e
False False Last mode code
bNewMode Bool false Non-retain False Fals
e




Bool false Non-retain False Fals
e




Bool false Non-retain False Fals
e
False False Work position ena‐
bled
bAutoMode Bool false Non-retain False Fals
e




Bool false Non-retain False Fals
e
False False Manual Mode is
active





Bool false Non-retain False Fals
e
False False
bPB_Home Bool false Non-retain False Fals
e
False False

























































Valve Liquid 2 [FB3]
Valve Liquid 2 Properties
General
Name Valve Liquid 2 Number 3 Type FB
Language FBD Numbering Automatic
Information
Title Author Comment
Family Version 0.1 User-defined
ID







































tInTimeout Time T#0ms Non-retain False Fals
e





iInMode Int 0 Non-retain False Fals
e
False False Mode Selection





Bool false Non-retain False Fals
e




Bool false Non-retain False Fals
e
False False Work position
feedback
bInEnable Bool false Non-retain False Fals
e




Bool false Non-retain False Fals
e





Bool false Non-retain False Fals
e
False False Reset Error
bInSimulate Bool false Non-retain False Fals
e





Bool false Non-retain False Fals
e




Bool false Non-retain False Fals
e



































Bool false Non-retain False Fals
e




Bool false Non-retain False Fals
e
False False Valve is in work
position
bOutAuto Bool false Non-retain False Fals
e
False False Block in auto
mode
bOutError Bool false Non-retain False Fals
e











Bool false Non-retain False Fals
e





Bool false Non-retain False Fals
e







Bool false Non-retain False Fals
e







Bool false Non-retain False Fals
e






















Bool false Set in IDB False Fals
e




Bool false Set in IDB False Fals
e




Bool false Set in IDB False Fals
e




Bool false Set in IDB False Fals
e




Bool false Set in IDB False Fals
e




Bool false Set in IDB False Fals
e




Bool false Set in IDB False Fals
e




Bool false Set in IDB False Fals
e



































Bool false Set in IDB False Fals
e




Bool false Set in IDB False Fals
e




Bool false Set in IDB False Fals
e




Bool false Set in IDB False Fals
e




Bool false Set in IDB False Fals
e




Bool false Set in IDB False Fals
e




Bool false Set in IDB False Fals
e




Bool false Set in IDB False Fals
e




Bool false Set in IDB False Fals
e




Bool false Set in IDB False Fals
e




Bool false Set in IDB False Fals
e




Bool false Set in IDB False Fals
e




Bool false Set in IDB False Fals
e




Bool false Set in IDB False Fals
e




Bool false Set in IDB False Fals
e




Bool false Set in IDB False Fals
e




Bool false Set in IDB False Fals
e




Bool false Set in IDB False Fals
e




Bool false Set in IDB False Fals
e




Bool false Set in IDB False Fals
e




Bool false Set in IDB False Fals
e




Bool false Set in IDB False Fals
e






Bool false Set in IDB False Fals
e
False False An Error Exists
Totally Integrated
Automation Portal



































Int 0 Set in IDB False Fals
e








TON_TIME Non-retain False Fals
e
False False Delay between
each scroll for a
new error
PT Time T#0ms Non-retain False Fals
e
False False
ET Time T#0ms Non-retain False Fals
e
False False
IN Bool false Non-retain False Fals
e
False False





















































































































































































































































































Int 1 Non-retain False Fals
e






Int 1 Non-retain False Fals
e




Bool false Non-retain False Fals
e










TON_TIME Non-retain False Fals
e

































PT Time T#0ms Non-retain False Fals
e
False False
ET Time T#0ms Non-retain False Fals
e
False False
IN Bool false Non-retain False Fals
e
False False
Q Bool false Non-retain False Fals
e
False False
iLastMode Int 0 Non-retain False Fals
e
False False Last mode code
bNewMode Bool false Non-retain False Fals
e




Bool false Non-retain False Fals
e




Bool false Non-retain False Fals
e
False False Work position ena‐
bled
bAutoMode Bool false Non-retain False Fals
e




Bool false Non-retain False Fals
e
False False Manual Mode is
active





Bool false Non-retain False Fals
e
False False
bPB_Home Bool false Non-retain False Fals
e
False False




























































Name DB_HMI Number 3 Type DB
Language DB Numbering Automatic
Information
Title Author Comment
Family Version 0.1 User-defined
ID




































iMode Int 0 False True Tru
e
True False Current mode
iErrorCode Int 0 False True Fals
e
True False Error code
iStatus Int 0 False True Fals
e
True False Status for HMI display
bPB_ResetError Bool false False True Tru
e
True False PB Reset block errors
bPB_Home Bool false False True Tru
e
True False PB Move to home in
manual mode
bPB_Work Bool false False True Tru
e




Bool false False True Fals
e
True False PB Reset error enabled
bPBEN_Home Bool false False True Fals
e
True False PB Home enabled
bPBEN_Work Bool false False True Fals
e
True False PB Work enabled
bHomeOn Bool false False True Fals
e
True False Home command is on
bWorkOn Bool false False True Fals
e
True False Work command is on
bSignalHome Bool false False True Fals
e
True False Home feedback
bSignalWork Bool false False True Fals
e
True False Work feedback
bError Bool false False True Fals
e
True False Error status
bInterlock Bool false False True Fals
e
True False Valve interlocked
Totally Integrated
Automation Portal



































iMode Int 0 False True Tru
e
True False Current mode
iErrorCode Int 0 False True Fals
e
True False Error code
iStatus Int 0 False True Fals
e
True False Status for HMI display
bPB_ResetError Bool false False True Tru
e
True False PB Reset block errors
bPB_Home Bool false False True Tru
e
True False PB Move to home in
manual mode
bPB_Work Bool false False True Tru
e




Bool false False True Fals
e
True False PB Reset error enabled
bPBEN_Home Bool false False True Fals
e
True False PB Home enabled
bPBEN_Work Bool false False True Fals
e
True False PB Work enabled
bHomeOn Bool false False True Fals
e
True False Home command is on
bWorkOn Bool false False True Fals
e
True False Work command is on
bSignalHome Bool false False True Fals
e
True False Home feedback
bSignalWork Bool false False True Fals
e
True False Work feedback
bError Bool false False True Fals
e
True False Error status
bInterlock Bool false False True Fals
e







iMode Int 0 False True Tru
e
True False Current mode
iErrorCode Int 0 False True Fals
e
True False Error code
iStatus Int 0 False True Fals
e
True False Status for HMI display
bPB_ResetError Bool false False True Tru
e
True False PB Reset block errors
bPB_Home Bool false False True Tru
e
True False PB Move to home in
manual mode
bPB_Work Bool false False True Tru
e




Bool false False True Fals
e
True False PB Reset error enabled
Totally Integrated
Automation Portal





























bPBEN_Home Bool false False True Fals
e
True False PB Home enabled
bPBEN_Work Bool false False True Fals
e
True False PB Work enabled
bHomeOn Bool false False True Fals
e
True False Home command is on
bWorkOn Bool false False True Fals
e
True False Work command is on
bSignalHome Bool false False True Fals
e
True False Home feedback
bSignalWork Bool false False True Fals
e
True False Work feedback
bError Bool false False True Fals
e
True False Error status
bInterlock Bool false False True Fals
e






Name DB_ProgramLogic Number 4 Type DB
Language DB Numbering Automatic
Information
Title Author Comment
Family Version 0.1 User-defined
ID






























VlvLiq1_Open Bool false False True Tru
e
True False
VlvLiq2_Open Bool false False True Tru
e
True False








Name Program Logic_DB Number 2 Type DB
Language DB Numbering Automatic
Information
Title Author Comment
Family Version 0.1 User-defined
ID





































True False Modified by Ken Brey
2010-08-25 KLB. Added
Initialization inputs and




doesn't do anything. The
input value if un-wired
will be the last value set
for that input in a differ‐
ent call. The initialized
value in the declaration
section does not set it
back to default if un‐
wired. Allways supply
values for all inputs.
Modified by Tim Jager
2005-12-13 no block Id
in error message Modi‐
fied by Boris: branched -
> simplified version, no
errors, no timeout; still
have to use static memo‐
ry for TON/CurStep
(might be fixed later us‐
ing in/out structure)



































iInStep Int 0 False False Fals
e
False False Constant: current step
required for the FB to
run
iInNextStep Int 0 False False Fals
e




Bool false False False Fals
e
False False if step done logic is true,
then we move from
IN_STEP to NEXT_STEP
tInStepDelay Time T#0ms False False Fals
e
False False After the step done input
is true, we wait for x sec‐




Bool false False False Fals
e
False False Pause sequence at com‐
pletion of current step
bInStepAdv‐
ance
Bool false False False Fals
e
False False If paused, trigger next
step
bInit Bool false False False Fals
e
False False











Bool false False False Fals
e
False False
bOutPaused Bool false False False Fals
e




Int 0 False False Fals
e





TON_TIME False False Fals
e
False False used to delay moving to
the next step.
PT Time T#0ms False False Fals
e
False False
ET Time T#0ms False False Fals
e
False False
IN Bool false False False Fals
e
False False
Q Bool false False False Fals
e
False False
iCurrentStep Int 0 False False Fals
e




Bool false False False Fals
e
False False
CurrentStep Int 0 False True Tru
e
True True










































Name Valve Drain_DB Number 7 Type DB
Language DB Numbering Automatic
Information
Title Author Comment
Family Version 0.1 User-defined
ID







































tInTimeout Time T#0ms False False Fals
e
False False Timeout time for an ac‐
tuator's feedback to acti‐
vate before giving a fault
iInMode Int 0 False False Fals
e
False False Mode Selection





Bool false False False Fals
e
False False Home position feedback
bInSignal‐
Work
Bool false False False Fals
e
False False Work position feedback
bInEnable Bool false False False Fals
e
False False Home and Work Enabled
bInCom‐
mandWork
Bool false False False Fals
e




Bool false False False Fals
e
False False Reset Error
bInSimulate Bool false False False Fals
e





Bool false False False Fals
e
False False Home position command
bOutCom‐
mandWork
Bool false False False Fals
e
False False Work position command
bOutActive‐
Home
Bool false False False Fals
e
False False Valve is in home position
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Bool false False False Fals
e
False False Valve is in work position
bOutAuto Bool false False False Fals
e
False False Block in auto mode
bOutError Bool false False False Fals
e







False False Valve error structure
NoHome‐
Feedback
Bool false False False Fals
e




Bool false False False Fals
e






Bool false False False Fals
e






Bool false False False Fals
e





















Bool false False False Fals
e
False False Error 1 In Error Array
bInEr‐
ror02
Bool false False False Fals
e
False False Error 2 In Error Array
bInEr‐
ror03
Bool false False False Fals
e
False False Error 3 In Error Array
bInEr‐
ror04
Bool false False False Fals
e
False False Error 4 In Error Array
bInEr‐
ror05
Bool false False False Fals
e
False False Error 5 In Error Array
bInEr‐
ror06
Bool false False False Fals
e
False False Error 6 In Error Array
bInEr‐
ror07
Bool false False False Fals
e
False False Error 7 In Error Array
bInEr‐
ror08
Bool false False False Fals
e
False False Error 8 In Error Array
bInEr‐
ror09
Bool false False False Fals
e
False False Error 9 In Error Array
bInEr‐
ror10
Bool false False False Fals
e
False False Error 10 In Error Array
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Bool false False False Fals
e
False False Error 11 In Error Array
bInEr‐
ror12
Bool false False False Fals
e
False False Error 12 In Error Array
bInEr‐
ror13
Bool false False False Fals
e
False False Error 13 In Error Array
bInEr‐
ror14
Bool false False False Fals
e
False False Error 14 In Error Array
bInEr‐
ror15
Bool false False False Fals
e
False False Error 15 In Error Array
bInEr‐
ror16
Bool false False False Fals
e
False False Error 16 In Error Array
bInEr‐
ror17
Bool false False False Fals
e
False False Error 17 In Error Array
bInEr‐
ror18
Bool false False False Fals
e
False False Error 18 In Error Array
bInEr‐
ror19
Bool false False False Fals
e
False False Error 19 In Error Array
bInEr‐
ror20
Bool false False False Fals
e
False False Error 20 In Error Array
bInEr‐
ror21
Bool false False False Fals
e
False False Error 21 In Error Array
bInEr‐
ror22
Bool false False False Fals
e
False False Error 22 In Error Array
bInEr‐
ror23
Bool false False False Fals
e
False False Error 23 In Error Array
bInEr‐
ror24
Bool false False False Fals
e
False False Error 24 In Error Array
bInEr‐
ror25
Bool false False False Fals
e
False False Error 25 In Error Array
bInEr‐
ror26
Bool false False False Fals
e
False False Error 26 In Error Array
bInEr‐
ror27
Bool false False False Fals
e
False False Error 27 In Error Array
bInEr‐
ror28
Bool false False False Fals
e
False False Error 28 In Error Array
bInEr‐
ror29
Bool false False False Fals
e
False False Error 29 In Error Array
bInEr‐
ror30
Bool false False False Fals
e





Bool false False False Fals
e
False False An Error Exists
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Int 0 False False Fals
e







TON_TIME False False Fals
e
False False Delay between each
scroll for a new error
PT Time T#0ms False False Fals
e
False False
ET Time T#0ms False False Fals
e
False False
IN Bool false False False Fals
e
False False





















































































































































































































































































Int 1 False False Fals
e






Int 1 False False Fals
e




Bool false False False Fals
e









TON_TIME False False Fals
e
False False Timer for Error Timeout
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PT Time T#0ms False False Fals
e
False False
ET Time T#0ms False False Fals
e
False False
IN Bool false False False Fals
e
False False
Q Bool false False False Fals
e
False False
iLastMode Int 0 False False Fals
e
False False Last mode code
bNewMode Bool false False False Fals
e
False False New mode selected
bEnable‐
Home
Bool false False False Fals
e
False False Home position enabled
bEnable‐
Work
Bool false False False Fals
e
False False Work position enabled
bAutoMode Bool false False False Fals
e
False False Auto Mode is active
bManual‐
Mode
Bool false False False Fals
e
False False Manual Mode is active





Bool false False False Fals
e
False False
bPB_Home Bool false False False Fals
e
False False










Valve Liquid 1_DB [DB8]
Valve Liquid 1_DB Properties
General
Name Valve Liquid 1_DB Number 8 Type DB
Language DB Numbering Automatic
Information
Title Author Comment
Family Version 0.1 User-defined
ID







































tInTimeout Time T#0ms False False Fals
e
False False Timeout time for an ac‐
tuator's feedback to acti‐
vate before giving a fault
iInMode Int 0 False False Fals
e
False False Mode Selection





Bool false False False Fals
e
False False Home position feedback
bInSignal‐
Work
Bool false False False Fals
e
False False Work position feedback
bInEnable Bool false False False Fals
e
False False Home and Work Enabled
bInCom‐
mandWork
Bool false False False Fals
e




Bool false False False Fals
e
False False Reset Error
bInSimulate Bool false False False Fals
e





Bool false False False Fals
e
False False Home position command
bOutCom‐
mandWork
Bool false False False Fals
e
False False Work position command
bOutActive‐
Home
Bool false False False Fals
e
False False Valve is in home position
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Bool false False False Fals
e
False False Valve is in work position
bOutAuto Bool false False False Fals
e
False False Block in auto mode
bOutError Bool false False False Fals
e







False False Valve error structure
NoHome‐
Feedback
Bool false False False Fals
e




Bool false False False Fals
e






Bool false False False Fals
e






Bool false False False Fals
e





















Bool false False False Fals
e
False False Error 1 In Error Array
bInEr‐
ror02
Bool false False False Fals
e
False False Error 2 In Error Array
bInEr‐
ror03
Bool false False False Fals
e
False False Error 3 In Error Array
bInEr‐
ror04
Bool false False False Fals
e
False False Error 4 In Error Array
bInEr‐
ror05
Bool false False False Fals
e
False False Error 5 In Error Array
bInEr‐
ror06
Bool false False False Fals
e
False False Error 6 In Error Array
bInEr‐
ror07
Bool false False False Fals
e
False False Error 7 In Error Array
bInEr‐
ror08
Bool false False False Fals
e
False False Error 8 In Error Array
bInEr‐
ror09
Bool false False False Fals
e
False False Error 9 In Error Array
bInEr‐
ror10
Bool false False False Fals
e
False False Error 10 In Error Array
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Bool false False False Fals
e
False False Error 11 In Error Array
bInEr‐
ror12
Bool false False False Fals
e
False False Error 12 In Error Array
bInEr‐
ror13
Bool false False False Fals
e
False False Error 13 In Error Array
bInEr‐
ror14
Bool false False False Fals
e
False False Error 14 In Error Array
bInEr‐
ror15
Bool false False False Fals
e
False False Error 15 In Error Array
bInEr‐
ror16
Bool false False False Fals
e
False False Error 16 In Error Array
bInEr‐
ror17
Bool false False False Fals
e
False False Error 17 In Error Array
bInEr‐
ror18
Bool false False False Fals
e
False False Error 18 In Error Array
bInEr‐
ror19
Bool false False False Fals
e
False False Error 19 In Error Array
bInEr‐
ror20
Bool false False False Fals
e
False False Error 20 In Error Array
bInEr‐
ror21
Bool false False False Fals
e
False False Error 21 In Error Array
bInEr‐
ror22
Bool false False False Fals
e
False False Error 22 In Error Array
bInEr‐
ror23
Bool false False False Fals
e
False False Error 23 In Error Array
bInEr‐
ror24
Bool false False False Fals
e
False False Error 24 In Error Array
bInEr‐
ror25
Bool false False False Fals
e
False False Error 25 In Error Array
bInEr‐
ror26
Bool false False False Fals
e
False False Error 26 In Error Array
bInEr‐
ror27
Bool false False False Fals
e
False False Error 27 In Error Array
bInEr‐
ror28
Bool false False False Fals
e
False False Error 28 In Error Array
bInEr‐
ror29
Bool false False False Fals
e
False False Error 29 In Error Array
bInEr‐
ror30
Bool false False False Fals
e





Bool false False False Fals
e
False False An Error Exists
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Int 0 False False Fals
e







TON_TIME False False Fals
e
False False Delay between each
scroll for a new error
PT Time T#0ms False False Fals
e
False False
ET Time T#0ms False False Fals
e
False False
IN Bool false False False Fals
e
False False





















































































































































































































































































Int 1 False False Fals
e






Int 1 False False Fals
e




Bool false False False Fals
e









TON_TIME False False Fals
e
False False Timer for Error Timeout
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PT Time T#0ms False False Fals
e
False False
ET Time T#0ms False False Fals
e
False False
IN Bool false False False Fals
e
False False
Q Bool false False False Fals
e
False False
iLastMode Int 0 False False Fals
e
False False Last mode code
bNewMode Bool false False False Fals
e
False False New mode selected
bEnable‐
Home
Bool false False False Fals
e
False False Home position enabled
bEnable‐
Work
Bool false False False Fals
e
False False Work position enabled
bAutoMode Bool false False False Fals
e
False False Auto Mode is active
bManual‐
Mode
Bool false False False Fals
e
False False Manual Mode is active





Bool false False False Fals
e
False False
bPB_Home Bool false False False Fals
e
False False










Valve Liquid 2_DB [DB9]
Valve Liquid 2_DB Properties
General
Name Valve Liquid 2_DB Number 9 Type DB
Language DB Numbering Automatic
Information
Title Author Comment
Family Version 0.1 User-defined
ID







































tInTimeout Time T#0ms False False Fals
e
False False Timeout time for an ac‐
tuator's feedback to acti‐
vate before giving a fault
iInMode Int 0 False False Fals
e
False False Mode Selection





Bool false False False Fals
e
False False Home position feedback
bInSignal‐
Work
Bool false False False Fals
e
False False Work position feedback
bInEnable Bool false False False Fals
e
False False Home and Work Enabled
bInCom‐
mandWork
Bool false False False Fals
e




Bool false False False Fals
e
False False Reset Error
bInSimulate Bool false False False Fals
e





Bool false False False Fals
e
False False Home position command
bOutCom‐
mandWork
Bool false False False Fals
e
False False Work position command
bOutActive‐
Home
Bool false False False Fals
e
False False Valve is in home position
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Bool false False False Fals
e
False False Valve is in work position
bOutAuto Bool false False False Fals
e
False False Block in auto mode
bOutError Bool false False False Fals
e







False False Valve error structure
NoHome‐
Feedback
Bool false False False Fals
e




Bool false False False Fals
e






Bool false False False Fals
e






Bool false False False Fals
e





















Bool false False False Fals
e
False False Error 1 In Error Array
bInEr‐
ror02
Bool false False False Fals
e
False False Error 2 In Error Array
bInEr‐
ror03
Bool false False False Fals
e
False False Error 3 In Error Array
bInEr‐
ror04
Bool false False False Fals
e
False False Error 4 In Error Array
bInEr‐
ror05
Bool false False False Fals
e
False False Error 5 In Error Array
bInEr‐
ror06
Bool false False False Fals
e
False False Error 6 In Error Array
bInEr‐
ror07
Bool false False False Fals
e
False False Error 7 In Error Array
bInEr‐
ror08
Bool false False False Fals
e
False False Error 8 In Error Array
bInEr‐
ror09
Bool false False False Fals
e
False False Error 9 In Error Array
bInEr‐
ror10
Bool false False False Fals
e
False False Error 10 In Error Array
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Bool false False False Fals
e
False False Error 11 In Error Array
bInEr‐
ror12
Bool false False False Fals
e
False False Error 12 In Error Array
bInEr‐
ror13
Bool false False False Fals
e
False False Error 13 In Error Array
bInEr‐
ror14
Bool false False False Fals
e
False False Error 14 In Error Array
bInEr‐
ror15
Bool false False False Fals
e
False False Error 15 In Error Array
bInEr‐
ror16
Bool false False False Fals
e
False False Error 16 In Error Array
bInEr‐
ror17
Bool false False False Fals
e
False False Error 17 In Error Array
bInEr‐
ror18
Bool false False False Fals
e
False False Error 18 In Error Array
bInEr‐
ror19
Bool false False False Fals
e
False False Error 19 In Error Array
bInEr‐
ror20
Bool false False False Fals
e
False False Error 20 In Error Array
bInEr‐
ror21
Bool false False False Fals
e
False False Error 21 In Error Array
bInEr‐
ror22
Bool false False False Fals
e
False False Error 22 In Error Array
bInEr‐
ror23
Bool false False False Fals
e
False False Error 23 In Error Array
bInEr‐
ror24
Bool false False False Fals
e
False False Error 24 In Error Array
bInEr‐
ror25
Bool false False False Fals
e
False False Error 25 In Error Array
bInEr‐
ror26
Bool false False False Fals
e
False False Error 26 In Error Array
bInEr‐
ror27
Bool false False False Fals
e
False False Error 27 In Error Array
bInEr‐
ror28
Bool false False False Fals
e
False False Error 28 In Error Array
bInEr‐
ror29
Bool false False False Fals
e
False False Error 29 In Error Array
bInEr‐
ror30
Bool false False False Fals
e





Bool false False False Fals
e
False False An Error Exists
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Int 0 False False Fals
e







TON_TIME False False Fals
e
False False Delay between each
scroll for a new error
PT Time T#0ms False False Fals
e
False False
ET Time T#0ms False False Fals
e
False False
IN Bool false False False Fals
e
False False





















































































































































































































































































Int 1 False False Fals
e






Int 1 False False Fals
e




Bool false False False Fals
e









TON_TIME False False Fals
e
False False Timer for Error Timeout
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PT Time T#0ms False False Fals
e
False False
ET Time T#0ms False False Fals
e
False False
IN Bool false False False Fals
e
False False
Q Bool false False False Fals
e
False False
iLastMode Int 0 False False Fals
e
False False Last mode code
bNewMode Bool false False False Fals
e
False False New mode selected
bEnable‐
Home
Bool false False False Fals
e
False False Home position enabled
bEnable‐
Work
Bool false False False Fals
e
False False Work position enabled
bAutoMode Bool false False False Fals
e
False False Auto Mode is active
bManual‐
Mode
Bool false False False Fals
e
False False Manual Mode is active





Bool false False False Fals
e
False False
bPB_Home Bool false False False Fals
e
False False










Open Library V15 / Resources / HMI
fbErrorScroller [FB330] [fbErrorScroller V 3.0.3]
fbErrorScroller Properties
General
Name fbErrorScroller Number 330 Type FB
Language FBD Numbering Manual
Information
Title Scrolls through the error
codes for display on the
HMI
Author DMC Comment
Family Error Version 0.1 User-defined
ID






























bInError01 Bool false Set in IDB False Fals
e
False False Error 1 In Error Ar‐
ray
bInError02 Bool false Set in IDB False Fals
e
False False Error 2 In Error Ar‐
ray
bInError03 Bool false Set in IDB False Fals
e
False False Error 3 In Error Ar‐
ray
bInError04 Bool false Set in IDB False Fals
e
False False Error 4 In Error Ar‐
ray
bInError05 Bool false Set in IDB False Fals
e
False False Error 5 In Error Ar‐
ray
bInError06 Bool false Set in IDB False Fals
e
False False Error 6 In Error Ar‐
ray
bInError07 Bool false Set in IDB False Fals
e
False False Error 7 In Error Ar‐
ray
bInError08 Bool false Set in IDB False Fals
e
False False Error 8 In Error Ar‐
ray
bInError09 Bool false Set in IDB False Fals
e
False False Error 9 In Error Ar‐
ray
bInError10 Bool false Set in IDB False Fals
e
False False Error 10 In Error
Array
bInError11 Bool false Set in IDB False Fals
e
False False Error 11 In Error
Array
bInError12 Bool false Set in IDB False Fals
e
False False Error 12 In Error
Array
bInError13 Bool false Set in IDB False Fals
e
False False Error 13 In Error
Array
bInError14 Bool false Set in IDB False Fals
e
False False Error 14 In Error
Array
bInError15 Bool false Set in IDB False Fals
e
False False Error 15 In Error
Array
bInError16 Bool false Set in IDB False Fals
e

































bInError17 Bool false Set in IDB False Fals
e
False False Error 17 In Error
Array
bInError18 Bool false Set in IDB False Fals
e
False False Error 18 In Error
Array
bInError19 Bool false Set in IDB False Fals
e
False False Error 19 In Error
Array
bInError20 Bool false Set in IDB False Fals
e
False False Error 20 In Error
Array
bInError21 Bool false Set in IDB False Fals
e
False False Error 21 In Error
Array
bInError22 Bool false Set in IDB False Fals
e
False False Error 22 In Error
Array
bInError23 Bool false Set in IDB False Fals
e
False False Error 23 In Error
Array
bInError24 Bool false Set in IDB False Fals
e
False False Error 24 In Error
Array
bInError25 Bool false Set in IDB False Fals
e
False False Error 25 In Error
Array
bInError26 Bool false Set in IDB False Fals
e
False False Error 26 In Error
Array
bInError27 Bool false Set in IDB False Fals
e
False False Error 27 In Error
Array
bInError28 Bool false Set in IDB False Fals
e
False False Error 28 In Error
Array
bInError29 Bool false Set in IDB False Fals
e
False False Error 29 In Error
Array
bInError30 Bool false Set in IDB False Fals
e
False False Error 30 In Error
Array
Output
bOutErrorExists Bool false Set in IDB False Fals
e
False False An Error Exists
iOutScrollingEr‐
rorNumber
Int 0 Set in IDB False Fals
e





TON_ErrorDelay TON_TIME Non-retain False Fals
e
False True Delay between
each scroll for a
new error
PT Time T#0ms Non-retain False Fals
e
False False
ET Time T#0ms Non-retain False Fals
e
False False
IN Bool false Non-retain False Fals
e
False False








































Set in IDB False Fals
e
False False
abErrors[1] Bool false Set in IDB False Fals
e
False False
abErrors[2] Bool false Set in IDB False Fals
e
False False
abErrors[3] Bool false Set in IDB False Fals
e
False False
abErrors[4] Bool false Set in IDB False Fals
e
False False
abErrors[5] Bool false Set in IDB False Fals
e
False False
abErrors[6] Bool false Set in IDB False Fals
e
False False
abErrors[7] Bool false Set in IDB False Fals
e
False False
abErrors[8] Bool false Set in IDB False Fals
e
False False
abErrors[9] Bool false Set in IDB False Fals
e
False False
abErrors[10] Bool false Set in IDB False Fals
e
False False
abErrors[11] Bool false Set in IDB False Fals
e
False False
abErrors[12] Bool false Set in IDB False Fals
e
False False
abErrors[13] Bool false Set in IDB False Fals
e
False False
abErrors[14] Bool false Set in IDB False Fals
e
False False
abErrors[15] Bool false Set in IDB False Fals
e
False False
abErrors[16] Bool false Set in IDB False Fals
e
False False
abErrors[17] Bool false Set in IDB False Fals
e
False False
abErrors[18] Bool false Set in IDB False Fals
e
False False
abErrors[19] Bool false Set in IDB False Fals
e
False False
abErrors[20] Bool false Set in IDB False Fals
e
False False
abErrors[21] Bool false Set in IDB False Fals
e
False False


































abErrors[23] Bool false Set in IDB False Fals
e
False False
abErrors[24] Bool false Set in IDB False Fals
e
False False
abErrors[25] Bool false Set in IDB False Fals
e
False False
abErrors[26] Bool false Set in IDB False Fals
e
False False
abErrors[27] Bool false Set in IDB False Fals
e
False False
abErrors[28] Bool false Set in IDB False Fals
e
False False
abErrors[29] Bool false Set in IDB False Fals
e
False False
abErrors[30] Bool false Set in IDB False Fals
e
False False
iNextScrollNum Int 1 Non-retain False Fals
e
False False Index of next error
position
iErrorsScrollNum Int 1 Non-retain False Fals
e
False False Index of current
error position
bScrolling Bool false Non-retain False Fals
e
False False Indicates we are
scrolling
























































Network 2: Check if error exists
OR all of the possible errors. If any error Exists, SET bErrorExists
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2.1 ( Page20 - 7)
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Network 2: Check if error exists (2.1 / 2.1)















































Network 3: Timer to change displayed error















Network 4: Set bit to scroll for the next error
Set a static bit indicating that we are scrolling.
Each pass cycle through the function, we will increment.
If there is no error, set the scroll num to 0 and turn off scrolling.































Network 5: Increment the error index checked
The function will only increment the scroll num one value per scan.
It will scroll until it finds the next active error, then stop scrolling.



































Network 6: Check if the next scroll number has an error















Network 7: Output: Error



















Open Library V15 / Resources / HMI
fcHMIBitEnable [FC329] [fcHMIBitEnable V 3.0.3]
fcHMIBitEnable Properties
General
Name fcHMIBitEnable Number 329 Type FC
Language FBD Numbering Automatic
Information
Title Handles an async reading




Family Version 0.1 User-defined
ID


























































Open Library V15 / Resources / HMI





Number 333 Type FC
Language FBD Numbering Automatic
Information
Title Sets HMI Status Author Comment Wrapper function for set‐
ting the HMI status of a
device








Family Version 0.1 User-defined
ID













































































































































































Open Library V15 / Devices
fbValve_Solenoid [FB110] [fbValve_Solenoid V 3.0.6 in test]
fbValve_Solenoid Properties
General
Name fbValve_Solenoid Number 110 Type FB
Language FBD Numbering Manual
Information
Title Controls a double- or sin‐
gle-acting valve
Author Comment
Family Version 0.1 User-defined
ID






























tInTimeout Time T#0ms Non-retain False Fals
e





iInMode Int 0 Non-retain False Fals
e
False False Mode Selection
bInEstop Bool false Non-retain False Fals
e
False False Estop
bInSignalHome Bool false Non-retain False Fals
e
False False Home position
feedback
bInSignalWork Bool false Non-retain False Fals
e
False False Work position
feedback
bInEnable Bool false Non-retain False Fals
e




Bool false Non-retain False Fals
e
False False Move to work posi‐
tion in automatic
mode
bInResetError Bool false Non-retain False Fals
e
False False Reset Error
bInSimulate Bool false Non-retain False Fals
e





Bool false Non-retain False Fals
e




Bool false Non-retain False Fals
e
False False Work position
command
bOutActiveHome Bool false Non-retain False Fals
e
False False Valve is in home
position
bOutActiveWork Bool false Non-retain False Fals
e
False False Valve is in work
position
bOutAuto Bool false Non-retain False Fals
e

































bOutError Bool false Non-retain False Fals
e









Bool false Non-retain False Fals
e





Bool false Non-retain False Fals
e





Bool false Non-retain False Fals
e





Bool false Non-retain False Fals
e









False False HMI valve control
iMode Int False Fals
e
False False Current mode
iErrorCode Int False Fals
e
False False Error code
iStatus Int False Fals
e
False False Status for HMI dis‐
play
bPB_ResetError Bool False Fals
e
False False PB Reset block er‐
rors
bPB_Home Bool False Fals
e
False False PB Move to home
in manual mode
bPB_Work Bool False Fals
e






False False PB Reset error ena‐
bled
bPBEN_Home Bool False Fals
e
False False PB Home enabled
bPBEN_Work Bool False Fals
e
False False PB Work enabled
bHomeOn Bool False Fals
e
False False Home command is
on
bWorkOn Bool False Fals
e
False False Work command is
on
bSignalHome Bool False Fals
e
False False Home feedback
bSignalWork Bool False Fals
e
False False Work feedback
bError Bool False Fals
e
False False Error status
bInterlock Bool False Fals
e
False False Valve interlocked
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False True Sub-block to han‐
dle error scroller
Input
bInError01 Bool false Set in IDB False Fals
e
False False Error 1 In Error Ar‐
ray
bInError02 Bool false Set in IDB False Fals
e
False False Error 2 In Error Ar‐
ray
bInError03 Bool false Set in IDB False Fals
e
False False Error 3 In Error Ar‐
ray
bInError04 Bool false Set in IDB False Fals
e
False False Error 4 In Error Ar‐
ray
bInError05 Bool false Set in IDB False Fals
e
False False Error 5 In Error Ar‐
ray
bInError06 Bool false Set in IDB False Fals
e
False False Error 6 In Error Ar‐
ray
bInError07 Bool false Set in IDB False Fals
e
False False Error 7 In Error Ar‐
ray
bInError08 Bool false Set in IDB False Fals
e
False False Error 8 In Error Ar‐
ray
bInError09 Bool false Set in IDB False Fals
e
False False Error 9 In Error Ar‐
ray
bInError10 Bool false Set in IDB False Fals
e
False False Error 10 In Error
Array
bInError11 Bool false Set in IDB False Fals
e
False False Error 11 In Error
Array
bInError12 Bool false Set in IDB False Fals
e
False False Error 12 In Error
Array
bInError13 Bool false Set in IDB False Fals
e
False False Error 13 In Error
Array
bInError14 Bool false Set in IDB False Fals
e
False False Error 14 In Error
Array
bInError15 Bool false Set in IDB False Fals
e
False False Error 15 In Error
Array
bInError16 Bool false Set in IDB False Fals
e
False False Error 16 In Error
Array
bInError17 Bool false Set in IDB False Fals
e
False False Error 17 In Error
Array
bInError18 Bool false Set in IDB False Fals
e
False False Error 18 In Error
Array
bInError19 Bool false Set in IDB False Fals
e
False False Error 19 In Error
Array
bInError20 Bool false Set in IDB False Fals
e
False False Error 20 In Error
Array
bInError21 Bool false Set in IDB False Fals
e
False False Error 21 In Error
Array
bInError22 Bool false Set in IDB False Fals
e

































bInError23 Bool false Set in IDB False Fals
e
False False Error 23 In Error
Array
bInError24 Bool false Set in IDB False Fals
e
False False Error 24 In Error
Array
bInError25 Bool false Set in IDB False Fals
e
False False Error 25 In Error
Array
bInError26 Bool false Set in IDB False Fals
e
False False Error 26 In Error
Array
bInError27 Bool false Set in IDB False Fals
e
False False Error 27 In Error
Array
bInError28 Bool false Set in IDB False Fals
e
False False Error 28 In Error
Array
bInError29 Bool false Set in IDB False Fals
e
False False Error 29 In Error
Array
bInError30 Bool false Set in IDB False Fals
e





Bool false Set in IDB False Fals
e




Int 0 Set in IDB False Fals
e







TON_TIME Non-retain False Fals
e
False True Delay between
each scroll for a
new error
PT Time T#0ms Non-retain False Fals
e
False False
ET Time T#0ms Non-retain False Fals
e
False False
IN Bool false Non-retain False Fals
e
False False































































































































































































































Int 1 Non-retain False Fals
e




Int 1 Non-retain False Fals
e
False False Index of current
error position
bScrolling Bool false Non-retain False Fals
e




Bool false Non-retain False Fals
e
False False
TON_TimeOut TON_TIME Non-retain False Fals
e
False True Timer for Error
Timeout
PT Time T#0ms Non-retain False Fals
e
False False
ET Time T#0ms Non-retain False Fals
e
False False
IN Bool false Non-retain False Fals
e
False False
Q Bool false Non-retain False Fals
e
False False
iLastMode Int 0 Non-retain False Fals
e
False False Last mode code
bNewMode Bool false Non-retain False Fals
e
False False New mode selec‐
ted
bEnableHome Bool false Non-retain False Fals
e
False False Home position en‐
abled
bEnableWork Bool false Non-retain False Fals
e
False False Work position ena‐
bled
bAutoMode Bool false Non-retain False Fals
e
False False Auto Mode is ac‐
tive
bManualMode Bool false Non-retain False Fals
e
False False Manual Mode is
active
bReset Bool false Non-retain False Fals
e
False False
bTON_TimeOut Bool false Non-retain False Fals
e
False False
bPB_Home Bool false Non-retain False Fals
e
False False
bPB_Work Bool false Non-retain False Fals
e
False False










Network 1: --------------------------------------------------------- Inputs
------------------------------------------------------------------
Network 2: Read HMI input buttons
Totally Integrated
Automation Portal






















































































































Network 5: --------------------------------------------------- Control Logic
------------------------------------------------------------

































































































Network 11: Enable Home & Work Positions
IF manual mode AND no estop AND not a new mode AND enabled =>
--if no cylinder errors, enable move to Home and Work












Network 12: Move to Home Position (Retracted)























Network 13: Move to Work Position (Extended)

























Network 14: Reset home on if not enabled








Network 15: Reset work on if not enabled








Network 16: Reset both home and work if not in auto or manual
















Network 18: Timeout timer


























































Network 20: Error: Work position feedback not active















Network 21: Error: Home position feedback still active














Network 22: Error: Work position feedback still active














Network 23: Error scroller
Call the Error-Scroller which cyles through all possible errors and checks















































































Network 26: -------------------------------------------------- Outputs --------------------------------------------------

































































Open Library V15 / Process
fbStepSequencer [FB185] [fbStepSequencer V 3.0.1]
fbStepSequencer Properties
General
Name fbStepSequencer Number 185 Type FB
Language SCL Numbering Manual
Information




Modified by Ken Brey
2006-08-08 Removed ini‐
tialization of inputs. Initi‐
alizing inputs doesn't do
anything. The input value
if un-wired will be the
last value
set for that input in a dif‐
ferent call. The initialized
value in the declaration
section does not set it
back to default
if unwired. Allways sup‐
ply values for all inputs.
Modified by Tim Jager




version, no errors, no
timeout; still have to use
static memory for TON/
CurStep (might be fixed
later using in/out struc‐
ture)
Modified by Nick Shea:
2012-03-30 Re-instated
step mode
Family Version 4.0 User-defined
ID






























iInStep Int 0 Non-retain False Fals
e
False False Constant: current
step required for
the FB to run
Totally Integrated
Automation Portal





























iInNextStep Int 0 Non-retain False Fals
e
False False Next step to go to
if step is done
bInStepDone Bool false Non-retain False Fals
e
False False if step done logic




tInStepDelay Time T#0ms Non-retain False Fals
e
False False After the step
done input is true,
we wait for x sec‐
onds before mov‐
ing to next
bInStepMode Bool false Non-retain False Fals
e
False False Pause sequence at
completion of cur‐
rent step
bInStepAdvance Bool false Non-retain False Fals
e
False False If paused, trigger
next step
bInit Bool false Non-retain False Fals
e
False False




bOutEnterEvent Bool false Non-retain False Fals
e
False False
bOutExitEvent Bool false Non-retain False Fals
e
False False
bOutPaused Bool false Non-retain False Fals
e
False False Sequence is cur‐
rently paused.
iOutCurrentStep Int 0 Non-retain False Fals
e




TON_StepDelay TON_TIME Non-retain False Fals
e
False True used to delay mov‐
ing to the next
step.
PT Time T#0ms Non-retain False Fals
e
False False
ET Time T#0ms Non-retain False Fals
e
False False
IN Bool false Non-retain False Fals
e
False False
Q Bool false Non-retain False Fals
e
False False
iCurrentStep Int 0 Non-retain False Fals
e








bNoStepDelay Bool step delay disabled
Totally Integrated
Automation Portal



































0004 // INSTRUCTION SECTION




0009 IF (#iInStep=#iCurrentStep) THEN
0010   IF NOT #bAlreadyInThisStep THEN
0011     #bOutEnterEvent:=true;
0012     #bAlreadyInThisStep:=true;
0013   END_IF;
0014   IF #bInStepDone THEN
0015     //Run Step done Timer
0016     #TON_StepDelay(IN:=(TRUE),PT:=#tInStepDelay);
0017     
0018     //check if we are using a step delay
0019     #bNoStepDelay:= (#tInStepDelay<=T#0MS);
0020
0021     //We can move to the next step if (STEP_DONE and StepDelay timer complete) 
0022     // AND
0023     //(we are in step mode and the step advance is true, or if we are not in 
step mode 
0024     // AND
0025     //It is not the first scan of this step
0026     IF ((#TON_StepDelay.Q OR #bNoStepDelay) AND (NOT #bInStepMode OR (#bIn-
StepMode AND #bInStepAdvance)) AND NOT #bOutEnterEvent) THEN 
0027       #iCurrentStep   := #iInNextStep;   //move to next step
0028       //Reset Step done Timer
0029       #TON_StepDelay(IN:=(false),PT:=#tInStepDelay); 
0030       #bOutExitEvent:=true;
0031       #bAlreadyInThisStep:=false;
0032     END_IF;
0033   END_IF;
0034   #bOutPaused := #bInStepDone AND (#TON_StepDelay.Q OR #bNoStepDelay) AND 
(#bInStepMode AND NOT #bInStepAdvance);
0035   //Only set this if we are ok and in the right step
0036   ENO:= true;
0037 END_IF;
0038 IF (#bInit) THEN
0039   #iCurrentStep := #iInitStep;
0040   #bInit:=false;  //Clear so that if it is unwired on the next call, it is 
not run.





0044 //Set output variables
0045 #iOutCurrentStep := #iCurrentStep;
0046 #tInStepDelay := T#0MS;
0047
Symbol Address Type Comment
#bAlreadyInThisStep Bool
#bInit Bool
#bInStepAdvance Bool If paused, trigger next step
#bInStepDone Bool if step done logic is true, then we move from
IN_STEP to NEXT_STEP
#bInStepMode Bool Pause sequence at completion of current step
#bNoStepDelay Bool step delay disabled
#bOutEnterEvent Bool
#bOutExitEvent Bool
#bOutPaused Bool Sequence is currently paused.
#iCurrentStep Int Current step of the sequencer
#iInitStep Int
#iInNextStep Int Next step to go to if step is done
#iInStep Int Constant: current step required for the FB to run
#iOutCurrentStep Int output current step
#tInStepDelay Time After the step done input is true, we wait for x
seconds before moving to next




Open Library V15 / Process
fcStepChooser [FC185] [fcStepChooser V 3.0.1]
fcStepChooser Properties
General
Name fcStepChooser Number 185 Type FC
Language SCL Numbering Manual
Information
Title Author Comment
Family Version 0.0 User-defined
ID













0002   IF #bCondition THEN
0003     #iResult:=#iTrueStep;
0004   ELSE
0005     #iResult:=#iFalseStep;
0006   END_IF;
0007   ENO:=true;
0008   #fcStepChooser:=#iResult;
0009






B. APPENDIX: PLC INSTRUCTIONS
1 Coil :
2 output = input
3
4 Not :
5 output = ! input
6
7 Set :
8 output = ( i f input then TRUE)
9
10 Reset :
11 output = ( i f input then FALSE)
12
13 SetReset :
14 output = ( ( i f input1 then TRUE) ( e l s e i f input2 then FALSE)
15
16 And :
17 output = input1 && input2
18
19 Or :
20 output = input1 | | input2
21
22 Equal :
23 output = input1 == input2
24
25 LessThen :
26 output = input1 < input2
27
28 GreaterThen :
29 output = input1 > input2
30
31 Move:
32 output = input
33 or
34 output = ( i f input1 then input2 )
35
36 Add :
37 output = input1 + input2
38
39 Call block1 :
40 Call : block1 (name of block1 )
41 Inputs :
42 var1 ==> input1
43 var2 ==> input2
44 Outputs :
45 output1 ==> var3
46 output2 ==> var4
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C. APPENDIX: EXPORT LIST OF PLC PROGRAM BLOCKS
1 OrganizationBlock : OB1 (Main)
2 XMLFileLocation : C : \ . . . \ Main . xml
3 ProgrammingLanguage : FBD
4 FunctionBlock : FB2 ( Valve Liquid 1)
5 XMLFileLocation : C : \ . . . \ Valve Liquid 1 . xml
6 ProgrammingLanguage : FBD
7 FunctionBlock : FB3 ( Valve Liquid 2)
8 XMLFileLocation : C : \ . . . \ Valve Liquid 2 . xml
9 ProgrammingLanguage : FBD
10 FunctionBlock : FB4 ( Valve Drain )
11 XMLFileLocation : C : \ . . . \ Valve Drain . xml
12 ProgrammingLanguage : FBD
13 FunctionBlock : FB5 ( Program Logic )
14 XMLFileLocation : C : \ . . . \ Program Logic . xml
15 ProgrammingLanguage : FBD
16 FunctionBlock : FB110 ( fbValve_Solenoid )
17 XMLFileLocation : C : \ . . . \ Open Library V15\ Devices \fbValve_SolenoidFBD . xml
18 ProgrammingLanguage : FBD
19 FunctionBlock : FB185 ( fbStepSequencer )
20 XMLFileLocation : C : \ . . . \ Open Library V15\ Process \ fbStepSequencer . xml
21 ProgrammingLanguage : SCL
22 FunctionBlock : FB330 ( f b E r r o r S c r o l l e r )
23 XMLFileLocation : C : \ . . . \ Open Library V15\Resources\HMI\ fbErrorScrollerFBD . xml
24 ProgrammingLanguage : FBD
25 Function : FC185 ( fcStepChooser )
26 XMLFileLocation : C : \ . . . \ Open Library V15\ Process \ fcStepChooser . xml
27 ProgrammingLanguage : SCL
28 Function : FC329 ( fcHMIBitEnable )
29 XMLFileLocation : C : \ . . . \ Open Library V15\Resources\HMI\fcHMIBitEnableFBD . xml
30 ProgrammingLanguage : FBD
31 Function : FC333 ( fcSetHMIStatusSimulation )
32 XMLFileLocation : C : \ . . . \ Open Library V15\Resources\HMI\fcSetHMIStatusSimulationFBD .
xml
33 ProgrammingLanguage : FBD
34 GlobalDB : DB3 (DB_HMI)
35 XMLFileLocation : C : \ . . . \ DB_HMI. xml
36 GlobalDB : DB4 ( DB_ProgramLogic )
37 XMLFileLocation : C : \ . . . \ DB_ProgramLogic . xml
38 InstanceDB : iDB2 ( Program Logic_DB )
39 XMLFileLocation : C : \ . . . \ Program Logic_DB . xml
40 InstanceDB : iDB7 ( Valve Drain_DB )
41 XMLFileLocation : C : \ . . . \ Valve Drain_DB . xml
42 InstanceDB : iDB8 ( Valve Liquid 1_DB)
43 XMLFileLocation : C : \ . . . \ Valve Liquid 1_DB. xml
44 InstanceDB : iDB9 ( Valve Liquid 2_DB)
45 XMLFileLocation : C : \ . . . \ Valve Liquid 2_DB. xml
150
D. APPENDIX: CALL STRUCTURE
1 Main OB1
2 |−−Valve Drain FB4 ( Valve Drain_DB DB7)




7 |−−|−−|−− f b E r r o r S c r o l l e r FB330 ( E r r o r S c r o l l e r )
8 |−−|−−|−−fcSetHMIStatusSimulation FC333
9 |−−Valve Liquid 1 FB2 ( Valve Liquid 1_DB DB8)




14 |−−|−−|−− f b E r r o r S c r o l l e r FB330 ( E r r o r S c r o l l e r )
15 |−−|−−|−−fcSetHMIStatusSimulation FC333
16 |−−Valve Liquid 2 FB3 ( Valve Liquid 2_DB DB9)




21 |−−|−−|−− f b E r r o r S c r o l l e r FB330 ( E r r o r S c r o l l e r )
22 |−−|−−|−−fcSetHMIStatusSimulation FC333













36 |−−|−−fbStepSequencer FB185 ( StepSeq )
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E. APPENDIX: LOGIC MODELS PLC PROGRAM
1 OrganizationBlock : OB1 (Main) (FBD)
2 Network 1 :
3 Call : FB4 ( Valve Drain ) , Instance : Valve Drain_DB ( GlobalVariable )
4 Inputs :
5 Outputs :
6 Network 2 :
7 Call : FB2 ( Valve Liquid 1) , Instance : Valve Liquid 1_DB ( GlobalVariable )
8 Inputs :
9 Outputs :
10 Network 3 :
11 Call : FB3 ( Valve Liquid 2) , Instance : Valve Liquid 2_DB ( GlobalVariable )
12 Inputs :
13 Outputs :
14 Network 4 :




19 FunctionBlock : FB110 ( fbValve_Solenoid ) (FBD)
20 Network 2 :
21 Call : FC329 ( fcHMIBitEnable )
22 Inputs :
23 f a l s e ==> bInToggle
24 f a l s e ==> bInLatch
25 bManualMode ==> bInEnable
26 HMI_ValveControl .bPB_Home ==> bInOutHMI
27 bPB_Home ==> bInOutPLC
28 Outputs :
29 bOutEnable ==> HMI_ValveControl .bPBEN_Home
30 eno ==> en
31 Call : FC329 ( fcHMIBitEnable )
32 Inputs :
33 eno ==> en
34 f a l s e ==> bInToggle
35 f a l s e ==> bInLatch
36 bManualMode ==> bInEnable
37 HMI_ValveControl . bPB_Work ==> bInOutHMI
38 bPB_Work ==> bInOutPLC
39 Outputs :
40 bOutEnable ==> HMI_ValveControl . bPBEN_Work
41 eno ==> en
42 Call : FC329 ( fcHMIBitEnable )
43 Inputs :
44 eno ==> en
45 f a l s e ==> bInToggle
46 f a l s e ==> bInLatch
47 HMI_ValveControl . bError ==> bInEnable
48 HMI_ValveControl . bPB_ResetError ==> bInOutHMI
49 bPB_ResetError ==> bInOutPLC
50 Outputs :
51 bOutEnable ==> HMI_ValveControl . bPBEN_ResetError
52 Network 3 :
53 HMI_ValveControl . bSignalHome = ( ( bInSignalHome && ! bInSimulate ) | | ( HMI_ValveControl
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.bHomeOn && bInSimulate ) )
54 Network 4 :
55 HMI_ValveControl . bSignalWork = ( ( bInSignalWork && ! bInSimulate ) | | ( HMI_ValveControl
.bWorkOn && bInSimulate ) )
56 Network 6 :
57 bReset = ( ( bInResetError | | bPB_ResetError ) && HMI_ValveControl . bPBEN_ResetError )
58 ERROR_Valve . NoHomeFeedback = ( i f ( ( bInResetError | | bPB_ResetError ) &&
HMI_ValveControl . bPBEN_ResetError ) then FALSE)
59 ERROR_Valve . NoWorkFeedback = ( i f ( ( bInResetError | | bPB_ResetError ) &&
HMI_ValveControl . bPBEN_ResetError ) then FALSE)
60 ERROR_Valve . HomeFeedbackStillActive = ( i f ( ( bInResetError | | bPB_ResetError ) &&
HMI_ValveControl . bPBEN_ResetError ) then FALSE)
61 ERROR_Valve . WorkFeedbackStillActive = ( i f ( ( bInResetError | | bPB_ResetError ) &&
HMI_ValveControl . bPBEN_ResetError ) then FALSE)
62 Network 7 :
63 HMI_ValveControl . iMode = ( i f ( iInMode <> Modes . Independent ) then iInMode )
64 Network 8 :
65 bNewMode = ( HMI_ValveControl . iMode <> iLastMode )
66 Network 9 :
67 iLastMode = HMI_ValveControl . iMode
68 Network 10:
69 bManualMode = ( ( HMI_ValveControl . iMode == Modes . Manual) && ( ! bInEstop && !bNewMode
&& bInEnable ) )
70 bAutoMode = ( ( HMI_ValveControl . iMode == Modes . Auto ) && ( ! bInEstop && !bNewMode &&
bInEnable ) )
71 Network 11:
72 bEnableHome = ( ! HMI_ValveControl . bError && (bManualMode | | bAutoMode) )
73 bEnableWork = ( ! HMI_ValveControl . bError && (bManualMode | | bAutoMode) )
74 Network 12:
75 HMI_ValveControl .bHomeOn = ( i f ( ( bManualMode && bPB_Home && ! bPB_Work &&
HMI_ValveControl .bPBEN_Home) | | (bAutoMode && !bInCommandWork && bEnableHome) )
then TRUE)
76 HMI_ValveControl .bWorkOn = ( i f ( ( bManualMode && bPB_Home && ! bPB_Work &&
HMI_ValveControl .bPBEN_Home) | | (bAutoMode && !bInCommandWork && bEnableHome) )
then FALSE)
77 Network 13:
78 HMI_ValveControl .bWorkOn = ( i f ( ( bManualMode && bPB_Work && !bPB_Home &&
HMI_ValveControl . bPBEN_Work) | | (bAutoMode && bInCommandWork && bEnableWork ) )
then TRUE)
79 HMI_ValveControl .bHomeOn = ( i f ( ( bManualMode && bPB_Work && !bPB_Home &&
HMI_ValveControl . bPBEN_Work) | | (bAutoMode && bInCommandWork && bEnableWork ) )
then FALSE)
80 Network 14:
81 HMI_ValveControl .bHomeOn = ( i f (bAutoMode && ! bEnableHome) then FALSE)
82 Network 15:
83 HMI_ValveControl .bWorkOn = ( i f (bAutoMode && ! bEnableWork ) then FALSE)
84 Network 16:
85 HMI_ValveControl .bHomeOn = ( i f ( ! bAutoMode && ! bManualMode) then FALSE)
86 HMI_ValveControl .bWorkOn = ( i f ( ! bAutoMode && ! bManualMode) then FALSE)
87 Network 18:
88 bTON_TimeOut = (TON: TON_TimeOut IN : ( ( ( HMI_ValveControl .bHomeOn && ! HMI_ValveControl
. bSignalHome ) | | ( HMI_ValveControl .bWorkOn && ! HMI_ValveControl . bSignalWork ) | | (
HMI_ValveControl . bSignalHome && HMI_ValveControl .bWorkOn) | | ( HMI_ValveControl .
bSignalWork && HMI_ValveControl .bHomeOn) ) && ! bReset ) PT : tInTimeout )
89 Network 19:
90 ERROR_Valve . NoHomeFeedback = ( i f ( ! bInEstop && bTON_TimeOut && HMI_ValveControl .
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bHomeOn && ! HMI_ValveControl . bSignalHome ) then TRUE)
91 Network 20:
92 ERROR_Valve . NoWorkFeedback = ( i f ( ! bInEstop && bTON_TimeOut && HMI_ValveControl .
bWorkOn && ! HMI_ValveControl . bSignalWork ) then TRUE)
93 Network 21:
94 ERROR_Valve . HomeFeedbackStillActive = ( i f ( ! bInEstop && bTON_TimeOut &&
HMI_ValveControl .bWorkOn && HMI_ValveControl . bSignalHome ) then TRUE)
95 Network 22:
96 ERROR_Valve . WorkFeedbackStillActive = ( i f ( ! bInEstop && bTON_TimeOut &&
HMI_ValveControl .bHomeOn && HMI_ValveControl . bSignalWork ) then TRUE)
97 Network 23:
98 Call : FB330 ( f b E r r o r S c r o l l e r ) , Instance : E r r o r S c r o l l e r ( LocalVariable )
99 Inputs :
100 ERROR_Valve . NoHomeFeedback ==> bInError01
101 ERROR_Valve . NoWorkFeedback ==> bInError02
102 ERROR_Valve . HomeFeedbackStillActive ==> bInError03
103 ERROR_Valve . WorkFeedbackStillActive ==> bInError04
104 bInEstop ==> bInError05
105 Outputs :
106 bOutErrorExists ==> HMI_ValveControl . bError
107 iOutScrollingErrorNumber ==> HMI_ValveControl . iErrorCode
108 Network 24:
109 HMI_ValveControl . bInterlock ! = bInEnable
110 Network 25:
111 Call : FC333 ( fcSetHMIStatusSimulation )
112 Inputs :
113 bInEstop ==> bInEstop
114 HMI_ValveControl . bError ==> bInError
115 HMI_ValveControl . bSignalWork ==> bInForwardWork
116 HMI_ValveControl . bSignalHome ==> bInReverseHome
117 HMI_ValveControl .bWorkOn ==> bInOnForwardWork
118 HMI_ValveControl .bHomeOn ==> bInOnReverseHome
119 bInSimulate ==> bInSimulate
120 Outputs :
121 iOutStatus ==> HMI_ValveControl . i S t a t u s
122 Network 27:
123 bOutCommandHome = ( HMI_ValveControl .bHomeOn && ! bInSimulate )
124 Network 28:
125 bOutCommandWork = ( HMI_ValveControl .bWorkOn && ! bInSimulate )
126 Network 29:
127 bOutActiveHome = ( HMI_ValveControl .bHomeOn && HMI_ValveControl . bSignalHome )
128 Network 30:
129 bOutActiveWork = ( HMI_ValveControl .bWorkOn && HMI_ValveControl . bSignalWork )
130 Network 31:
131 bOutAuto = ( HMI_ValveControl . iMode == Modes . Auto )
132 Network 32:
133 bOutError = HMI_ValveControl . bError
134 Network 33:
135
136 FunctionBlock : FB185 ( fbStepSequencer ) (SCL)
137
138 Function : FC185 ( fcStepChooser ) (SCL)
139
140 FunctionBlock : FB330 ( f b E r r o r S c r o l l e r ) (FBD)
141 Network 1 :
142 iErrorsScrollNum = ( i f ( ( iErrorsScrollNum < ciNoErrrors ) | | ( iErrorsScrollNum >
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ciIndexHigh ) ) then ciNoErrrors )
143 iNextScrollNum = ( i f ( ( iNextScrollNum < ciIndexLow ) | | ( iNextScrollNum > ciIndexHigh
) ) then ciIndexLow )
144 Network 2 :
145 abErrors [ 1 ] = bInError01
146 abErrors [ 2 ] = bInError02
147 abErrors [ 3 ] = bInError03
148 abErrors [ 4 ] = bInError04
149 abErrors [ 5 ] = bInError05
150 abErrors [ 6 ] = bInError06
151 abErrors [ 7 ] = bInError07
152 abErrors [ 8 ] = bInError08
153 abErrors [ 9 ] = bInError09
154 abErrors [ 1 0 ] = bInError10
155 abErrors [ 1 1 ] = bInError11
156 abErrors [ 1 2 ] = bInError12
157 abErrors [ 1 3 ] = bInError13
158 abErrors [ 1 4 ] = bInError14
159 abErrors [ 1 5 ] = bInError15
160 abErrors [ 1 6 ] = bInError16
161 abErrors [ 1 7 ] = bInError17
162 abErrors [ 1 8 ] = bInError18
163 abErrors [ 1 9 ] = bInError19
164 abErrors [ 2 0 ] = bInError20
165 abErrors [ 2 1 ] = bInError21
166 abErrors [ 2 2 ] = bInError22
167 abErrors [ 2 3 ] = bInError23
168 abErrors [ 2 4 ] = bInError24
169 abErrors [ 2 5 ] = bInError25
170 abErrors [ 2 6 ] = bInError26
171 abErrors [ 2 7 ] = bInError27
172 abErrors [ 2 8 ] = bInError28
173 abErrors [ 2 9 ] = bInError29
174 abErrors [ 3 0 ] = bInError30
175 bErrorExists = ( bInError01 | | bInError02 | | bInError03 | | bInError04 | | bInError05
| | bInError06 | | bInError07 | | bInError08 | | bInError09 | | bInError10 | |
bInError11 | | bInError12 | | bInError13 | | bInError14 | | bInError15 | | bInError16
| | bInError17 | | bInError18 | | bInError19 | | bInError20 | | bInError21 | |
bInError22 | | bInError23 | | bInError24 | | bInError25 | | bInError26 | | bInError27
| | bInError28 | | bInError29 | | bInError30 )
176 Network 3 :
177 bTON_ErrorDelay = (TON: TON_ErrorDelay IN : ( bErrorExists && ! bTON_ErrorDelay ) PT : T#2S
)
178 Network 4 :
179 iNextScrollNum = ( i f bTON_ErrorDelay then iErrorsScrollNum )
180 iErrorsScrollNum = ( i f ! bErrorExists then ciNoErrrors )
181 bScrol l ing = ( ( i f ( ( bErrorExists && ( iErrorsScrollNum == ciNoErrrors ) ) | |
bTON_ErrorDelay ) then TRUE) ( e l s e i f ! bErrorExists then FALSE) )
182 Network 5 :
183 ( iNextScrollNum = ( i f bScrol l ing then 1 + iNextScrollNum ) )
184 iNextScrollNum = ( i f ( ( ( iNextScrollNum > ciIndexHigh ) | | ( iNextScrollNum <
ciIndexLow ) ) && bScrol l ing ) then ciIndexLow )
185 Network 6 :
186 iErrorsScrollNum = ( i f ( bScrol l ing && abErrors [ iNextScrollNum ] ) then iNextScrollNum )
187 bScrol l ing = ( i f ( bScrol l ing && abErrors [ iNextScrollNum ] ) then FALSE)
188 Network 7 :
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189 iOutScrollingErrorNumber = iErrorsScrollNum
190 bOutErrorExists = bErrorExists
191 Network 8 :
192
193 Function : FC329 ( fcHMIBitEnable ) (FBD)
194 Network 1 :
195 bInOutPLC = ( i f ( ! bInToggle && ! bInLatch ) then FALSE)
196 Network 2 :
197 bInOutPLC = ( i f ( bInEnable && bInOutHMI && bInToggle && bInOutPLC ) then FALSE)
198 bInOutHMI = ( i f ( bInEnable && bInOutHMI && bInToggle && bInOutPLC ) then FALSE)
199 Network 3 :
200 bInOutPLC = ( i f ( bInEnable && bInOutHMI && bInToggle && ! bInOutPLC ) then TRUE)
201 Network 4 :
202 bInOutPLC = ( i f ( bInEnable && bInOutHMI && ! bInToggle ) then TRUE)
203 Network 5 :
204 bOutEnable = bInEnable
205 Network 6 :
206 bInOutHMI = FALSE
207 Network 7 :
208
209 Function : FC333 ( fcSetHMIStatusSimulation ) (FBD)
210 Network 1 :
211 iOutStatus = ( i f ( bInSimulate && bInOnReverseHome) then HMI. Status .
SimulatedOnReverseHome )
212 iOutStatus = ( i f ( ! bInSimulate && bInOnReverseHome) then HMI. Status . OnReverseHome)
213 Network 2 :
214 iOutStatus = ( i f ( bInSimulate && bInOnForwardWork) then HMI. Status .
SimulatedOnForwardWork )
215 iOutStatus = ( i f ( ! bInSimulate && bInOnForwardWork) then HMI. Status . OnForwardWork)
216 Network 3 :
217 iOutStatus = ( i f ( bInSimulate && bInReverseHome ) then HMI. Status .
SimulatedReverseHome )
218 iOutStatus = ( i f ( ! bInSimulate && bInReverseHome ) then HMI. Status . ReverseHome)
219 Network 4 :
220 iOutStatus = ( i f ( bInSimulate && bInForwardWork ) then HMI. Status .
SimulatedForwardWork )
221 iOutStatus = ( i f ( ! bInSimulate && bInForwardWork ) then HMI. Status . ForwardWork )
222 Network 5 :
223 iOutStatus = ( i f bInError then HMI. Status . Error )
224 Network 6 :
225 iOutStatus = ( i f bInEstop then HMI. Status . Estop )
226 Network 7 :
227 iOutStatus = ( i f ( ! bInEstop && ! bInError && ! bInForwardWork && ! bInReverseHome && !
bInOnForwardWork && ! bInOnReverseHome) then HMI. Status . Stopped )
228 Network 8 :
229
230 FunctionBlock : FB5 ( Program Logic ) (FBD)
231 Network 1 :
232 Call : FC185 ( fcStepChooser )
233 Inputs :
234 ( CurrentStep == 0) ==> en
235 Ib_PBStart ==> bCondition
236 10 ==> iTrueStep
237 0 ==> iFalseStep
238 Outputs :
239 Ret_Val ==> NextStep
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240 eno ==> StepDone = TRUE
241 Network 3 :
242 Call : FC185 ( fcStepChooser )
243 Inputs :
244 ( CurrentStep == 10) ==> en
245 ( Ib_LvlContEmpty && ! Ib_LvlContFull ) ==> bCondition
246 20 ==> iTrueStep
247 11 ==> iFalseStep
248 Outputs :
249 Ret_Val ==> NextStep
250 eno ==> StepDone = TRUE
251 Network 4 :
252 Call : FC185 ( fcStepChooser )
253 Inputs :
254 ( CurrentStep == 11) ==> en
255 ( Ib_LvlContEmpty && ! Ib_LvlContFull ) ==> bCondition
256 20 ==> iTrueStep
257 11 ==> iFalseStep
258 Outputs :
259 Ret_Val ==> NextStep
260 eno ==> StepDone = TRUE
261 Network 6 :
262 Call : FC185 ( fcStepChooser )
263 Inputs :
264 ( CurrentStep == 20) ==> en
265 Ib_PBFil lLiq1 ==> bCondition
266 21 ==> iTrueStep
267 20 ==> iFalseStep
268 Outputs :
269 Ret_Val ==> NextStep
270 eno ==> StepDone = TRUE
271 Network 7 :
272 Call : FC185 ( fcStepChooser )
273 Inputs :
274 ( CurrentStep == 21) ==> en
275 Ib_LvlContFull ==> bCondition
276 30 ==> iTrueStep
277 21 ==> iFalseStep
278 Outputs :
279 Ret_Val ==> NextStep
280 eno ==> StepDone = TRUE
281 Network 9 :
282 Call : FC185 ( fcStepChooser )
283 Inputs :
284 ( CurrentStep == 30) ==> en
285 Ib_PBEmptyCont ==> bCondition
286 31 ==> iTrueStep
287 30 ==> iFalseStep
288 Outputs :
289 Ret_Val ==> NextStep
290 eno ==> StepDone = TRUE
291 Network 10:
292 Call : FC185 ( fcStepChooser )
293 Inputs :
294 ( CurrentStep == 31) ==> en
295 Ib_LvlContEmpty ==> bCondition
157
296 40 ==> iTrueStep
297 31 ==> iFalseStep
298 Outputs :
299 Ret_Val ==> NextStep
300 eno ==> StepDone = TRUE
301 Network 12:
302 Call : FC185 ( fcStepChooser )
303 Inputs :
304 ( CurrentStep == 40) ==> en
305 Ib_PBFil lLiq2 ==> bCondition
306 41 ==> iTrueStep
307 40 ==> iFalseStep
308 Outputs :
309 Ret_Val ==> NextStep
310 eno ==> StepDone = TRUE
311 Network 13:
312 Call : FC185 ( fcStepChooser )
313 Inputs :
314 ( CurrentStep == 41) ==> en
315 Ib_LvlContFull ==> bCondition
316 50 ==> iTrueStep
317 41 ==> iFalseStep
318 Outputs :
319 Ret_Val ==> NextStep
320 eno ==> StepDone = TRUE
321 Network 15:
322 Call : FC185 ( fcStepChooser )
323 Inputs :
324 ( CurrentStep == 50) ==> en
325 Ib_PBEmptyCont ==> bCondition
326 51 ==> iTrueStep
327 50 ==> iFalseStep
328 Outputs :
329 Ret_Val ==> NextStep
330 eno ==> StepDone = TRUE
331 Network 16:
332 Call : FC185 ( fcStepChooser )
333 Inputs :
334 ( CurrentStep == 51) ==> en
335 Ib_LvlContEmpty ==> bCondition
336 60 ==> iTrueStep
337 51 ==> iFalseStep
338 Outputs :
339 Ret_Val ==> NextStep
340 eno ==> StepDone = TRUE
341 Network 18:
342 Call : FC185 ( fcStepChooser )
343 Inputs :
344 ( CurrentStep == 60) ==> en
345 Ib_PBStop ==> bCondition
346 0 ==> iTrueStep
347 60 ==> iFalseStep
348 Outputs :
349 Ret_Val ==> NextStep
350 eno ==> StepDone = TRUE
351 Network 20:
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352 Call : FB185 ( fbStepSequencer ) , Instance : StepSeq ( LocalVariable )
353 Inputs :
354 CurrentStep ==> iInStep
355 NextStep ==> iInNextStep
356 StepDone ==> bInStepDone
357 Outputs :
358 iOutCurrentStep ==> CurrentStep
359 eno ==> StepDone = FALSE
360 Network 22:
361 DB_ProgramLogic . VlvDrn_Open = ( ( CurrentStep == 11) | | ( CurrentStep == 31) | | (
CurrentStep == 51) )
362 DB_ProgramLogic . VlvLiq1_Open = ( CurrentStep == 21)
363 DB_ProgramLogic . VlvLiq2_Open = ( CurrentStep == 41)
364
365 FunctionBlock : FB4 ( Valve Drain ) (FBD)
366 Network 1 :
367 Call : FB110 ( fbValve_Solenoid ) , Instance : VlvDrn ( LocalVariable )
368 Inputs :
369 t #2s ==> tInTimeout
370 1 ==> iInMode
371 Ib_VlvDrnClosed ==> bInSignalHome
372 Ib_VlvDrnOpened ==> bInSignalWork
373 true ==> bInEnable
374 DB_ProgramLogic . VlvDrn_Open ==> bInCommandWork
375 Ib_PBReset ==> bInResetError
376 DB_HMI. VlvDrn ==> HMI_ValveControl
377 Outputs :
378 bOutCommandWork ==> Qb_VlvDrnOpen
379
380 FunctionBlock : FB2 ( Valve Liquid 1) (FBD)
381 Network 1 :
382 Call : FB110 ( fbValve_Solenoid ) , Instance : VlvLiq1 ( LocalVariable )
383 Inputs :
384 t #2s ==> tInTimeout
385 1 ==> iInMode
386 Ib_VlvLiq1Closed ==> bInSignalHome
387 Ib_VlvLiq1Opened ==> bInSignalWork
388 true ==> bInEnable
389 DB_ProgramLogic . VlvLiq1_Open ==> bInCommandWork
390 Ib_PBReset ==> bInResetError
391 DB_HMI. VlvLiq1 ==> HMI_ValveControl
392 Outputs :
393 bOutCommandWork ==> Qb_VlvLiq1Open
394
395 FunctionBlock : FB3 ( Valve Liquid 2) (FBD)
396 Network 1 :
397 Call : FB110 ( fbValve_Solenoid ) , Instance : VlvLiq2 ( LocalVariable )
398 Inputs :
399 t #2s ==> tInTimeout
400 1 ==> iInMode
401 Ib_VlvLiq2Closed ==> bInSignalHome
402 Ib_VlvLiq2Opened ==> bInSignalWork
403 true ==> bInEnable
404 DB_ProgramLogic . VlvLiq2_Open ==> bInCommandWork
405 Ib_PBReset ==> bInResetError
406 DB_HMI. VlvLiq2 ==> HMI_ValveControl
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407 Outputs :
408 bOutCommandWork ==> Qb_VlvLiq2Open
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F. APPENDIX: NUXMV MODELS PLC PROGRAM
FB110:
1 MODULE fb110 ( iInMode , bInSignalHome , bInSignalWork , bInEnable , bInCommandWork,
bInResetError , bInSimulate , bInEstop )
2 VAR
3 global : global ;
4 loc : { s t a r t , nw1, nw2, nw3, nw4, nw5, nw6, nw7 ,nw8, nw9, nw10, nw11, nw12, nw13,
nw14, nw15, nw16, nw17, nw18, nw19, nw20, nw21, nw22, nw23, nw24, nw25, nw26,
nw27, nw28, nw29, nw30, nw31, nw32, nw33, end } ;
5
6 output_bOutCommandWork : boolean ;
7 output_bOutCommandHome : boolean ;
8 output_bOutActiveHome : boolean ;
9 output_bOutActiveWork : boolean ;
10 output_bOutAuto : boolean ;
11 output_bOutError : boolean ;
12
13 output_ERROR_Valve_NoHomeFeedback : boolean ;
14 output_ERROR_Valve_NoWorkFeedback : boolean ;
15 output_ERROR_Valve_HomeFeedbackStillActive : boolean ;
16 output_ERROR_Valve_WorkFeedbackStillActive : boolean ;
17
18 inout_HMI_ValveControl_bPB_Home : boolean ;
19 inout_HMI_ValveControl_bPBEN_Home : boolean ;
20 inout_HMI_ValveControl_bPB_Work : boolean ;
21 inout_HMI_ValveControl_bPBEN_Work : boolean ;
22 inout_HMI_ValveControl_bError : boolean ;
23 inout_HMI_ValveControl_bPB_ResetError : boolean ;
24 inout_HMI_ValveControl_bPBEN_ResetError : boolean ;
25 inout_HMI_ValveControl_bSignalHome : boolean ;
26 inout_HMI_ValveControl_bSignalWork : boolean ;
27 inout_HMI_ValveControl_bInterlock : boolean ;
28 inout_HMI_ValveControl_bHomeOn : boolean ;
29 inout_HMI_ValveControl_bWorkOn : boolean ;
30 inout_HMI_ValveControl_iMode : signed word [ 1 6 ] ;
31 inout_HMI_ValveControl_iStatus : signed word [ 1 6 ] ;
32
33 static_bManualMode : boolean ;
34 static_bAutoMode : boolean ;
35 static_bPB_Home : boolean ;
36 static_bPB_Work : boolean ;
37 static_bEnableHome : boolean ;
38 static_bEnableWork : boolean ;
39 static_bTON_TimeOut : boolean ;
40 static_bPB_ResetError : boolean ;
41 stat ic_bReset : boolean ;
42 static_bNewMode : boolean ;
43 static_iLastMode : signed word [ 1 6 ] ;
44
45 timer_TON_TimeOut : { 0 , 1 , 2 } ;
46




50 i n i t ( loc ) := s t a r t ;
51
52 i n i t (output_bOutCommandWork) := FALSE ;
53 i n i t (output_bOutCommandHome) := FALSE ;
54 i n i t ( output_bOutActiveHome ) := FALSE ;
55 i n i t ( output_bOutActiveWork ) := FALSE ;
56 i n i t ( output_bOutAuto ) := FALSE ;
57 i n i t ( output_bOutError ) := FALSE ;
58
59 i n i t ( output_ERROR_Valve_NoHomeFeedback ) := FALSE ;
60 i n i t ( output_ERROR_Valve_NoWorkFeedback ) := FALSE ;
61 i n i t ( output_ERROR_Valve_HomeFeedbackStillActive ) := FALSE ;
62 i n i t ( output_ERROR_Valve_WorkFeedbackStillActive ) := FALSE ;
63
64 i n i t ( inout_HMI_ValveControl_bPB_Home ) := FALSE ;
65 i n i t ( inout_HMI_ValveControl_bPBEN_Home ) := FALSE ;
66 i n i t ( inout_HMI_ValveControl_bPB_Work ) := FALSE ;
67 i n i t ( inout_HMI_ValveControl_bPBEN_Work ) := FALSE ;
68 i n i t ( inout_HMI_ValveControl_bError ) := FALSE ;
69 i n i t ( inout_HMI_ValveControl_bPB_ResetError ) := FALSE ;
70 i n i t ( inout_HMI_ValveControl_bPBEN_ResetError ) := FALSE ;
71 i n i t ( inout_HMI_ValveControl_bSignalHome ) := FALSE ;
72 i n i t ( inout_HMI_ValveControl_bSignalWork ) := FALSE ;
73 i n i t ( inout_HMI_ValveControl_bInterlock ) := FALSE ;
74 i n i t ( inout_HMI_ValveControl_bHomeOn ) := FALSE ;
75 i n i t ( inout_HMI_ValveControl_bWorkOn ) := FALSE ;
76 i n i t ( inout_HMI_ValveControl_iMode ) := 0sd16_0 ;
77 i n i t ( inout_HMI_ValveControl_iStatus ) := 0sd16_0 ;
78
79 i n i t ( static_bManualMode ) := FALSE ;
80 i n i t ( static_bAutoMode ) := FALSE ;
81 i n i t ( static_bPB_Home ) := FALSE ;
82 i n i t ( static_bPB_Work ) := FALSE ;
83 i n i t ( static_bEnableHome ) := FALSE ;
84 i n i t ( static_bEnableWork ) := FALSE ;
85 i n i t ( static_bTON_TimeOut ) := FALSE ;
86 i n i t ( static_bPB_ResetError ) := FALSE ;
87 i n i t ( stat ic_bReset ) := FALSE ;
88 i n i t ( static_bNewMode ) := FALSE ;
89 i n i t ( static_iLastMode ) := 0sd16_0 ;
90
91 next ( loc ) :=
92 case
93 ( loc = s t a r t ) : nw1;
94 ( loc = nw1) : nw2;
95 ( loc = nw2) : nw3;
96 ( loc = nw3) : nw4;
97 ( loc = nw4) : nw5;
98 ( loc = nw5) : nw6;
99 ( loc = nw6) : nw7;
100 ( loc = nw7) : nw8;
101 ( loc = nw8) : nw9;
102 ( loc = nw9) : nw10 ;
103 ( loc = nw10) : nw11 ;
104 ( loc = nw11) : nw12 ;
105 ( loc = nw12) : nw13 ;
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106 ( loc = nw13) : nw14 ;
107 ( loc = nw14) : nw15 ;
108 ( loc = nw15) : nw16 ;
109 ( loc = nw16) : nw17 ;
110 ( loc = nw17) : nw18 ;
111 ( loc = nw18) : nw19 ;
112 ( loc = nw19) : nw20 ;
113 ( loc = nw20) : nw21 ;
114 ( loc = nw21) : nw22 ;
115 ( loc = nw22) : nw23 ;
116 ( loc = nw23) : nw24 ;
117 ( loc = nw24) : nw25 ;
118 ( loc = nw25) : nw26 ;
119 ( loc = nw26) : nw27 ;
120 ( loc = nw27) : nw28 ;
121 ( loc = nw28) : nw29 ;
122 ( loc = nw29) : nw30 ;
123 ( loc = nw30) : nw31 ;
124 ( loc = nw31) : nw32 ;
125 ( loc = nw32) : nw33 ;
126 ( loc = nw33) : end ;




131 next ( inout_HMI_ValveControl_bPBEN_Home ) :=
132 case
133 ( loc = nw2) : {FALSE , TRUE} ;
134 TRUE : inout_HMI_ValveControl_bPBEN_Home ;
135 esac ;
136 next ( inout_HMI_ValveControl_bPB_Home ) :=
137 case
138 ( loc = nw2) : {FALSE , TRUE} ;
139 TRUE : inout_HMI_ValveControl_bPB_Home ;
140 esac ;
141 next ( static_bPB_Home ) :=
142 case
143 ( loc = nw2) : {FALSE , TRUE} ;
144 TRUE : static_bPB_Home ;
145 esac ;
146
147 next ( inout_HMI_ValveControl_bPBEN_Work ) :=
148 case
149 ( loc = nw2) : {FALSE , TRUE} ;
150 TRUE : inout_HMI_ValveControl_bPBEN_Work ;
151 esac ;
152 next ( inout_HMI_ValveControl_bPB_Work ) :=
153 case
154 ( loc = nw2) : {FALSE , TRUE} ;
155 TRUE : inout_HMI_ValveControl_bPB_Work ;
156 esac ;
157 next ( static_bPB_Work ) :=
158 case
159 ( loc = nw2) : {FALSE , TRUE} ;




163 next ( inout_HMI_ValveControl_bPBEN_ResetError ) :=
164 case
165 ( loc = nw2) : {FALSE , TRUE} ;
166 TRUE : inout_HMI_ValveControl_bPBEN_ResetError ;
167 esac ;
168 next ( inout_HMI_ValveControl_bPB_ResetError ) :=
169 case
170 ( loc = nw2) : {FALSE , TRUE} ;
171 TRUE : inout_HMI_ValveControl_bPB_ResetError ;
172 esac ;
173 next ( static_bPB_ResetError ) :=
174 case
175 ( loc = nw2) : {FALSE , TRUE} ;




180 next ( inout_HMI_ValveControl_bSignalHome ) :=
181 case
182 ( loc = nw3) : ( bInSignalHome & ! bInSimulate ) | ( inout_HMI_ValveControl_bHomeOn &
bInSimulate ) ;
183 TRUE : inout_HMI_ValveControl_bSignalHome ;
184 esac ;
185
186 next ( inout_HMI_ValveControl_bSignalWork ) :=
187 case
188 ( loc = nw4) : ( bInSignalWork & ! bInSimulate ) | ( inout_HMI_ValveControl_bWorkOn &
bInSimulate ) ;
189 TRUE : inout_HMI_ValveControl_bSignalWork ;
190 esac ;
191
192 next ( output_ERROR_Valve_NoHomeFeedback ) :=
193 case
194 ( loc = nw6 & ( bInResetError | static_bPB_ResetError ) &
inout_HMI_ValveControl_bPBEN_ResetError ) : FALSE ;
195 ( loc = nw19) & ( ! bInEstop & static_bTON_TimeOut & inout_HMI_ValveControl_bHomeOn
& ! inout_HMI_ValveControl_bSignalHome ) : TRUE;
196 TRUE : output_ERROR_Valve_NoHomeFeedback ;
197 esac ;
198
199 next ( output_ERROR_Valve_NoWorkFeedback ) :=
200 case
201 ( loc = nw6 & ( bInResetError | static_bPB_ResetError ) &
inout_HMI_ValveControl_bPBEN_ResetError ) : FALSE ;
202 ( loc = nw20) & ( ! bInEstop & static_bTON_TimeOut & inout_HMI_ValveControl_bWorkOn
& ! inout_HMI_ValveControl_bSignalWork ) : TRUE;
203 TRUE : output_ERROR_Valve_NoWorkFeedback ;
204 esac ;
205
206 next ( output_ERROR_Valve_HomeFeedbackStillActive ) :=
207 case
208 ( loc = nw6 & ( bInResetError | static_bPB_ResetError ) &
inout_HMI_ValveControl_bPBEN_ResetError ) : FALSE ;
209 ( loc = nw21) & ( ! bInEstop & static_bTON_TimeOut & inout_HMI_ValveControl_bWorkOn
& inout_HMI_ValveControl_bSignalHome ) : TRUE;
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210 TRUE : output_ERROR_Valve_HomeFeedbackStillActive ;
211 esac ;
212
213 next ( output_ERROR_Valve_WorkFeedbackStillActive ) :=
214 case
215 ( loc = nw6 & ( bInResetError | static_bPB_ResetError ) &
inout_HMI_ValveControl_bPBEN_ResetError ) : FALSE ;
216 ( loc = nw22) & ( ! bInEstop & static_bTON_TimeOut & inout_HMI_ValveControl_bHomeOn
& inout_HMI_ValveControl_bSignalWork ) : TRUE;
217 TRUE : output_ERROR_Valve_WorkFeedbackStillActive ;
218 esac ;
219
220 next ( stat ic_bReset ) :=
221 case
222 ( loc = nw6) : ( ( bInResetError | static_bPB_ResetError ) &
inout_HMI_ValveControl_bPBEN_ResetError ) ;
223 TRUE : stat ic_bReset ;
224 esac ;
225
226 next ( inout_HMI_ValveControl_iMode ) :=
227 case
228 ( loc = nw7 & iInMode ! = global . Modes_Independent ) : iInMode ;
229 TRUE : inout_HMI_ValveControl_iMode ;
230 esac ;
231
232 next ( static_bNewMode ) :=
233 case
234 ( loc = nw8) : inout_HMI_ValveControl_iMode ! = static_iLastMode ;
235 TRUE : static_bNewMode ;
236 esac ;
237
238 next ( static_iLastMode ) :=
239 case
240 ( loc = nw9) : inout_HMI_ValveControl_iMode ;
241 TRUE : static_iLastMode ;
242 esac ;
243
244 next ( static_bManualMode ) :=
245 case
246 ( loc = nw10) : inout_HMI_ValveControl_iMode = global . Modes_Manual & ( ! bInEstop &
! static_bNewMode & bInEnable ) ;
247 TRUE: static_bManualMode ;
248 esac ;
249
250 next ( static_bAutoMode ) :=
251 case
252 ( loc = nw10) : inout_HMI_ValveControl_iMode = global . Modes_Auto & ( ! bInEstop & !
static_bNewMode & bInEnable ) ;
253 TRUE: static_bAutoMode ;
254 esac ;
255
256 next ( static_bEnableHome ) :=
257 case
258 ( loc = nw11) : ! inout_HMI_ValveControl_bError & ( static_bManualMode |
static_bAutoMode ) ;




262 next ( static_bEnableWork ) :=
263 case
264 ( loc = nw11) : ! inout_HMI_ValveControl_bError & ( static_bManualMode |
static_bAutoMode ) ;
265 TRUE: static_bEnableWork ;
266 esac ;
267
268 next ( inout_HMI_ValveControl_bHomeOn ) :=
269 case
270 ( loc = nw12) & ( static_bManualMode & static_bPB_Home & ! static_bPB_Work &
inout_HMI_ValveControl_bPBEN_Home ) | ( static_bAutoMode & !bInCommandWork &
static_bEnableHome ) : TRUE;
271 ( loc = nw13) & ( ( static_bManualMode & static_bPB_Work & ! static_bPB_Home &
inout_HMI_ValveControl_bPBEN_Work ) | ( static_bAutoMode & bInCommandWork &
static_bEnableWork ) ) : FALSE ;
272 ( loc = nw14) & ( static_bAutoMode & ! static_bEnableHome ) : FALSE ;
273 ( loc = nw16) & ( ! static_bAutoMode & ! static_bManualMode ) : FALSE ;
274 TRUE: inout_HMI_ValveControl_bHomeOn ;
275 esac ;
276
277 next ( inout_HMI_ValveControl_bWorkOn ) :=
278 case
279 ( loc = nw12) & ( static_bManualMode & static_bPB_Home & ! static_bPB_Work &
inout_HMI_ValveControl_bPBEN_Home ) | ( static_bAutoMode & !bInCommandWork &
static_bEnableHome ) : FALSE ;
280 ( loc = nw13) & ( ( static_bManualMode & static_bPB_Work & ! static_bPB_Home &
inout_HMI_ValveControl_bPBEN_Work ) | ( static_bAutoMode & bInCommandWork &
static_bEnableWork ) ) : TRUE;
281 ( loc = nw15) & ( static_bAutoMode & ! static_bEnableWork ) : FALSE ;
282 ( loc = nw16) & ( ! static_bAutoMode & ! static_bManualMode ) : FALSE ;
283 TRUE: inout_HMI_ValveControl_bWorkOn ;
284 esac ;
285
286 next ( timer_TON_TimeOut ) :=
287 case
288 ( loc = nw18) & ! ( ( ( inout_HMI_ValveControl_bHomeOn & !
inout_HMI_ValveControl_bSignalHome ) | ( inout_HMI_ValveControl_bWorkOn & !
inout_HMI_ValveControl_bSignalWork ) | ( inout_HMI_ValveControl_bSignalHome &
inout_HMI_ValveControl_bWorkOn ) | ( inout_HMI_ValveControl_bSignalWork &
inout_HMI_ValveControl_bHomeOn ) ) & ! stat ic_bReset ) : 0 ;
289 ( loc = nw18) & ( ( ( inout_HMI_ValveControl_bHomeOn & !
inout_HMI_ValveControl_bSignalHome ) | ( inout_HMI_ValveControl_bWorkOn & !
inout_HMI_ValveControl_bSignalWork ) | ( inout_HMI_ValveControl_bSignalHome &
inout_HMI_ValveControl_bWorkOn ) | ( inout_HMI_ValveControl_bSignalWork &
inout_HMI_ValveControl_bHomeOn ) ) & ! stat ic_bReset ) & ( timer_TON_TimeOut < 2) :
timer_TON_TimeOut + 1 ;
290 TRUE : timer_TON_TimeOut ;
291 esac ;
292
293 next ( static_bTON_TimeOut ) :=
294 case
295 ( loc = nw18) & ( timer_TON_TimeOut < 2) : FALSE ;
296 ( loc = nw18) & ( timer_TON_TimeOut >= 2) : TRUE;




300 next ( inout_HMI_ValveControl_bError ) :=
301 case
302 ( loc = nw23) : {FALSE , TRUE} ;
303 TRUE : inout_HMI_ValveControl_bError ;
304 esac ;
305
306 next ( inout_HMI_ValveControl_bInterlock ) :=
307 case
308 ( loc = nw24) : ! bInEnable ;
309 TRUE: inout_HMI_ValveControl_bInterlock ;
310 esac ;
311
312 next ( inout_HMI_ValveControl_iStatus ) :=
313 case
314 ( loc = nw25 & randomModeNr = 0) : swconst ( 0 , 16) ;
315 ( loc = nw25 & randomModeNr = 1) : swconst ( 1 , 16) ;
316 ( loc = nw25 & randomModeNr = 2) : swconst ( 2 , 16) ;
317 ( loc = nw25 & randomModeNr = 3) : swconst ( 3 , 16) ;
318 ( loc = nw25 & randomModeNr = 4) : swconst ( 4 , 16) ;
319 ( loc = nw25 & randomModeNr = 5) : swconst ( 5 , 16) ;
320 ( loc = nw25 & randomModeNr = 6) : swconst ( 6 , 16) ;
321 ( loc = nw25 & randomModeNr = 7) : swconst ( 7 , 16) ;
322 ( loc = nw25 & randomModeNr = 8) : swconst ( 8 , 16) ;
323 ( loc = nw25 & randomModeNr = 9) : swconst ( 9 , 16) ;
324 ( loc = nw25 & randomModeNr = 10) : swconst (10 , 16) ;
325 TRUE : inout_HMI_ValveControl_iStatus ;
326 esac ;
327
328 next (output_bOutCommandHome) :=
329 case
330 ( loc = nw27) : ( inout_HMI_ValveControl_bHomeOn & ! bInSimulate ) ;
331 TRUE: output_bOutCommandHome ;
332 esac ;
333
334 next (output_bOutCommandWork) :=
335 case
336 ( loc = nw28) : ( inout_HMI_ValveControl_bWorkOn & ! bInSimulate ) ;
337 TRUE: output_bOutCommandWork ;
338 esac ;
339
340 next ( output_bOutActiveHome ) :=
341 case
342 ( loc = nw29) : ( inout_HMI_ValveControl_bHomeOn &
inout_HMI_ValveControl_bSignalHome ) ;
343 TRUE: output_bOutActiveHome ;
344 esac ;
345
346 next ( output_bOutActiveWork ) :=
347 case
348 ( loc = nw30) : ( inout_HMI_ValveControl_bWorkOn &
inout_HMI_ValveControl_bSignalWork ) ;




352 next ( output_bOutAuto ) :=
353 case
354 ( loc = nw31) : ( inout_HMI_ValveControl_iMode = global . Modes_Auto ) ;
355 TRUE: output_bOutAuto ;
356 esac ;
357
358 next ( output_bOutError ) :=
359 case
360 ( loc = nw32) : ( inout_HMI_ValveControl_bError ) ;






367 Modes_Independent := 0sd16_10 ;
368 Modes_Manual := 0sd16_2 ;





374 iInMode : signed word [ 1 6 ] ;
375 bInSignalHome : boolean ;
376 bInSignalWork : boolean ;
377 bInEnable : boolean ;
378 bInCommandWork : boolean ;
379 bInResetError : boolean ;
380 bInSimulate : boolean ;
381 bInEstop : boolean ;
382 TestVlv : fb110 ( iInMode , bInSignalHome , bInSignalWork , bInEnable , bInCommandWork,
bInResetError , bInSimulate , bInEstop ) ;
383 randomModeNr : { 0 , 1 , 2 , 1 0 } ;
384
385 ASSIGN
386 i n i t ( iInMode ) := 0sd16_1 ;
387 i n i t ( bInSignalHome ) := FALSE ;
388 i n i t ( bInSignalWork ) := FALSE ;
389 i n i t ( bInEnable ) := FALSE ;
390 i n i t (bInCommandWork) := FALSE ;
391 i n i t ( bInResetError ) := FALSE ;
392 i n i t ( bInSimulate ) := FALSE ;
393 i n i t ( bInEstop ) := FALSE ;
394
395 next ( iInMode ) :=
396 case
397 ( TestVlv . loc = end & randomModeNr = 0) : swconst ( 0 , 16) ;
398 ( TestVlv . loc = end & randomModeNr = 1) : swconst ( 1 , 16) ;
399 ( TestVlv . loc = end & randomModeNr = 2) : swconst ( 2 , 16) ;
400 ( TestVlv . loc = end & randomModeNr = 10) : swconst (10 , 16) ;
401 TRUE : iInMode ;
402 esac ;
403
404 next ( bInSignalHome ) :=
405 case
406 ( TestVlv . loc = end) : {FALSE , TRUE} ;
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407 TRUE : bInSignalHome ;
408 esac ;
409
410 next ( bInSignalWork ) :=
411 case
412 ( TestVlv . loc = end) : {FALSE , TRUE} ;
413 TRUE : bInSignalWork ;
414 esac ;
415
416 next ( bInEnable ) :=
417 case
418 ( TestVlv . loc = end) : {FALSE , TRUE} ;
419 TRUE : bInEnable ;
420 esac ;
421
422 next (bInCommandWork) :=
423 case
424 ( TestVlv . loc = end) : {FALSE , TRUE} ;
425 TRUE : bInCommandWork;
426 esac ;
427
428 next ( bInResetError ) :=
429 case
430 ( TestVlv . loc = end) : {FALSE , TRUE} ;
431 TRUE : bInResetError ;
432 esac ;
433
434 next ( bInSimulate ) :=
435 case
436 ( TestVlv . loc = end) : {FALSE , TRUE} ;
437 TRUE : bInSimulate ;
438 esac ;
439
440 next ( bInEstop ) :=
441 case
442 ( TestVlv . loc = end) : {FALSE , TRUE} ;
443 TRUE : bInEstop ;
444 esac ;
FB330:
1 MODULE fb330 ( bInError01 , bInError02 , bInError03 , bInError04 , bInError05 )
2 VAR
3 loc : { s t a r t , nw1, nw2, nw3, nw4, nw5, nw6, nw7 ,nw8, end } ;
4
5 output_bOutErrorExists : boolean ;
6 output_iOutScrollingErrorNumber : signed word [ 1 6 ] ;
7
8 stat ic_abErrors : array 0 . . 5 of boolean ;
9 static_iNextScrollNum : signed word [ 1 6 ] ;
10 static_iErrorsScrollNum : signed word [ 1 6 ] ;
11 s t a t i c _ b S c r o l l i n g : boolean ;
12 static_bTON_ErrorDelay : boolean ;
13
14 temp_bErrorExists : boolean ;
15
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16 const_ciNoErrors : signed word [ 1 6 ] ;
17 const_ciIndexLow : signed word [ 1 6 ] ;
18 const_ciIndexHigh : signed word [ 1 6 ] ;
19




24 i n i t ( loc ) := s t a r t ;
25
26 i n i t ( output_bOutErrorExists ) := FALSE ;
27 i n i t ( output_iOutScrollingErrorNumber ) := 0sd16_0 ;
28
29 i n i t ( static_iNextScrollNum ) := 0sd16_0 ;
30 i n i t ( static_iErrorsScrollNum ) := 0sd16_0 ;
31 i n i t ( s t a t i c _ b S c r o l l i n g ) := FALSE ;
32 i n i t ( static_bTON_ErrorDelay ) := FALSE ;
33
34 i n i t ( temp_bErrorExists ) := FALSE ;
35
36 i n i t ( const_ciNoErrors ) := 0sd16_0 ;
37 i n i t ( const_ciIndexLow ) := 0sd16_1 ;
38 i n i t ( const_ciIndexHigh ) := 0sd16_5 ;
39
40 i n i t ( timer_TON_ErrorDelay ) := 0 ;
41
42 next ( const_ciNoErrors ) := 0sd16_0 ;
43 next ( const_ciIndexLow ) := 0sd16_1 ;
44 next ( const_ciIndexHigh ) := 0sd16_5 ;
45
46 next ( loc ) :=
47 case
48 ( loc = s t a r t ) : nw1;
49 ( loc = nw1) : nw2;
50 ( loc = nw2) : nw3;
51 ( loc = nw3) : nw4;
52 ( loc = nw4) : nw5;
53 ( loc = nw5) : nw6;
54 ( loc = nw6) : nw7;
55 ( loc = nw7) : nw8;
56 ( loc = nw8) : end ;
57 ( loc = end) : s t a r t ;
58 esac ;
59
60 −− network 1
61 next ( static_iErrorsScrollNum ) :=
62 case
63 ( loc = nw1) & ( ( static_iErrorsScrollNum < const_ciNoErrors ) | (
static_iErrorsScrollNum > const_ciIndexHigh ) ) : const_ciNoErrors ;
64 ( loc = nw4) & ! temp_bErrorExists : const_ciNoErrors ;
65 ( loc = nw6) & ( s t a t i c _ b S c r o l l i n g & stat ic_abErrors [ 1 ] & static_iNextScrollNum =
0sd16_1 ) : 0sd16_1 ;
66 ( loc = nw6) & ( s t a t i c _ b S c r o l l i n g & stat ic_abErrors [ 2 ] & static_iNextScrollNum =
0sd16_2 ) : 0sd16_2 ;
67 ( loc = nw6) & ( s t a t i c _ b S c r o l l i n g & stat ic_abErrors [ 3 ] & static_iNextScrollNum =
0sd16_3 ) : 0sd16_3 ;
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68 ( loc = nw6) & ( s t a t i c _ b S c r o l l i n g & stat ic_abErrors [ 4 ] & static_iNextScrollNum =
0sd16_4 ) : 0sd16_4 ;
69 ( loc = nw6) & ( s t a t i c _ b S c r o l l i n g & stat ic_abErrors [ 5 ] & static_iNextScrollNum =
0sd16_5 ) : 0sd16_5 ;
70 TRUE : static_iErrorsScrollNum ;
71 esac ;
72 next ( static_iNextScrollNum ) :=
73 case
74 ( loc = nw1) & ( ( static_iNextScrollNum < const_ciIndexLow ) | (
static_iNextScrollNum > const_ciIndexHigh ) ) : const_ciIndexLow ;
75 ( loc = nw4) & static_bTON_ErrorDelay : static_iErrorsScrollNum ;
76 ( loc = nw5) & s t a t i c _ b S c r o l l i n g : static_iNextScrollNum + 0sd16_1 ;
77 ( loc = nw5) & ( ( static_iNextScrollNum > const_ciIndexHigh ) | (
static_iNextScrollNum < const_ciIndexLow ) ) &s t a t i c _ b S c r o l l i n g : const_ciIndexLow ;
78 TRUE : static_iNextScrollNum ;
79 esac ;
80
81 −− network 2
82 next ( stat ic_abErrors [ 1 ] ) :=
83 case
84 ( loc = nw2) : bInError01 ;
85 TRUE : stat ic_abErrors [ 1 ] ;
86 esac ;
87
88 next ( stat ic_abErrors [ 2 ] ) :=
89 case
90 ( loc = nw2) : bInError02 ;
91 TRUE : stat ic_abErrors [ 2 ] ;
92 esac ;
93
94 next ( stat ic_abErrors [ 3 ] ) :=
95 case
96 ( loc = nw2) : bInError03 ;
97 TRUE : stat ic_abErrors [ 3 ] ;
98 esac ;
99
100 next ( stat ic_abErrors [ 4 ] ) :=
101 case
102 ( loc = nw2) : bInError04 ;
103 TRUE : stat ic_abErrors [ 4 ] ;
104 esac ;
105
106 next ( stat ic_abErrors [ 5 ] ) :=
107 case
108 ( loc = nw2) : bInError05 ;
109 TRUE : stat ic_abErrors [ 5 ] ;
110 esac ;
111
112 next ( temp_bErrorExists ) :=
113 case
114 ( loc = nw2) : bInError01 | bInError02 | bInError03 | bInError04 | bInError05 ;
115 TRUE : temp_bErrorExists ;
116 esac ;
117
118 −− network 3
119 next ( timer_TON_ErrorDelay ) :=
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120 case
121 ( loc = nw3) & ! ( temp_bErrorExists & ! static_bTON_ErrorDelay ) : 0 ;
122 ( loc = nw3) & ( temp_bErrorExists & ! static_bTON_ErrorDelay ) & (
timer_TON_ErrorDelay < 2) : timer_TON_ErrorDelay + 1 ;
123 TRUE : timer_TON_ErrorDelay ;
124 esac ;
125
126 next ( static_bTON_ErrorDelay ) :=
127 case
128 ( loc = nw3) & ( timer_TON_ErrorDelay < 2) : FALSE ;
129 ( loc = nw3) & ( timer_TON_ErrorDelay >= 2) : TRUE;
130 TRUE : static_bTON_ErrorDelay ;
131 esac ;
132
133 −− network 4
134 next ( s t a t i c _ b S c r o l l i n g ) :=
135 case
136 ( loc = nw4) & ( static_bTON_ErrorDelay | ( temp_bErrorExists & (
static_iErrorsScrollNum = const_ciNoErrors ) ) ) : TRUE;
137 ( loc = nw4) & ( ! temp_bErrorExists ) : FALSE ;
138 ( loc = nw6) & ( s t a t i c _ b S c r o l l i n g & stat ic_abErrors [ 1 ] & static_iNextScrollNum =
0sd16_1 ) : FALSE ;
139 ( loc = nw6) & ( s t a t i c _ b S c r o l l i n g & stat ic_abErrors [ 2 ] & static_iNextScrollNum =
0sd16_2 ) : FALSE ;
140 ( loc = nw6) & ( s t a t i c _ b S c r o l l i n g & stat ic_abErrors [ 3 ] & static_iNextScrollNum =
0sd16_3 ) : FALSE ;
141 ( loc = nw6) & ( s t a t i c _ b S c r o l l i n g & stat ic_abErrors [ 4 ] & static_iNextScrollNum =
0sd16_4 ) : FALSE ;
142 ( loc = nw6) & ( s t a t i c _ b S c r o l l i n g & stat ic_abErrors [ 5 ] & static_iNextScrollNum =
0sd16_5 ) : FALSE ;
143 TRUE : s t a t i c _ b S c r o l l i n g ;
144 esac ;
145
146 −− network 7
147 next ( output_bOutErrorExists ) :=
148 case
149 ( loc = nw7) : temp_bErrorExists ;
150 TRUE : output_bOutErrorExists ;
151 esac ;
152
153 next ( output_iOutScrollingErrorNumber ) :=
154 case
155 ( loc = nw7) : static_iErrorsScrollNum ;






162 bInError01 : boolean ;
163 bInError02 : boolean ;
164 bInError03 : boolean ;
165 bInError04 : boolean ;
166 bInError05 : boolean ;




170 i n i t ( bInError01 ) := FALSE ;
171 i n i t ( bInError02 ) := FALSE ;
172 i n i t ( bInError03 ) := FALSE ;
173 i n i t ( bInError04 ) := FALSE ;
174 i n i t ( bInError05 ) := FALSE ;
175
176
177 next ( bInError01 ) :=
178 case
179 ( Test_FB330 . loc = end) : {FALSE , TRUE} ;
180 TRUE : bInError01 ;
181 esac ;
182
183 next ( bInError02 ) :=
184 case
185 ( Test_FB330 . loc = end) : {FALSE , TRUE} ;
186 TRUE : bInError02 ;
187 esac ;
188
189 next ( bInError03 ) :=
190 case
191 ( Test_FB330 . loc = end) : {FALSE , TRUE} ;
192 TRUE : bInError03 ;
193 esac ;
194
195 next ( bInError04 ) :=
196 case
197 ( Test_FB330 . loc = end) : {FALSE , TRUE} ;
198 TRUE : bInError04 ;
199 esac ;
200
201 next ( bInError05 ) :=
202 case
203 ( Test_FB330 . loc = end) : {FALSE , TRUE} ;
204 TRUE : bInError05 ;
205 esac ;
FC329:
1 MODULE fc329 ( bInToggle , bInLatch , bInEnable )
2 VAR
3 loc : { s t a r t , nw1, nw2, nw3, nw4, nw5, nw6, nw7 , end } ;
4
5 output_bOutEnable : boolean ;
6
7 inout_bInOutHMI : boolean ;




12 i n i t ( loc ) := s t a r t ;
13
14 i n i t ( output_bOutEnable ) := FALSE ;
15
16 i n i t ( inout_bInOutHMI ) := FALSE ;
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17 i n i t ( inout_bInOutPLC ) := FALSE ;
18
19 next ( loc ) :=
20 case
21 ( loc = s t a r t ) : nw1;
22 ( loc = nw1) : nw2;
23 ( loc = nw2) : nw3;
24 ( loc = nw3) : nw4;
25 ( loc = nw4) : nw5;
26 ( loc = nw5) : nw6;
27 ( loc = nw6) : nw7;
28 ( loc = nw7) : end ;
29 ( loc = end) : s t a r t ;
30 esac ;
31
32 −− network 1
33 next ( inout_bInOutPLC ) :=
34 case
35 ( loc = nw1) & ( ! bInToggle & ! bInLatch ) : FALSE ;
36 ( loc = nw2) & ( bInEnable & inout_bInOutHMI & bInToggle & inout_bInOutPLC ) : FALSE
;
37 ( loc = nw3) & ( bInEnable & inout_bInOutHMI & bInToggle & ! inout_bInOutPLC ) : TRUE
;
38 ( loc = nw4) & ( bInEnable & inout_bInOutHMI & ! bInToggle ) : TRUE;
39 ( loc = end) : {FALSE , TRUE} ;
40 TRUE : inout_bInOutPLC ;
41 esac ;
42
43 −− network 2
44 next ( inout_bInOutHMI ) :=
45 case
46 ( loc = nw2) & ( bInEnable & inout_bInOutHMI & bInToggle & inout_bInOutPLC ) : FALSE
;
47 ( loc = nw6) : FALSE ;
48 ( loc = end) : {FALSE , TRUE} ;
49 TRUE : inout_bInOutHMI ;
50 esac ;
51
52 −− network 5
53 next ( output_bOutEnable ) :=
54 case
55 ( loc = nw5) : bInEnable ;






62 bInToggle : boolean ;
63 bInLatch : boolean ;
64 bInEnable : boolean ;
65 Test_FC329 : fc329 ( bInToggle , bInLatch , bInEnable ) ;
66
67 ASSIGN
68 i n i t ( bInToggle ) := FALSE ;
69 i n i t ( bInLatch ) := FALSE ;
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70 i n i t ( bInEnable ) := FALSE ;
71
72 next ( bInToggle ) :=
73 case
74 ( Test_FC329 . loc = end) : {FALSE , TRUE} ;
75 TRUE : bInToggle ;
76 esac ;
77
78 next ( bInLatch ) :=
79 case
80 ( Test_FC329 . loc = end) : {FALSE , TRUE} ;
81 TRUE : bInLatch ;
82 esac ;
83
84 next ( bInEnable ) :=
85 case
86 ( Test_FC329 . loc = end) : {FALSE , TRUE} ;
87 TRUE : bInEnable ;
88 esac ;
FC333:
1 MODULE fc333 ( bInEstop , bInError , bInForwardWork , bInReverseHome , bInOnForwardWork ,
bInOnReverseHome , bInSimulate )
2 VAR
3 global : global ;
4 loc : { s t a r t , nw1, nw2, nw3, nw4, nw5, nw6, nw7, nw8, end } ;
5
6 output_iOutStatus : signed word [ 1 6 ] ;
7
8 ASSIGN
9 i n i t ( loc ) := s t a r t ;
10
11 i n i t ( output_iOutStatus ) := 0sd16_0 ;
12
13 next ( loc ) :=
14 case
15 ( loc = s t a r t ) : nw1;
16 ( loc = nw1) : nw2;
17 ( loc = nw2) : nw3;
18 ( loc = nw3) : nw4;
19 ( loc = nw4) : nw5;
20 ( loc = nw5) : nw6;
21 ( loc = nw6) : nw7;
22 ( loc = nw7) : nw8;
23 ( loc = nw8) : end ;
24 ( loc = end) : s t a r t ;
25 esac ;
26
27 −− network 1
28 next ( output_iOutStatus ) :=
29 case
30
31 ( loc = nw1) & ( bInSimulate & bInOnReverseHome) : global .
HMI_Status_SimulatedOnReverseHome ;
175
32 ( loc = nw1) & ( ! bInSimulate & bInOnReverseHome) : global . HMI_Status_OnReverseHome
;
33 ( loc = nw2) & ( bInSimulate & bInOnForwardWork) : global .
HMI_Status_SimulatedOnForwardWork ;
34 ( loc = nw2) & ( ! bInSimulate & bInOnForwardWork) : global . HMI_Status_OnForwardWork
;
35 ( loc = nw3) & ( bInSimulate & bInReverseHome ) : global .
HMI_Status_SimulatedReverseHome ;
36 ( loc = nw3) & ( ! bInSimulate & bInReverseHome ) : global . HMI_Status_ReverseHome ;
37 ( loc = nw4) & ( bInSimulate & bInForwardWork ) : global .
HMI_Status_SimulatedForwardWork ;
38 ( loc = nw4) & ( ! bInSimulate & bInForwardWork ) : global . HMI_Status_ForwardWork ;
39 ( loc = nw5) & ( bInError ) : global . HMI_Status_Error ;
40 ( loc = nw6) & ( bInEstop ) : global . HMI_Status_Estop ;
41 ( loc = nw7) & ( ! bInEstop & ! bInError & ! bInForwardWork & ! bInReverseHome & !
bInOnForwardWork & ! bInOnReverseHome) : global . HMI_Status_Stopped ;






48 HMI_Status_SimulatedOnReverseHome := 0sd16_10 ;
49 HMI_Status_OnReverseHome := 0sd16_6 ;
50 HMI_Status_SimulatedOnForwardWork := 0sd16_9 ;
51 HMI_Status_OnForwardWork := 0sd16_5 ;
52 HMI_Status_SimulatedReverseHome := 0sd16_8 ;
53 HMI_Status_ReverseHome := 0sd16_4 ;
54 HMI_Status_SimulatedForwardWork := 0sd16_7 ;
55 HMI_Status_ForwardWork := 0sd16_3 ;
56 HMI_Status_Error := 0sd16_2 ;
57 HMI_Status_Estop := 0sd16_1 ;





63 bInEstop : boolean ;
64 bInError : boolean ;
65 bInForwardWork : boolean ;
66 bInReverseHome : boolean ;
67 bInOnForwardWork : boolean ;
68 bInOnReverseHome : boolean ;
69 bInSimulate : boolean ;
70
71 Test_FC333 : fc333 ( bInEstop , bInError , bInForwardWork , bInReverseHome ,
bInOnForwardWork , bInOnReverseHome , bInSimulate ) ;
72
73 ASSIGN
74 i n i t ( bInEstop ) := FALSE ;
75 i n i t ( bInError ) := FALSE ;
76 i n i t ( bInForwardWork ) := FALSE ;
77 i n i t ( bInReverseHome ) := FALSE ;
78 i n i t (bInOnForwardWork) := FALSE ;
79 i n i t (bInOnReverseHome) := FALSE ;
80 i n i t ( bInSimulate ) := FALSE ;
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81
82 next ( bInEstop ) :=
83 case
84 ( Test_FC333 . loc = end) : {FALSE , TRUE} ;
85 TRUE : bInEstop ;
86 esac ;
87
88 next ( bInError ) :=
89 case
90 ( Test_FC333 . loc = end) : {FALSE , TRUE} ;
91 TRUE : bInError ;
92 esac ;
93
94 next ( bInForwardWork ) :=
95 case
96 ( Test_FC333 . loc = end) : {FALSE , TRUE} ;
97 TRUE : bInForwardWork ;
98 esac ;
99
100 next ( bInReverseHome ) :=
101 case
102 ( Test_FC333 . loc = end) : {FALSE , TRUE} ;
103 TRUE : bInReverseHome ;
104 esac ;
105
106 next (bInOnForwardWork) :=
107 case
108 ( Test_FC333 . loc = end) : {FALSE , TRUE} ;
109 TRUE : bInOnForwardWork ;
110 esac ;
111
112 next (bInOnReverseHome) :=
113 case
114 ( Test_FC333 . loc = end) : {FALSE , TRUE} ;
115 TRUE : bInOnReverseHome ;
116 esac ;
117
118 next ( bInSimulate ) :=
119 case
120 ( Test_FC333 . loc = end) : {FALSE , TRUE} ;
121 TRUE : bInSimulate ;
122 esac ;
FB5:
1 MODULE fb5 ( )
2 VAR
3 loc : { s t a r t , nw1, nw2, nw3, nw4, nw5, nw6, nw7 ,nw8, nw9, nw10, nw11, nw12, nw13,
nw14, nw15, nw16, nw17, nw18, nw19, nw20, nw21, nw22, end } ;
4
5 Ib_PBStart : boolean ;
6 Ib_LvlContEmpty : boolean ;
7 Ib_LvlContFull : boolean ;
8 Ib_PBFil lLiq1 : boolean ;
9 Ib_PBEmptyCont : boolean ;
10 Ib_PBFil lLiq2 : boolean ;
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11 Ib_PBStop : boolean ;
12 Ib_VlvDrnClosed : boolean ;
13 Ib_VlvDrnOpened : boolean ;
14 Ib_VlvLiq1Closed : boolean ;
15 Ib_VlvLiq1Opened : boolean ;
16 Ib_VlvLiq2Closed : boolean ;
17 Ib_VlvLiq2Opened : boolean ;
18
19 static_CurrentStep : signed word [ 1 6 ] ;
20 static_NextStep : signed word [ 1 6 ] ;
21 static_bVlvDrn_Open : boolean ;
22 static_bVlvLiq1_Open : boolean ;
23 static_bVlvLiq2_Open : boolean ;
24
25 ASSIGN
26 i n i t ( loc ) := s t a r t ;
27
28 i n i t ( Ib_PBStart ) := FALSE ;
29 i n i t ( Ib_LvlContEmpty ) := FALSE ;
30 i n i t ( Ib_LvlContFull ) := FALSE ;
31 i n i t ( Ib_PBFil lLiq1 ) := FALSE ;
32 i n i t ( Ib_PBEmptyCont ) := FALSE ;
33 i n i t ( Ib_PBFil lLiq2 ) := FALSE ;
34 i n i t ( Ib_PBStop ) := FALSE ;
35 i n i t ( Ib_VlvDrnClosed ) := FALSE ;
36 i n i t ( Ib_VlvDrnOpened ) := FALSE ;
37 i n i t ( Ib_VlvLiq1Closed ) := FALSE ;
38 i n i t ( Ib_VlvLiq1Opened ) := FALSE ;
39 i n i t ( Ib_VlvLiq2Closed ) := FALSE ;
40 i n i t ( Ib_VlvLiq2Opened ) := FALSE ;
41
42 i n i t ( static_CurrentStep ) := 0sd16_0 ;
43 i n i t ( static_NextStep ) := 0sd16_0 ;
44 i n i t ( static_bVlvDrn_Open ) := FALSE ;
45 i n i t ( static_bVlvLiq1_Open ) := FALSE ;
46 i n i t ( static_bVlvLiq2_Open ) := FALSE ;
47
48 next ( loc ) :=
49 case
50 ( loc = s t a r t ) : nw1;
51 ( loc = nw1) : nw2;
52 ( loc = nw2) : nw3;
53 ( loc = nw3) : nw4;
54 ( loc = nw4) : nw5;
55 ( loc = nw5) : nw6;
56 ( loc = nw6) : nw7;
57 ( loc = nw7) : nw8;
58 ( loc = nw8) : nw9;
59 ( loc = nw9) : nw10 ;
60 ( loc = nw10) : nw11 ;
61 ( loc = nw11) : nw12 ;
62 ( loc = nw12) : nw13 ;
63 ( loc = nw13) : nw14 ;
64 ( loc = nw14) : nw15 ;
65 ( loc = nw15) : nw16 ;
66 ( loc = nw16) : nw17 ;
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67 ( loc = nw17) : nw18 ;
68 ( loc = nw18) : nw19 ;
69 ( loc = nw19) : nw20 ;
70 ( loc = nw20) : nw21 ;
71 ( loc = nw21) : nw22 ;
72 ( loc = nw22) : end ;
73 ( loc = end) : s t a r t ;
74 esac ;
75
76 next ( Ib_PBStart ) :=
77 case
78 ( loc = end) : {FALSE , TRUE} ;
79 TRUE : Ib_PBStart ;
80 esac ;
81 next ( Ib_LvlContEmpty ) :=
82 case
83 ( loc = end) : {FALSE , TRUE} ;
84 TRUE : Ib_LvlContEmpty ;
85 esac ;
86 next ( Ib_LvlContFull ) :=
87 case
88 ( loc = end) : {FALSE , TRUE} ;
89 TRUE : Ib_LvlContFull ;
90 esac ;
91 next ( Ib_PBFil lLiq1 ) :=
92 case
93 ( loc = end) : {FALSE , TRUE} ;
94 TRUE : Ib_PBFil lLiq1 ;
95 esac ;
96 next ( Ib_PBEmptyCont ) :=
97 case
98 ( loc = end) : {FALSE , TRUE} ;
99 TRUE : Ib_PBEmptyCont ;
100 esac ;
101 next ( Ib_PBFil lLiq2 ) :=
102 case
103 ( loc = end) : {FALSE , TRUE} ;
104 TRUE : Ib_PBFil lLiq2 ;
105 esac ;
106 next ( Ib_PBStop ) :=
107 case
108 ( loc = end) : {FALSE , TRUE} ;
109 TRUE : Ib_PBStop ;
110 esac ;
111
112 next ( Ib_VlvDrnClosed ) :=
113 case
114 ( loc = end) : {FALSE , TRUE} ;
115 TRUE : Ib_VlvDrnClosed ;
116 esac ;
117 next ( Ib_VlvDrnOpened ) :=
118 case
119 ( loc = end) : {FALSE , TRUE} ;
120 TRUE : Ib_VlvDrnOpened ;
121 esac ;
122 next ( Ib_VlvLiq1Closed ) :=
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123 case
124 ( loc = end) : {FALSE , TRUE} ;
125 TRUE : Ib_VlvLiq1Closed ;
126 esac ;
127 next ( Ib_VlvLiq1Opened ) :=
128 case
129 ( loc = end) : {FALSE , TRUE} ;
130 TRUE : Ib_VlvLiq1Opened ;
131 esac ;
132 next ( Ib_VlvLiq2Closed ) :=
133 case
134 ( loc = end) : {FALSE , TRUE} ;
135 TRUE : Ib_VlvLiq2Closed ;
136 esac ;
137 next ( Ib_VlvLiq2Opened ) :=
138 case
139 ( loc = end) : {FALSE , TRUE} ;
140 TRUE : Ib_VlvLiq2Opened ;
141 esac ;
142
143 −− network 1−19
144 next ( static_NextStep ) :=
145 case
146 ( loc = nw1) & ( Ib_PBStart & ( static_CurrentStep = 0sd16_0 ) ) : 0sd16_10 ;
147 ( loc = nw3) & ( Ib_LvlContEmpty & ! Ib_LvlContFull & ( static_CurrentStep = 0
sd16_10 ) ) : 0sd16_20 ;
148 ( loc = nw3) & ( ! ( Ib_LvlContEmpty & ! Ib_LvlContFull ) & ( static_CurrentStep = 0
sd16_10 ) ) : 0sd16_11 ;
149 ( loc = nw4) & ( Ib_LvlContEmpty & ! Ib_LvlContFull & ( static_CurrentStep = 0
sd16_11 ) ) : 0sd16_20 ;
150 ( loc = nw6) & ( Ib_PBFil lLiq1 & ( static_CurrentStep = 0sd16_20 ) ) : 0sd16_21 ;
151 ( loc = nw7) & ( Ib_LvlContFull & ( static_CurrentStep = 0sd16_21 ) ) : 0sd16_30 ;
152 ( loc = nw9) & ( Ib_PBEmptyCont & ( static_CurrentStep = 0sd16_30 ) ) : 0sd16_31 ;
153 ( loc = nw10) & ( Ib_LvlContEmpty & ( static_CurrentStep = 0sd16_31 ) ) : 0sd16_40 ;
154 ( loc = nw12) & ( Ib_PBFil lLiq2 & ( static_CurrentStep = 0sd16_40 ) ) : 0sd16_41 ;
155 ( loc = nw13) & ( Ib_LvlContFull & ( static_CurrentStep = 0sd16_41 ) ) : 0sd16_50 ;
156 ( loc = nw15) & ( Ib_PBEmptyCont & ( static_CurrentStep = 0sd16_50 ) ) : 0sd16_51 ;
157 ( loc = nw16) & ( Ib_LvlContEmpty & ( static_CurrentStep = 0sd16_51 ) ) : 0sd16_60 ;
158 ( loc = nw18) & ( Ib_PBStop & ( static_CurrentStep = 0sd16_60 ) ) : 0sd16_0 ;
159 TRUE : static_NextStep ;
160 esac ;
161
162 −− network 20
163 next ( static_CurrentStep ) :=
164 case
165 ( loc = nw20) & ! ( static_NextStep = static_CurrentStep ) : static_NextStep ;
166 TRUE: static_CurrentStep ;
167 esac ;
168
169 −− network 22
170 next ( static_bVlvDrn_Open ) :=
171 case
172 ( loc = nw22) : ( ( static_CurrentStep = 0sd16_11 ) | ( static_CurrentStep = 0sd16_31 )
| ( static_CurrentStep = 0sd16_51 ) ) & ( Ib_VlvLiq1Closed & Ib_VlvLiq2Closed ) ;
173 TRUE : static_bVlvDrn_Open ;
174 esac ;
180
175 next ( static_bVlvLiq1_Open ) :=
176 case
177 ( loc = nw22) : ( ( static_CurrentStep = 0sd16_21 ) & ( Ib_VlvDrnClosed &
Ib_VlvLiq2Closed ) ) ;
178 TRUE : static_bVlvLiq1_Open ;
179 esac ;
180 next ( static_bVlvLiq2_Open ) :=
181 case
182 ( loc = nw22) : ( ( static_CurrentStep = 0sd16_41 ) & ( Ib_VlvDrnClosed &
Ib_VlvLiq1Closed ) ) ;









G. APPENDIX: NUXMV PROPERTIES TO VERIFY
FB110:
1 −− Basic r e a c h a b i l i t y
2 SPEC AG AF ( TestVlv . loc = end)
3 SPEC AF ( TestVlv . loc = end)
4 SPEC AG ( TestVlv . loc = end −> AX ( TestVlv . loc = s t a r t ) )
5
6 −− Basic l iveness
7 SPEC EF ( TestVlv . loc = end & TestVlv . output_bOutError )
8 SPEC EF ( TestVlv . loc = end & TestVlv . static_bTON_TimeOut )
9 SPEC EF ( TestVlv . loc = end & TestVlv . output_ERROR_Valve_NoHomeFeedback )
10 SPEC EF ( TestVlv . loc = end & TestVlv . output_bOutCommandWork)
11 SPEC EF ( TestVlv . loc = end & TestVlv . output_bOutCommandHome)
12
13 −− Functionality
14 SPEC AG ( TestVlv . loc = end −> ! ( TestVlv . output_bOutCommandHome & TestVlv .
output_bOutCommandWork) )
15 SPEC AG ( ( TestVlv . loc = end & ! bInEstop & bInEnable & bInCommandWork & ! bInSimulate
& iInMode = 0sd16_1 & ! TestVlv . output_bOutError ) −> EF TestVlv .
output_bOutCommandWork)
16 SPEC AG ( ( TestVlv . loc = end & ! bInEstop & bInEnable & !bInCommandWork & ! bInSimulate
& iInMode = 0sd16_1 & ! TestVlv . output_bOutError ) −> EF TestVlv .
output_bOutCommandHome)
17 SPEC AG ( ( TestVlv . loc = end & bInCommandWork & iInMode = 0sd16_1 ) −> ! TestVlv .
output_bOutCommandHome)
18 SPEC AG ( ( TestVlv . loc = end & !bInCommandWork & iInMode = 0sd16_1 ) −> ! TestVlv .
output_bOutCommandWork)
19 SPEC AG ( TestVlv . loc = end & bInEstop −> ( ! TestVlv . output_bOutCommandHome & ! TestVlv
. output_bOutCommandWork) )
20
21 SPEC AG ( ( TestVlv . loc = end & TestVlv . output_bOutActiveHome & TestVlv .
timer_TON_TimeOut=0 & ! bInSimulate & ! TestVlv . stat ic_bReset ) −> AF( bInSignalHome )
)
22 SPEC AG ( ( TestVlv . loc = end & TestVlv . output_bOutActiveWork & TestVlv .
timer_TON_TimeOut=0 & ! bInSimulate & ! TestVlv . stat ic_bReset ) −> AF( bInSignalWork )
)
23 SPEC AG ( TestVlv . loc = end −> ! ( TestVlv . output_bOutActiveHome & TestVlv .
output_bOutActiveWork ) )
24 SPEC AG ( ( TestVlv . loc = end & TestVlv . output_bOutCommandWork & iInMode = 0sd16_1 ) −>
bInCommandWork)
25 SPEC AG ( ( TestVlv . loc = end & TestVlv . output_bOutCommandHome & iInMode = 0sd16_1 ) −>
!bInCommandWork)
FB330:
1 −− Basic r e a c h a b i l i t y
2 SPEC AG AF ( Test_FB330 . loc = end)
3 SPEC AF ( Test_FB330 . loc = end)
4 SPEC AG ( Test_FB330 . loc = end −> AX ( Test_FB330 . loc = s t a r t ) )
5
6 −− Basic l iveness
7 SPEC EF ( Test_FB330 . loc = end & Test_FB330 . output_bOutErrorExists )
8 SPEC EF ( Test_FB330 . loc = end & Test_FB330 . output_iOutScrollingErrorNumber = 0sd16_0
)
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9 SPEC EF ( Test_FB330 . loc = end & Test_FB330 . output_iOutScrollingErrorNumber = 0sd16_1
)
10 SPEC EF ( Test_FB330 . loc = end & Test_FB330 . output_iOutScrollingErrorNumber = 0sd16_2
)
11 SPEC EF ( Test_FB330 . loc = end & Test_FB330 . output_iOutScrollingErrorNumber = 0sd16_3
)
12 SPEC EF ( Test_FB330 . loc = end & Test_FB330 . output_iOutScrollingErrorNumber = 0sd16_4
)
13 SPEC EF ( Test_FB330 . loc = end & Test_FB330 . output_iOutScrollingErrorNumber = 0sd16_5
)
14 SPEC EF ( Test_FB330 . loc = end & ! Test_FB330 . bInError01 )
15
16 −− Functionality
17 SPEC EF ( Test_FB330 . loc = end & ! Test_FB330 . bInError01 & ! Test_FB330 . bInError02 & !
Test_FB330 . bInError03 & ! Test_FB330 . bInError04 & ! Test_FB330 . bInError05 )
18 SPEC AG AF ( ( Test_FB330 . loc = end & Test_FB330 . output_bOutErrorExists ) −> ( ! (
Test_FB330 . output_iOutScrollingErrorNumber = 0sd16_0 ) ) )
19 SPEC AG ( ( Test_FB330 . loc = end & ! Test_FB330 . output_bOutErrorExists ) −> ( Test_FB330 .
output_iOutScrollingErrorNumber = 0sd16_0 ) )
20 SPEC AG AF ( ( Test_FB330 . loc = end & Test_FB330 . bInError01 & ! Test_FB330 . bInError02 &
! Test_FB330 . bInError03 & ! Test_FB330 . bInError04 & ! Test_FB330 . bInError05 & ! (
Test_FB330 . output_iOutScrollingErrorNumber = 0sd16_0 ) ) −> ( Test_FB330 .
output_iOutScrollingErrorNumber = 0sd16_1 ) )
21 SPEC AG ( ( Test_FB330 . loc = end & ! Test_FB330 . bInError01 & ! Test_FB330 . bInError02 & !
Test_FB330 . bInError03 & ! Test_FB330 . bInError04 & ! Test_FB330 . bInError05 ) −> (
Test_FB330 . output_iOutScrollingErrorNumber = 0sd16_0 ) )
22
23
24 −− Test compositional Model Checking ( FB110 )
25 SPEC AG ( ( Test_FB330 . loc = end & Test_FB330 . bInError01 ) −> ( Test_FB330 .
output_bOutErrorExists ) )
26 SPEC AG ( ( Test_FB330 . loc = end & ( Test_FB330 . bInError03 | Test_FB330 . bInError04 ) ) −>
( Test_FB330 . output_bOutErrorExists ) )
FC329:
1 −− Basic r e a c h a b i l i t y
2 SPEC AG AF ( Test_FC329 . loc = end)
3 SPEC AF ( Test_FC329 . loc = end)
4 SPEC AG ( Test_FC329 . loc = end −> AX ( Test_FC329 . loc = s t a r t ) )
5
6 −− Basic l iveness
7 SPEC EF ( Test_FC329 . loc = end & Test_FC329 . output_bOutEnable )
8 SPEC EF ( Test_FC329 . loc = end & ! Test_FC329 . output_bOutEnable )
9 SPEC EF ( Test_FC329 . loc = end & ! Test_FC329 . inout_bInOutHMI )
10 SPEC EF ( Test_FC329 . loc = end & Test_FC329 . inout_bInOutPLC )
11 SPEC EF ( Test_FC329 . loc = end & ! Test_FC329 . inout_bInOutPLC )
12
13 −− Functionality
14 SPEC AG ( ( Test_FC329 . loc = end & bInEnable ) −> ( Test_FC329 . output_bOutEnable ) )
15 SPEC AG ( ( Test_FC329 . loc = end & bInEnable & bInToggle & Test_FC329 . inout_bInOutHMI
& ! Test_FC329 . inout_bInOutPLC ) −> Test_FC329 . inout_bInOutPLC )
16 SPEC AG ( ( Test_FC329 . loc = end & bInEnable & ! bInToggle & Test_FC329 . inout_bInOutHMI
) −> Test_FC329 . inout_bInOutPLC )
FC333:
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1 −− Basic r e a c h a b i l i t y
2 SPEC AG AF ( Test_FC333 . loc = end)
3 SPEC AF ( Test_FC333 . loc = end)
4 SPEC AG ( Test_FC333 . loc = end −> AX ( Test_FC333 . loc = s t a r t ) )
5
6 −− Basic l iveness
7 SPEC EF ( Test_FC333 . loc = end & ( Test_FC333 . output_iOutStatus = 0sd16_0 ) )
8 SPEC EF ( Test_FC333 . loc = end & ! ( Test_FC333 . output_iOutStatus = 0sd16_0 ) )
9
10 −− Functionality
11 SPEC AG ( ( Test_FC333 . loc = end & bInEstop ) −> ( Test_FC333 . output_iOutStatus =
Test_FC333 . global . HMI_Status_Estop ) )
12 SPEC AG ( ( Test_FC333 . loc = end & ! bInEstop & bInError ) −> ( Test_FC333 .
output_iOutStatus = Test_FC333 . global . HMI_Status_Error ) )
13
14 SPEC AG ( ( Test_FC333 . loc = end & ! bInEstop & ! bInError & bInSimulate &
bInForwardWork & ! bInOnForwardWork & ! bInOnReverseHome & ! bInReverseHome ) −> (
Test_FC333 . output_iOutStatus = Test_FC333 . global . HMI_Status_SimulatedForwardWork )
)
15 SPEC AG ( ( Test_FC333 . loc = end & ! bInEstop & ! bInError & ! bInSimulate &
bInForwardWork & ! bInOnForwardWork & ! bInOnReverseHome & ! bInReverseHome ) −> (
Test_FC333 . output_iOutStatus = Test_FC333 . global . HMI_Status_ForwardWork ) )
16
17 SPEC AG ( ( Test_FC333 . loc = end & ! bInEstop & ! bInError & bInSimulate &
bInOnForwardWork & ! bInForwardWork & ! bInOnReverseHome & ! bInReverseHome ) −> (
Test_FC333 . output_iOutStatus = Test_FC333 . global .
HMI_Status_SimulatedOnForwardWork ) )
18 SPEC AG ( ( Test_FC333 . loc = end & ! bInEstop & ! bInError & ! bInSimulate &
bInOnForwardWork & ! bInForwardWork & ! bInOnReverseHome & ! bInReverseHome ) −> (
Test_FC333 . output_iOutStatus = Test_FC333 . global . HMI_Status_OnForwardWork ) )
19
20 SPEC AG ( ( Test_FC333 . loc = end & ! bInEstop & ! bInError & bInSimulate &
bInReverseHome & ! bInOnReverseHome & ! bInForwardWork & ! bInOnForwardWork) −> (
Test_FC333 . output_iOutStatus = Test_FC333 . global . HMI_Status_SimulatedReverseHome )
)
21 SPEC AG ( ( Test_FC333 . loc = end & ! bInEstop & ! bInError & ! bInSimulate &
bInReverseHome & ! bInOnReverseHome & ! bInForwardWork & ! bInOnForwardWork) −> (
Test_FC333 . output_iOutStatus = Test_FC333 . global . HMI_Status_ReverseHome ) )
22
23 SPEC AG ( ( Test_FC333 . loc = end & ! bInEstop & ! bInError & bInSimulate &
bInOnReverseHome & ! bInReverseHome & ! bInForwardWork & ! bInOnForwardWork) −> (
Test_FC333 . output_iOutStatus = Test_FC333 . global .
HMI_Status_SimulatedOnReverseHome ) )
24 SPEC AG ( ( Test_FC333 . loc = end & ! bInEstop & ! bInError & ! bInSimulate &
bInOnReverseHome & ! bInReverseHome & ! bInForwardWork & ! bInOnForwardWork) −> (
Test_FC333 . output_iOutStatus = Test_FC333 . global . HMI_Status_OnReverseHome ) )
FB5:
1 −− Basic r e a c h a b i l i t y
2 SPEC AG AF ( Test_FB5 . loc = end)
3 SPEC AF ( Test_FB5 . loc = end)
4 SPEC AG ( Test_FB5 . loc = end −> AX ( Test_FB5 . loc = s t a r t ) )
5
6 −− Basic l iveness
7 SPEC EF ( Test_FB5 . loc = end & Test_FB5 . static_CurrentStep = 0sd16_0 )
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8 SPEC EF ( Test_FB5 . loc = end & Test_FB5 . static_CurrentStep = 0sd16_11 )
9 SPEC EF ( Test_FB5 . loc = end & Test_FB5 . static_CurrentStep = 0sd16_20 )
10 SPEC EF ( Test_FB5 . loc = end & Test_FB5 . static_CurrentStep = 0sd16_21 )
11 SPEC EF ( Test_FB5 . loc = end & Test_FB5 . static_CurrentStep = 0sd16_30 )
12 SPEC EF ( Test_FB5 . loc = end & Test_FB5 . static_CurrentStep = 0sd16_31 )
13 SPEC EF ( Test_FB5 . loc = end & Test_FB5 . static_CurrentStep = 0sd16_40 )
14 SPEC EF ( Test_FB5 . loc = end & Test_FB5 . static_CurrentStep = 0sd16_41 )
15 SPEC EF ( Test_FB5 . loc = end & Test_FB5 . static_CurrentStep = 0sd16_50 )
16 SPEC EF ( Test_FB5 . loc = end & Test_FB5 . static_CurrentStep = 0sd16_51 )
17 SPEC EF ( Test_FB5 . loc = end & Test_FB5 . static_CurrentStep = 0sd16_60 )
18 SPEC EF ( Test_FB5 . loc = end & Test_FB5 . static_bVlvDrn_Open )
19 SPEC EF ( Test_FB5 . loc = end & Test_FB5 . static_bVlvLiq1_Open )




24 SPEC AG ( ( Test_FB5 . loc = end) −> ( ! ( Test_FB5 . static_bVlvLiq1_Open & Test_FB5 .
static_bVlvLiq2_Open ) ) )
25 SPEC AG ( ( ( Test_FB5 . loc = end) & Test_FB5 . static_bVlvDrn_Open ) −> ( ! ( Test_FB5 .
static_bVlvLiq1_Open | Test_FB5 . static_bVlvLiq2_Open ) ) )
26 SPEC AG ( ( ( Test_FB5 . loc = end) & Test_FB5 . static_bVlvLiq1_Open ) −> ( ! ( Test_FB5 .
static_bVlvDrn_Open | Test_FB5 . static_bVlvLiq2_Open ) ) )
27 SPEC AG ( ( ( Test_FB5 . loc = end) & Test_FB5 . static_bVlvLiq2_Open ) −> ( ! ( Test_FB5 .
static_bVlvDrn_Open | Test_FB5 . static_bVlvLiq1_Open ) ) )
28 SPEC AG ( ( Test_FB5 . loc = end & Test_FB5 . static_bVlvDrn_Open ) −> ( Test_FB5 .
Ib_VlvLiq1Closed & Test_FB5 . Ib_VlvLiq2Closed ) )
29 SPEC AG ( ( Test_FB5 . loc = end & Test_FB5 . static_bVlvLiq1_Open ) −> ( Test_FB5 .
Ib_VlvDrnClosed & Test_FB5 . Ib_VlvLiq2Closed ) )
30 SPEC AG ( ( Test_FB5 . loc = end & Test_FB5 . static_bVlvLiq2_Open ) −> ( Test_FB5 .
Ib_VlvDrnClosed & Test_FB5 . Ib_VlvLiq1Closed ) )
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H. APPENDIX: COMPOSITIONAL NUXMV PROPERTIES TO VERIFY
FB110:
1 −− Test compositional Model Checking ( FB330 )
2 INVAR ( ( TestVlv . loc = end & TestVlv . output_ERROR_Valve_NoHomeFeedback ) −> ( TestVlv .
inout_HMI_ValveControl_bError ) )
3 SPEC AG ( ( TestVlv . loc = end & TestVlv . output_ERROR_Valve_NoHomeFeedback & TestVlv .
output_bOutAuto ) −> TestVlv . output_bOutError )
4
5 SPEC AG ( ( TestVlv . loc = end & TestVlv . output_ERROR_Valve_NoHomeFeedback & TestVlv .
output_bOutAuto ) −> AF ( ! TestVlv . output_bOutCommandHome & ! TestVlv .
output_bOutCommandWork) )
6
7 INVAR ( ( TestVlv . loc = end & ( TestVlv . output_ERROR_Valve_HomeFeedbackStillActive |
TestVlv . output_ERROR_Valve_WorkFeedbackStillActive ) ) −> TestVlv .
inout_HMI_ValveControl_bError )
8 SPEC AG( ( TestVlv . loc = end & TestVlv . output_bOutActiveHome & ! TestVlv .
output_bOutError & ! bInSimulate & ! TestVlv . stat ic_bReset & TestVlv .
timer_TON_TimeOut < 1) −> ( bInSignalHome & ! bInSignalWork ) )
9
10 −− Test compositional Model Checking ( FC329 )
11 INVAR ( ( TestVlv . loc = end & TestVlv . static_bManualMode ) −> ( TestVlv .
inout_HMI_ValveControl_bPBEN_Home ) )
12 SPEC AG ( ( TestVlv . loc = end & TestVlv . static_bManualMode & TestVlv . static_bPB_Home &
! TestVlv . static_bPB_Work & ! bInSimulate & ! TestVlv . output_bOutError & !
bInSignalHome ) −> TestVlv . output_bOutCommandHome)
13
14 −− Test compositional Model Checking ( FC333 )
15 INVAR ( TestVlv . loc=end & bInEstop ) −> ( TestVlv . inout_HMI_ValveControl_iStatus = 0
sd16_1 )
16 SPEC AG( ( TestVlv . loc = end & bInEstop ) −> ( TestVlv . inout_HMI_ValveControl_iStatus =
0sd16_1 ) )
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